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PREFACE 
 
In the course of the past few years Europe has had to face an 
unprecedented arrival of migrants and refugees. The EU 
political agenda, however, has been driven mostly by the 
priority will to combat irregular migration and protect border 
controls. The absence of refugees’ and transregional migration’s 
governance is the cornerstone of the Mediterranean “crisis” and, 
accordingly, response provided by current policies are 
confusing, at odds between the need to protect the human rights 
of refugees and migrants and security aspects. 
Migration flows to Europe in 2015 and 2016 have challenged 
the principal statements of the so-called ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors 
that usually drive EU policy. EU responses have failed because 
of the lack of a fair policy implementation that reflects flawed 
assumptions regarding the reasons why people move to Europe. 
Indeed, migration flows have a profound social and economic 
impact on hosting societies but too often local governments do 
not guarantee the respect of the rights they are supposed to 
protect. Therefore, re-focusing on the improvement of access to 
rights and to socioeconomic opportunities in countries hosting 
significantly larger numbers of refugees and migrants, becomes 
increasingly necessary. 
In order to provide a rights-oriented view of the situation, the 
Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence on Migrants Rights in the 
Mediterranean focused the “OPEN DOORS” Summer School on 
Migration, Sea Border Control and Human Rights of 21 June 
2017 on these issues. 
Essays included in this volume are excerpts from the lectures 
given, in particular, during the international final Conference. Its 
Proceedings have been collected in two volumes: the present 
publication and a subsequent one to be published in the coming; 
Publication realized with the contribution of Erasmus+ 
Programme of the European Union. 
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In order to build more inclusive societies, it is essential that 
the fundamental need to protect the rights of refugees and 
migrants be recognised. The essay by Elena Santiemma, 
Amnesty International Italy, gives a picture of the current 
violations of human rights as a consequence of EU policies, 
analyzing inter alia the risks connected to the widespread 
externalization of border controls.  
Following essays focus on contemporary issues of 
international law that are closely connected to the previous ones. 
In particular, the essay by Elspeth Guild, Queen Mary 
University of London and Radboud University Nijmegen 
Netherlands, analyses how the Schengen Member States have 
exploited the fear of terrorism (and consequently the quest for 
more security) to re-introduce intra-Schengen state border 
controls.  
With respect to migration by sea, Tullio Scovazzi, University 
of Milano-Bicocca, focuses his contribution on the rights arising 
from customary international law and treaties in force, showing 
how migrants at sea are too often the victims not only of 
smugglers, but also of States that try to evade their legal and 
moral duties to meet internal security needs.  
As to security issues, the essay by Marco Fantinato, Italian 
Guardia di Finanza, focuses on enforcement powers at sea and 
explains how the phenomenon of moving borders through 
military operations is progressively leading to the process of the 
externalization of border control management.  
Finally, Anna Liguori, University of Naples “L’Orientale” 
and co-editor of this collected volume, analyses a recent case of 
externalisation, i.e. the Memorandum of Understanding between 
Italy and Libya of 2 February 2017, and explores the basis for 
Italy’s responsibility for the violation of the fundamental rights 
of migrants as a consequence of the MoU.  
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both will be available in open access on the website 
(www.jmcemigrants.eu). 
The first essays of the volume analyse the push factors, 
routes and personal motivations of migration in the 
Mediterranean. Specifically, the contribution of Giovanni 
Gozzini, University of Siena, highlights two fundamental 
aspects: the evolution of the perception of international 
migrations throughout the twentieth century and the relationship 
between the increasing number of displaced peoples and 
refugees and current armed conflicts.  
In her contribution Maja Savic-Bojanic, of the Sarajevo 
School of Science and Technology, Department of Political 
Science and International Relations, assesses Balkan-bound 
migrants’ stories from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria through in-
depth interviews and focuses on the dynamics that determine 
recent migrants’ motivations to remain in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia or Serbia.  
The essay by Valeria Saggiomo, University of Naples 
“L’Orientale”, analyses the ‘diaspora’ processes, addressing 
three case-studies from Mali, Libya and Afghanistan, which 
present different characteristics but also common features.  
The essay by Sandra Paola Alvarez Tinajero, International 
Organization for Migration, explores the links between 
migration governance and development in the current global and 
European contexts. In particular, the author highlights the need 
to shift from a ‘crisis management’ approach to the need to form 
and develop more inclusive societies. 
In her second essay Valeria Saggiomo expands on the 
subjects dealt with in her first essay and analyses the theoretical 
nexus between migration and development within the scenario 
of Italian policy for international development and migration 
management. 
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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS: 
HISTORICAL FACTS AND WESTERN 
PERCEPTIONS 
Giovanni Gozzini* 
 
INDEX: 1. Introduction. – 2. The assimilation paradigm. – 3. The 
multicultural paradigm. – 4. The transnational paradigm. – 5. Human 
mobility and multiple identities. – 6. What the long-run data show. – 7. 
Refugees and new wars.   
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This article focuses on two main questions. The first concerns 
the way our perception of international migrations has been 
changing over the twentieth century. The second relates to the 
nature of contemporary armed conflicts and its connection with 
the increasing number of refugees and displaced peoples.  
 
2. The assimilation paradigm 
 
During the last hundred years, the Western mind on migrations 
was shaped by the succession of three scientific and practical 
paradigms: assimilationism, multiculturalism, transnationalism. 
The assimilationist paradigm was especially elaborated in the 
United States, even though it inspired the policies of several 
colonial empires, notably the French one. 
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It was the title of a theater drama that was performed for the 
first time in 1909 at Broadway, New York. The author was Israel 
Zwangwill, a Russian Jewish immigrant, who transplanted the 
classic and Shakespearean story of Romeo and Juliet into the 
context of Tsarist Russia. The father of one of the young lovers 
was an official of the Ochrana, the Tsarist secret police, and 
actively prosecuted the relatives of the other family until the 
forced exile to the United States. Afterwards, even the former 
family choose to migrate toward the United States and the lovers 
could meet again, but they have to face the reciprocal hatred of 
the two families. Eventually, this time the end was different and 
it was a typically American happy end. In the final scene of the 
drama, the young lovers are sitting down in Battery Park, at the 
extreme end of Manhattan in front of the Atlantic Ocean. They 
reciprocally tell themselves that the ancient conflicts were part of 
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On the face of the dime (the coin by ten cents of dollar) you 
can find the Latin motto which could be assumed as one of the 
basic foundations of assimilationism: e pluribus unum that means 
“from many one”. It conceives the American nation as the final 
destination of peoples who are requested to cancel their original 
identities in order to be “assimilated” and become the citizens of 
a totally new World, which coincides with the “Land of 
opportunities”. Needless to say, that such theoretical foundation 
corresponds to the imprinting of the American identity, as an 
equalitarian society which has overcome the aristocratic 
belongings of the Old European World. 
Famously, the most popular image concerning the paradigm of 
assimilation was the “melting pot”.  
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the two families. Eventually, this time the end was different and 
it was a typically American happy end. In the final scene of the 
drama, the young lovers are sitting down in Battery Park, at the 
extreme end of Manhattan in front of the Atlantic Ocean. They 
reciprocally tell themselves that the ancient conflicts were part of 
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One of the key testimonials of such process was Cassius Clay, 
the boxer who refused to serve the U.S. Army in Vietnam, was 
jailed, and then decided to change his name into Mohammad Alì, 
in order to appropriate his original African and Muslim identity.3 
Accordingly, one of the most distinguished scholars connected 
with this cultural and political movement was Charles Taylor and 
his concept of “politics of recognition”, that was considered the 
base of the multiculturalist paradigm.4 The “melting pot” was 
replaced by the “salad bowl”, whereby each component remains 
wholly divided from the others, without any mix. Aim of 
democracy is to recognize and safeguard the individual right to 
his/her cultural difference, avoiding to impose an official state 
religion, language, set of values. 
The way of multiculturalism was paved by an historical 
constant of the international movements of population, that is the 
                                            
3 G. de Groot, The 60s Unplugged: A Kaleidoscopic History of a Disorderly 
Decade, Pan MacMillan, London, 2008, p. 125; T. Hauser, Muhammad Alì: 
His Life and Times, Simond and Schuster, New York, 1991. 
4 C. M. Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1994. 
 4 
the Old World and they had the right and the duty to jointly 
conquer a new shared life in the New World at the condition of 
cancelling their past. Accordingly, the melting pot became the 
symbol of the assimilationist paradigm and, at the same time, the 
shared and grateful common life experience of millions of 
immigrants entering America.1 
 
3. The multicultural paradigm 
 
For a long time the United States Immigration Office did not 
register regular statistics of departing aliens because they were 
regarded as a discarded nonsense, conflicting against the 
happiness that was solemnly inscribed as a basic right in the 
Constitution of the United States. The assimilationist paradigm 
became the cultural foundation of the best experiment, ever 
attempted in the whole history of the mankind, concerning the 
integration of several subsequent waves of immigrants coming 
from the most remote corners of the world. Such was the story 
until 1968, when the student revolt of the baby boom generation 
broke the common consensus about many matters, assimilation 
not excluded.2 Different minorities living in the United States 
(natives, Afro-American, latinos) inaugurated a new and proud 
path toward the rediscovery of their ancient collective identities.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 M. M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, 
and National Origins, Oxford University Press, New York, 1964. For a more 
recent and critical view see P. Spickard, Almost All Aliens: Immigration, Race, 
and Colonialism in American History and Identity, Routledge, New York 
2007. 
2 T. Gitlin, Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage, Bantam, New York, 1987. 
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Like many others, even Arthur Schlesinger, one of the most 
authoritative American historians and former adviser of President 
John Kennedy (in the photograph at the top of slide 4 he is the 
second from left, among vice-President Lyndon Johnson and the 
Kennedys), was shocked by the events and wrote an instant-book 
whose significant title was “The Disuniting of America”.7 The 
main argument was that the multiculturalist paradigm had 
demonstrated to be efficient in reproducing distinct and separated 
ethno-cultural enclave, but even to be unable to build a common 
civic culture. Eventually, indifference had been replaced by 
violent hostility leaving no space to solidarity and compassion. 
Indeed, multiculturalism was a failure; a modern, democratic 
                                            
7 A. M. Schlesinger Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a 
Multicultural Society, Norton, New York, 1992. 
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settlement by clusters in receiving countries.5 Now and then the 
choice to migrate was originated by migration chains which are 
and were established between a first moving individual or group 
and the remainder of the «transplanted community» that over time 
was able to follow it. Little Italy and Chinatown are born in such 
a way and even today the largely prevailing tendency is to look 
for the protection (that sometimes implies illegal or criminal 
organization) of the network of compatriots who are already 
successfully living in the country of destination. 
What is commonly ignored by media is that multiculturalism 
was a short-lived paradigm. Its symbolic death can be dated back 
to 1992 and the riots which devastated Los Angeles. The killing 
of a Black man by the policemen was the starting point of a three-
days upheaval, whereby Black and Hispanic minorities attacked 
the shops and minimarkets owned by the Asian minority (at that 
time largely composed by South Korean immigrants) that, 
according to the data of 2000 population census, had an average 
income corresponding to 124 percent of the US gross domestic 
product per capita. By comparison, Black and Hispanic 
households had 80 and 60 percent, respectively.6  
 
 
                                            
5 For one of the first analyses, see C. Tilly, “Transplanted Networks”, in V. 
Yans-McLaughlin (ed.), Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and 
Politics, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, pp. 25-42. 
6 D. Schmidley, Profile of the Foreign-Born in the United States: 2000, US 
Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, 2001, available at: 
www.census.gov.  
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global and local conjunctures such as the 2008 Great Recession, 
and the ability to reach directly the needing situations, 
overcoming the institutional corruption and bribery often suffered 
by aid extended through the Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). Of course, the remittances are much better relief-oriented 
than the profit-oriented FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) led by 
multinational companies. Further, it is estimated some 40 percent 
of remittance flows that are not registered by the official channels, 
because they prefer informal long-distance transfer systems, such 
as individual travels or local phone centers. The problem is, 
however, the use of remittances. A working nexus between the 
increase of remittances and poverty reduction in developing 
countries is documented. From a development economics point 
of view, however, the multiplier effect of remittances is limited 
to the purchase of goods and services, especially medical and 
education. On average, only about one tenth of the remittances is 
used for small business investments, which increase the multiplier 
effect. In contrast, the largest share corresponds to conspicuous 
consumption, like for instance for marriages or purchase of 
houses.10 As it happens in many other variables concerning low 
income countries, the positive difference is often provided by 
women. For example, whenever women are the home recipients 
of the remittances, the use of remittances is more likely oriented 
towards the education of children. This attitude becomes 
particularly relevant for long-term human development as 
professional prospects of the next generation improve and 
                                            
10 R. H. Adams, J. Page, “Do International migration and remittances 
reduce poverty in developing countries?”, in World Development, 33, 2005, 
10, pp. 1645-69; I. Sirkeci, et al. (a cura di), Migration and Remittances during 
the Global Financial Crisis and Beyond, World Bank, Washington DC, 2012; 
R. P. C. Brown, E. Jimenez Soto, Migration and Remittances, in B. Chiswick-
P. W. Miller (eds.), Handbook of the Economics of International Migration, v. 
1B, North-Holland Elsevier, Amsterdam-New York, 2015, pp.1077-1140. 
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society needed a “light” constitutional patriotism, according to 
the concept coined by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, 
that fixed the rules of the citizens’ pacific coexistence and, in the 
meanwhile, avoided to have an official culture, lifestyle, 
religion.8 
 
4. The transnational paradigm 
 
What Schlesinger has to do with global migrations?  
A possible answer lies in two dynamics of the current situation. 
First, the remittances to developing countries have been 
constantly increasing over the last twenty years.9  
 
 
 
As compared to other financial flows, the remittances have two 
unequivocal advantages, that are a greater resilience against 
                                            
8 D. A. Hollinger, Postethnic America, Beyond Multiculturalism, Basic 
Books, New York, 1995. 
9 World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016, World Bank 
Group, Washington DC, 2016. 
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Significant minorities of immigrants choose to go back home 
after a period of stay, on average, no longer than five years. Even 
this is an historical constant; in the past, the Asian migration 
system of indentured laborers (5 years of work contract abroad, 
such as the Indian miners in South Africa) was working in the 
same way, with even higher, about 80 percent, of migrants.13  
                                            
13 A. McKeown, “Les migrations internationales à l’ère de la 
mondialisation industri elle 1840-1940”, in Mouvement Social, 2012, 241, p. 
38. 
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generate less dependency on remittances in the future. 
Remittances represent a further historical constant;  
 
 
one century ago, they corresponded to similar magnitude, 
meaning 2-3 percent of gross domestic product, in the case of 
Italy before World War 1, and mode of employment, such as land 
purchase.11 
The second dynamics relates to return migration, which is 
almost always obscured by media.12  
 
 
                                            
11 R. Esteves, D. Khoudour Casteras, “Remittances, capital flows and 
financial development during the mass migration period 1870-1913”, in 
European Review of Economic History, 15, 2011, 3, pp. 443-74; G. Massullo, 
“Economia delle rimesse”, in P. Bevilacqua, A. De Clementi, E. Franzina (ed.), 
Storia dell’emigrazione italiana. Partenze, Donzelli, Roma, 2001, pp.161-83; 
M. Hörner, “Immigration into Latin America, Especially Argentina and Chile”, 
in P. C. Emmer, M. Hörner (ed.), European Expansion and Migration. Essays 
on the Intercontinental Migration from Asia, Africa, and Europe, Berg, New 
York-Oxford, 1992, p. 238; M. Wyman, Round-Trip to America. The 
Immigrants return to Europe 1880-1930, Cornell University Press, Ithaca-
London, 1993, pp. 60-1. 
12 Sopemi (Système d’observation permanente des migrations), 
International Migration Outlook 2008, OECD, Paris, 2008,  pp.171 and 214. 
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destination country, as the multiculturalist paradigm maintained. 
The historical and current migrants are moving people, virtually 
by remittances as well as physically by their home journeys. Here 
is the third paradigm, the transnational one, and the answer to the 
question about Schlesinger.14 One of the most important scientific 
reviews concerning migrations is the Franco-Canadian Journal 
Diasporas».15  
 
 
 
The key concepts its articles elaborate are extracted from the 
very peculiar historical experience of the Jewish people (such as 
                                            
14 D. Hoerder, Cultures in Contact. World Migrations in the Second 
Millennium, Duke University Press, Durham-London, 2002. 
15 D. Schnapper, “De l’État-nation au monde transnational. Du sens et de 
l’utilité du concept de diaspora”, in Revue Européenne de Migrations 
Internationales, 17, 2001, 2, pp. 9-36. 
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The reasons of return could and can be quite opposite, deriving 
from the success or failure in the receiving country. Still, what is 
important is the symptom of an enduring transnational identity of 
the migrants. They neither cancel their original roots, as the 
assimilationist paradigm imagined, nor make them revive in the 
13
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ignoring agriculture; they predated the natural resources, flora 
and fauna, of a micro-local environment and then they moved. 
Migration was the foundational experience of the mankind. 
The essays published on Diasporas do not refer to the 
theoretical (and, in some measure, abstract) construction of a 
global civil society without borders. Rather, they investigate 
human networks whereby the migrants can activate flows of 
information and resources. Within the constraints of push and pull 
factors, such as the escape from depriving situations or life 
emergencies as well as the attraction toward more prosperous 
situations, the migrants try to improve their lives according to 
rational strategies of survival and improvement. Their identities 
are continuously changing, according to their movement across 
nations and cultures. A significant case study is embodied by 
Turkish women, who migrated to Germany during the 1990s, and 
then repatriated to their homeland, in the rural villages of the 
inland Turkey. They do not repudiate their Muslim identity, but 
they very often generate cultural conflicts within their original 
communities because they acquired some characters of German 
culture they do not want to renounce, namely about the women’s 
power in the household and their role in public life.18 
Social sciences are not accustomed to work according to the 
transnational paradigm and their operative framework remains 
statically national. A case in point is the last study by Samuel 
Huntington, that depicts the “Reconquista” of the United States 
by the Mexicans via immigration.19  
 
 
                                            
18 L. H. Day, A. Icduygu, “The Consequences of International Migration 
for the Status of Women: A Turkish Study”, in International Migration, 35, 
1997, 3, pp. 337-61. 
19 S. P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National 
Identity, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2005 (Italian translation, Milan 
2005). 
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a double identity and loyalty to Sion and other national 
belongings) in order to make them universal interpretative 
categories of the migration choice. The hyphenated term 
“dissemi-nation”, for instance, means the coexistence within the 
same person of multiple identities referring to different 
homelands, such as the original sending country and the receiving 
country where he or she is spending a part of his/her life.  
 
5. Human mobility and multiple identities 
 
According to the assimilation paradigm, human nature can be 
host only for one identity and belonging. But recent historical 
research is finding that mobility, even international mobility, was 
a common feature of everyday life in early modern Europe.16 
Seasonal laborers moving between countryside and cities, sailors, 
soldiers, merchants corresponded to significant minorities of pre-
industrial European societies, up to one third of the whole 
population, experiencing circular cross-border movements. Such 
experience was also common at the dawn of mankind. Over the 
last thirty years historical genetics elaborated a well-established 
hypothesis, which maintains that the human species evolved to its 
modern form in East Africa some 150,000 years ago, and 
thereafter embarked on populating the entire globe in a stepwise 
migration process beginning about 90,000 B.C.17 Using 
archeological data combined with mitochondrial and Y-
chromosomal DNA analysis, geneticists are able to offer evidence 
that every human being has only one common ancestor and the 
same root of DNA was moving over millennia all over the Earth. 
The first human groups were composed by hunters and gatherers 
                                            
16 J. Lucassen, “From mobility transition to comparative global migration 
history”, in Journal of Global History, 6, 2011, 4, pp. 299-307. 
17 L. L. Cavalli Sforza, P. Menozzi, A. Piazza, History and Geography of 
Human Genes, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1994. 
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6. What the long-run data show 
 
Over the last century the percentage of foreign born population 
(according to the official definition of the United Nations, 
everyone who lives in a country different from the country where 
she/he is born) has been constant, close to 3 percent.  
 
 
 
The 1990s increase (roughly 27 million), in fact, was wholly 
related to the administrative dissolution of the Soviet Union; 
especially Russians in Ukraine or Georgia were abruptly 
considered immigrants even though they never moved. The stable 
percentage of migrants is particularly significant if considering 
the current global inequality and higher people density.  
 
 16 
 
 
A real situation (the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant component 
is currently reduced to a mere 10 percent of the whole US 
population) which could be alarming if viewed with the lens of 
the assimilationist paradigm, is actually reversed by the dynamic 
changes occurring in the immigrant communities. In fact, second 
and third generation immigrants increasingly interact with the 
receiving society and deeply modify basic features of their 
identity. They speak English as first language and consistent 
minorities of them marry partners belonging to different 
communities.20 But these data are largely unknown. Huntington 
embodies the educated side of the xenophobic movements which 
gain consensus all over the world exploiting the ancestral fear of 
the barbarians. Thus, it is important to remember that we are not 
facing an invasion.  
 
 
                                            
20 R. D. Alba, V. Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation 
and Contemporary Immigration, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 
2003. 
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Today, the largest attractors of immigrants (US and Germany) 
have low and stable unemployment rates, as compared to other 
advanced economies. The main reason is the dual structure of the 
labour market; accordingly, the immigrants are employed in 
secondary occupations, which are commonly renamed as “3D” 
(Dirty, Dangerous, Demanding) and are not particularly requested 
by native population (notably, domestic service to aged people, 
undocumented jobs in construction industry, retail, and 
restoration).22 It ought to be added a demographic factor such as 
the sharp fall of fertility rates in a large majority of European 
countries, which implies a decline in working age population and 
a subsequent rise of the dependency ratio, i.e., the increasing 
share of unproductive population at the expenses of national 
welfare systems. At least temporarily immigration is able to 
provide a valid counterbalance because over time immigrants 
                                            
22 For an early exhibit of the situation see Sopemi, Trends in International 
Migration. Annual Report 2002, OECD, Paris 2002, chart I.14. For an update 
see S. Castles, “Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection?”, in International 
Migration Review, 40, 2006, 4, pp. 741-66. 
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In 1970, the world population was almost one fifth of the 
current one and the greater gross domestic product per capita 
differential (between United Kingdom and regional average of 
Africa) was 7:1 while in 1998 (between United States and Africa) 
was 20:1.21 Further, an increasing share of migrants is moving 
along South-South directions, especially from South-East Asia to 
Persian Gulf, and the corridor South-North recently lost the 
position of relative majority.  
                                            
21 A. Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, Oecd, 
Paris, 2001, tab. B-10 p. 241, tab. B-21 p. 264. 
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tend to imitate native population’s behaviour, even in the 
reproductive domain. 
From each of those points of view, high income countries have 
not to face an invasion or a “Reconquista”. Rather, a well-
regulated immigration could represent a driver of economic 
progress for both sending and receiving countries. 
Two are the main historical differences with the great 
migration at the end of the nineteenth century. First, an increasing 
presence of women, who cover today half of the international 
flows of population.23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
23 K. M. Donato, D. Gabaccia, Gender and International Migration: From 
the Slavery Era to the Global Age, Russell Sage, New York, 2016. 
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7. Refugees and new wars 
 
Unfortunately, there is a section of migrant population that is 
much more vulnerable and prone to the criminals’ violence: the 
refugees.  
 
 
 
 
 
Their number peaked at the end of the Cold War, declined 
thereafter, and peaked again during the civil wars (Syria, Libya) 
Fonti:	UNHCR,	Population Statistics,	http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series	 	per	i	dati	
sui	rifugiati,	 che	non	coincidono	con	quelli	di	UNDESA e	sono	più	dettagliati;	Uppsala	
Conflict Data	Program,	Peace Research Institute Oslo,	Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-
2016,	http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-4-2016.xlsx	 per	le	guerre	
in	atto	ogni	anno.	
 22 
Migrant women are the result of contrasting processes, such as 
women emancipation in some countries like Turkey, Peru, 
Philippines and trafficking in human beings in other ones 
(Nigeria). In fact, the second difference with the past concerns the 
active role played by criminal organizations, which exploit the 
illegal immigration.  
 
 
 
Their business is increasing, even though it remains minimal 
as compared to the drugs traffic. Admittedly, criminal 
organizations are the worst enemy for both immigrants and 
receiving countries; they are responsible for thousands of deaths 
and constrain immigrant inflows within an illegal mood which 
provokes the overreaction by native populations. The elimination 
of criminal organizations could make the global migration much 
more manageable and useful for all. 
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2016,	http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-4-2016.xlsx	 per	le	guerre	
in	atto	ogni	anno.	
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 All the basic features of the “new wars” are tightly connected 
with the creation of refugees. First, the collapse of the central state 
means the end of both monopoly of violence and protection of 
civilians by the rule of law. Second, the privatization of violence 
implies the proliferation of paramilitary bands whose main 
occupation is to extract the resources to survive such as food, 
heating, shelter, from the civilian population; in the Balkans they 
were numbered in more than eighty. Hence, third, the terror on 
the civilians and the subsequent escape of refugees are the main 
aspect of the new wars. Fourth, just because the criminal bands 
can survive only exploiting the civilians, they are not at all 
interested to be involved in pacification processes that could 
throw light into their crimes. On the contrary, they are only aimed 
at controlling a restricted portion of territory, terrorizing and 
draining resources from the local population. Fifth, as a 
consequence, armed conflicts tend to transform into endemic and 
“low intensity” (according to the international conventions, with 
less than one thousand of yearly victims) wars. The current 
typology of armed conflicts overwhelmingly corresponds to 
internal, civil, “new wars”.  
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which arose from the failure of the so-called “Arab Springs”. The 
United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees early 
adopted a policy aimed at containing the refugees within the 
boundaries of their nation (IDP, Internally Displaced Persons) but 
recently the percentage of refugees over the whole migrant 
population is again rising. It cannot be considered a transitory 
condition; in fact, the armed conflicts’ typology has been 
changing in the last decades.24 The 1992 Balkans War, which was 
the actual conflict observed by Mary Kaldor, cannot be 
considered the first “new war” of the history because many post-
colonial civil wars, such as Biafra or East Timor. had the same 
characters. But it was fought in the core of the Old World and 
apparently portrayed the changing nature of the armed conflict, 
by comparison with traditional wars such as Vietnam War. 
 
 
 
                                            
24 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 1999 (Italian translation, Rome 1999). 
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My last final point concerns the European Union.  
 
 
 
The program of resettlement of the asylum seekers is founded 
upon a shared management of the immigrant flows by the 
proactive collaboration of the member states. Famously, it was 
contrasted by some eastern countries, by totally false arguments. 
Hungary, for example, over the last 15 years has regularly 
accepted a yearly average of 20-25 thousands of immigrants; but 
it refused the resettlement of 1,300 refugees landed in Greece and 
Italy. Hungary does not deserve to be part of Europe. 
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The almost unavoidable result is an increasing global flow of 
refugees, who cannot hope in a prompt return to the homeland 
and have a coerced propensity to overlap with the economic 
migrants. In fact, it is unbearable for everyone to spend years in a 
refugee camp, without education for the children, without any 
prospect of a regular job; summing up, without any future. At that 
moment, the opportunity provided by criminal organization can 
be seemingly better than the present, even though the refugees are 
conscious of the dangers it involves. The list of the contemporary 
armed conflicts strictly resumes the typology of the refugees-
producing new wars. 
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1. Summary 
 
This descriptive qualitative study examines the stories of Balkan-
bound migrants from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. In particular, it 
focuses on the location choices and analyzes the factors that 
determine recent migrants’ motivations to remain in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia or Serbia. Using in-depth interviews to learn 
about the determinants of their location choices and the motivations 
that bind them to these three countries, much is learned about these 
individuals that now live and work in cities and towns across the 
former Balkan Route. The life histories used as empirical cases for 
this research present just a portion within a wide range of 
experiences, but I have used them to argue that, contrary to 
immigrant population trend of geographically concentrating, recent 
middle-Eastern migrants in their late teens to early thirties choose to 
divert from the main transition route and remain in the countries of 
                                                
* Sarajevo School of Science and Technology Department of Political Science 
and International Relations. 
 29 
MIGRATION AT THE OTHER SIDE OF THE 
MEDITERRANEAN: LOCATION CHOICES OF 
BALKAN-BOUND MIGRANTS 
Maja Savic-Bojanic* 
 
INDEX: 1. Summary. – 2. Introduction. – 3. How Familiar Ties Influence the 
Location Choices? “Network Externalities”, Solidarity and Urbanity as 
Determinants of Settlement Choices among Young Migrants from the Middle 
East. – 4. Religious Similaritiy as a Determinant of Location Choices: New 
Push Factors for Young Migrants? – 5. Conclusion. – 6. Bibliography. 
 
 
1. Summary 
 
This descriptive qualitative study examines the stories of Balkan-
bound migrants from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. In particular, it 
focuses on the location choices and analyzes the factors that 
determine recent migrants’ motivations to remain in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia or Serbia. Using in-depth interviews to learn 
about the determinants of their location choices and the motivations 
that bind them to these three countries, much is learned about these 
individuals that now live and work in cities and towns across the 
former Balkan Route. The life histories used as empirical cases for 
this research present just a portion within a wide range of 
experiences, but I have used them to argue that, contrary to 
immigrant population trend of geographically concentrating, recent 
middle-Eastern migrants in their late teens to early thirties choose to 
divert from the main transition route and remain in the countries of 
                                                
* Sarajevo School of Science and Technology Department of Political Science 
and International Relations. 
30
 31 
registered at Preševo Centre in Serbia and although these Western 
Balkan states are considered to be “bridge countries” and not 
destination countries (such as Austria or Germany), during my 
ethnographic field research in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, I encountered a considerable number of young 
migrants – those in their late teens and into their early thirties - who 
stated that they wanted to remain in their current Balkan host. Quite 
clearly, different factors have influenced their location choices. 
Scores of articles that have been published up until today in the fields 
ranging from anthropology and sociology, to economics and 
migration studies explore the determinants of location choices in 
detail (Zavodny, 1997; Zavodny, 1999; Owusu, 1999; Borjas, 2001; 
Malheiros, 2002; Arbaci, 2004; Åslund, 2005; Bauer et al., 2002, 
2005). One question that arises from the available literature and that 
connects to this research is what are the predominant push factors for 
young migrants coming from the Middle East that bind them to the 
Balkans, an unpopular destination in the last European refugee crisis.  
In his research on residential patterns in North European and 
Mediterranean metropolis centres, Malheiros (2002) concludes that 
spatial distribution in the cities of the European South differs from 
that in the North due to different migration processes and 
significantly dissimilar socio-urban contexts. Arbaci (2004) explains 
this latter phenomenon by bringing into context the social factors 
which determine the differences in spatial locations of migrants 
finding refuge in the North or South of Europe. Yet, reflecting the 
direction of this work which deals with recent young migrants from 
the Middle East in the Balkans and the determinants of their location 
choices, previous works which discuss economic and social factors 
show that it is not the economic benefits that represent the main push 
force; rather the presence of one’s own ethnic community in the host 
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the Balkans. Divergent to typical location choices of the majority of 
immigrants who left their homes in the wake of the immigration crisis 
and whose primary destination was the European Union (EU), the 
patterns that emerge among these young cohorts of middle-Eastern 
migrants are characterized by absence of their own families, but close 
familiar ties in the countries of the Balkans – such as presence of 
relatives and friends. Alternatively, a second finding demonstrates a 
high interest in religious similarities with the population of the host 
states, a factor that demonstrates easier transition and integration 
process. These push factors are the main motivators for Balkan-
bound migrants from the middle-East. They help in contextualizing 
the recent immigration challenges faced by migrants in the 
Mediterranean area passing along the Balkan Route.  
 
2. Introduction 
 
In 2015, Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
assessed that around 764.000 migrants, mainly from Syria, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, sought to enter the European Union via the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia and 
Croatia and onto Hungary or further into other union states. This 
number presented a 16-fold rise from 2014, although this route, 
commonly termed the “Balkan Route” served as a popular 
passageway from 2012, when visa requirements for Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and FYROM became less 
stringent. But, in the period from 2014 until 2016, the Balkan Route 
represented one of the rare channels for re-entry into the EU – once 
that migrants left Greece, their pathway continued through FYROM, 
Serbia and Croatia. According to the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), some 600.000 migrants were 
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Mediterranean metropolis centres, Malheiros (2002) concludes that 
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that in the North due to different migration processes and 
significantly dissimilar socio-urban contexts. Arbaci (2004) explains 
this latter phenomenon by bringing into context the social factors 
which determine the differences in spatial locations of migrants 
finding refuge in the North or South of Europe. Yet, reflecting the 
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the Middle East in the Balkans and the determinants of their location 
choices, previous works which discuss economic and social factors 
show that it is not the economic benefits that represent the main push 
force; rather the presence of one’s own ethnic community in the host 
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flow crisis in Europe to the extent that they provide the basis for 
testing rather the same conclusions hold true for young cohorts of 
migrants who escape home due to wars, lack of religious freedom or 
political motivations. On the one hand, these everyday challenges of 
a refugee and a foreigner in a distant land, deepen socio-economic 
burdens of integration with the hosts, assert belonging to a larger 
ethnic community and determine the choice of location. On the other 
hand, however, the motivations for staying in a given place are 
created and re-created throughout the journey and influence the paths 
that young migrants choose not to ignore on their way for a better 
life. Understood in such a broad sense, the social, personal and 
religious ties amongst young migrants from the Middle East 
altogether, determine the location choices that influence their 
decisions to remain in the Balkans.  
In what follows, I examine whether the above conclusions hold 
entirely true for the young migrant population who arrived to the 
Balkans in the recent immigration flow from Arab countries. Thus, 
the purpose of this work is to push forward the discussion of 
determinants of location choices of migrants by examining the 
specificities of several social factors that influenced the settlement of 
Middle-Eastern young migrants in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia 
and Serbia.2 In the wake of recent European migrant crisis, a need to 
discuss beyond different policy responses across the impacted states 
along the Balkan Route is especially relevant in the context of young 
migrants who left their home without families in hope to escape war, 
but also join friends and relatives who have inhabited these Balkan 
states prior to 2012. The young cohort of migrants that this study 
                                                
2 These three countries were chosen because the largest number of young 
migrants that I talked to choose to remain there, mainly in capital cities or other 
large urban areas.  
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state determines the choice of location for many migrants 
(O’Loughlin, 1995; Clark 1996). Borjas (2001) and Zavodny (1999) 
go on further to explain this phenomenon by differentiating between 
location patterns that are observable among immigrants who arrive 
to the host country without initially joining their own ethnic 
community. Zavodny (1999) describes the making of new 
communities by arguing that “immigrants ... are likely to be attracted 
to states with large total populations and large foreign born 
populations” (1999, p. 1019). She also raises questions about the 
effect of the “location of other foreign-born persons”1 (Ibid, p. 1019) 
which is deemed a significant push factor in determining the location 
of newly arriving immigrants. Alternatively, in his work on migrants 
residing outside of ethnically concentrated communities, Owusu 
(1999) raises similar questions of personal and cultural preferences, 
spatial proximity to other ethnic groups and social identity. These 
ties, according to Bauer et al. (2002, 2005), are also revealed by the 
fact that immigrant clustering is characterized by “network 
externalities” which “arise when previous immigrants provide shelter 
and work, assistance in obtaining credit, and/or generally reduce the 
stress of relocation to a foreign culture. Network externalities imply’ 
I will go to where my people are, since it will help me.’” (2002, p. 2). 
Hence, migrants joining their ethnic communities abroad hope to 
benefit in the transition process once they arrive to a particular 
foreign location. 
These bodies of research on migrants add to the recent debates of 
location choices of recent migrants in the wake of the immigration 
                                                
1 “Other foreign-born” persons refer to groups that do not belong to the same 
ethnic or national category as the newly arrived migrant, but similarities in socio-
economic conditions between two different migrant communities, largely 
influence the determination of location choices. 
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2 These three countries were chosen because the largest number of young 
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from May 2015 until January 2017. A portion of what I present 
henceforth is data gathered during in-depth interviews with twenty 
young migrants in Subotica (Serbia), Belgrade (Serbia), Zagreb 
(Croatia) and Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina). The more general 
conclusions are drawn from the combination of qualitative field 
research and a wider literature review on determinants of location 
choices among migrants. At this point, I also feel the need to briefly 
comment on the epistemology and bias as researcher. To investigate 
young migrants in the context of location choices and reasons for 
opting to stay along the Balkan Route in the wake of a major 
migration crisis in Europe, I have not only consulted written works, 
but also undertook fieldwork. These involved two trips of different 
length (between two and three days) to Belgrade and Subotica and 
Zagreb. Other interviews took place in Sarajevo. I conducted all 
interviews myself in English or French. I am aware of my biases as I 
have spent the entire time working with young migrants who have 
purposefully chosen to remain in these cities, thus forming networks 
within urban settings. I have discriminated the participants on the 
basis of the time during which they have arrived to these former 
Yugoslav states (spring 2015 - winter 2016/2017), the push factors 
they cited for influencing their location choices and the relationships 
they have previously had in these countries. While I do know the 
national and ethnic background of my participants, I did not consider 
nationality and ethnicity as variables which might relate to their 
choice of settlement. I did, however, consider religion as an 
important pattern which emerged during our numerous 
conversations. Lastly, I wish to state that this work should not be 
taken as an archetype of young migrants’ experience in the Balkans, 
but rather that various life histories – a particular form of in-depth 
interview that focuses on individual agency – have been used to 
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examines is, in essence, drastically different from migrants with 
families and children who moved along the Balkan Route in what 
concerns their location choices – that is a place they choose to settle 
in. The former, I have found, emerges out of three different factors, 
all of which stem from the social identity environment in their 
homeland: the importance of a close circle of family and/or friends, 
urbanity and religious freedom in identity formation. The 
background against which I observe these push factors and their 
levels of influence on location choices concerns the time and space 
(context) variables or better the period in which these young migrants 
arrived to the countries of former Yugoslavia and previous links they 
had with these locations.  
Hence, this work will focus on these three factors which have had 
an impact on the lives of current young migrants living in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia or Serbia in their struggle to socially (re) 
integrate and practice their religious habits. More importantly, this 
study divulges which of these factors contribute the most to 
individual choices of settling along the Balkan Route. While aware 
that these questions are not limited only to this group of migrants, I 
opt to look at, on the one hand, at young migrants who choose the 
locality based on the “network externalities” that Bauer et al. 
describe, and on the other, those who perceive religious similarity 
with the host state as the most important push factor and put second 
the presence of families and friends. Both groups of young migrants 
have exerted different types of efforts in order to “belong” to their 
host society, which is especially relevant among participants who 
have started their families in the meantime.  
The present study draws from an ethnographic study of young 
migrants who have settled in former Yugoslav countries along the 
Balkan Route and close by it (Bosnia and Herzegovina) conducted 
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These opinions show the general spirit among young Syrian 
refugees, apart from the location they chose to settle in, which, they 
state “was never on the list of friends they have spoken to”. Although, 
the majority of their compatriots that moved along with them 
continued on to Germany or Austria, they never had any doubts about 
their chosen location: “We were offered help in terms of housing and 
food. We had friends who helped us situate and make a much easier 
transition. There are many Syrians in Serbia who studied there 
during Tito’s times, so we have our diaspora there” notes a twenty-
four year old Karim (a pseudonym). Karim and the other two Syrians 
that I encountered in Belgrade, Salem and Wadud (pseudonyms) 
were also close friends or relatives of Samad (a pseudonym), the 
doctor who worked in Belgrade for the past 30 years. All four of them 
have moved on to finding jobs in local cafés and have started to learn 
Serbian language. The prospects of living in a new country are now 
much more attractive to them than returning to the damaged homes 
and “embracing life without future” as they say, in Holmes where 
they all come from.  
Despite the fact that for many young migrants that I met during 
my research, former Yugoslav countries did not seem initially 
attractive, all of the twenty interviewees who arrived to Sarajevo, 
Zagreb, Belgrade and Subotica now choose to remain. Their stories 
expose the importance of network externalities (Bauer, 2002), which, 
all of them say, have resulted in a decision to stay. Today, more than 
a year after, they are managing well on their own and some are even 
starting their own families as they find other Arab-speaking nationals 
around them and mix into marriages or close friendships. 
Consequently, what matters are “ties of kinship, friendship, and 
village, link migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in the 
home and host country. In an uncertain environment, migration 
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highlight a plethora of realities which determine migrants’ location 
choices when settling in a particular place.  
 
3. How Familiar Ties Influence the Location Choices? “Network 
Externalities”, Solidarity and Urbanity as Determinants of 
Settlement Choices among Young Migrants from the Middle 
East  
 
Qasim (a pseudonym), a 19 year old former medical student from 
Holmes arrived to Belgrade in summer of 2015. He first crossed the 
border between Syria and Turkey, where his mother’s older sister 
lived since the late 1980s and then continued along the well known 
route to reach first Greece and then northwards into Macedonia. He 
moved alone, a story hardly typical of Syrian refugees, where 
youngsters usually try to escape with their parents.  
 
I had my route planned – Turkey first, to reach my aunt 
Rana. I thought that even if I do not make it, if it becomes hard, 
I can always return back to her. Many families don’t have 
anybody in Turkey, but I am lucky that I do. The next stop for 
me was Serbia. I knew there were camps there, but I 
communicated with a close relative who settled in Belgrade in 
the 1980s, when Yugoslavia still existed. He is a doctor there 
now, so he promised to take me in with his family, so I thought 
it would be much easier to, at least, go back to school. I am a 
medical student, so a friend with a medical background would 
have helped with my schooling since I want to continue my 
education in that direction  
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apartment that they pay for me. I now attend Bosnian language 
classes with his wife and attend a local mosque where I also 
meet other Syrians who are married to Bosnian women. I have 
also managed to find a job - he says adding that - my people 
have helped me in every aspect of my new life in Bosnia.  
 
The overwhelming feeling of transitioning to a drastically 
different culture experienced by these individuals mirrors Bauer’s 
(2002) explanation of beneficial network externalities3, which 
explain for immigrant clustering.  
Sumaya (a pseudonym) is a twenty-year old NGO volunteer and a 
future culinary student currently living in Zagreb. Her experience as 
an orphan from Iraq, however, challenges the concept of the 
importance of network externalities:  
 
When I arrived to Zagreb I accidently met an older lady 
from Senegal. She was a cook, we started speaking, she brought 
food for many of us…This is how I learned about ‘Okus 
Doma’4, a project which helps asylum seekers from across the 
world adopt to their new life in Croatia. It gave me a chance to 
share the tastes of my home, to remember them for myself, to 
tell others about life back home, how it was…but also, it helps 
me connect to other people with similar stories and to locals 
who come and talk to us, from whom we learn and with whom 
we work. It helps me feel more ‘at home’  
 
                                                
3 These externalities arise when previous immigrants provide shelter and work, 
assistance in obtaining credit, and/or generally reduce the stress of relocation to a 
foreign culture (Bauer, 2002, p. 2).  
4 Eng. – “The Taste of Home”.  
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networks … decrease uncertainty …” (Ibid, p. 5). This reflection of 
low insecurity, dependent solely on migrant’s external networks with 
his/her ethnic group is captured by Saadia (a pseudonym), a twenty-
two year old student of chemistry from Kabul.  
 
I really care about settling in a place where I can speak my 
own language and where I know somebody. I do not care too 
much about whether that would be a co-national, but being 
able to hear my language, speak it, have somebody to share my 
fears and my hopes, having somebody to help me out, is more 
important to me. It eliminates the doubts of uncertainty that we 
have as we cross the long road to a better world. 
 
Another interesting aspect that emerged from the interview data 
was a shared perception that the presence of co-nationals and not 
other foreign-born migrants was more important for young 
individuals who settled along the Balkan Route.  
 
This country [Bosnia] is not a typical migration choice. 
Economy is poor; life is not the greatest, but I came here 
because back home I had several friends who married Bosnian 
women. When the war started most of them traveled to Bosnia, 
so it was easier for me to go to a place where I had my fellow 
countrymen. There is a significant Syrian diaspora in Sarajevo 
now, so life is much easier 
 
says Farooq, an eighteen year old baker from Damascus.  
 
When I arrived to Sarajevo, I immediately had a roof over 
my head. My friend and his wife found a place for me in an 
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apartment that they pay for me. I now attend Bosnian language 
classes with his wife and attend a local mosque where I also 
meet other Syrians who are married to Bosnian women. I have 
also managed to find a job - he says adding that - my people 
have helped me in every aspect of my new life in Bosnia.  
 
The overwhelming feeling of transitioning to a drastically 
different culture experienced by these individuals mirrors Bauer’s 
(2002) explanation of beneficial network externalities3, which 
explain for immigrant clustering.  
Sumaya (a pseudonym) is a twenty-year old NGO volunteer and a 
future culinary student currently living in Zagreb. Her experience as 
an orphan from Iraq, however, challenges the concept of the 
importance of network externalities:  
 
When I arrived to Zagreb I accidently met an older lady 
from Senegal. She was a cook, we started speaking, she brought 
food for many of us…This is how I learned about ‘Okus 
Doma’4, a project which helps asylum seekers from across the 
world adopt to their new life in Croatia. It gave me a chance to 
share the tastes of my home, to remember them for myself, to 
tell others about life back home, how it was…but also, it helps 
me connect to other people with similar stories and to locals 
who come and talk to us, from whom we learn and with whom 
we work. It helps me feel more ‘at home’  
 
                                                
3 These externalities arise when previous immigrants provide shelter and work, 
assistance in obtaining credit, and/or generally reduce the stress of relocation to a 
foreign culture (Bauer, 2002, p. 2).  
4 Eng. – “The Taste of Home”.  
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not live in a small town, let alone village, although I do know 
my co-nationals who are doing well in smaller places. 
However, most of them are in Austria, Sweden, Denmark … I 
think those countries are much better organized when it comes 
to immigrants and what is available to them than Serbia. So, as 
long as I am here I will remain in a city. It’s much easier  
 
says Basri (a pseudonym), a single twenty-nine year old from Iraq. 
For Basri, a decision to settle along the Balkan Route was a “natural 
inclination”, since in Belgrade he joined a group of medical 
volunteers who helped during the largest surge of immigrants, many 
of whom lived in parks or bus stations. He offered invaluable medical 
help, connected to locals and learned about the opportunities he 
would get in Belgrade.  
 
Thanks to my education and some practice I had back in 
Baghdad, I was able to help many refugees who, by the time 
they reached Belgrade, were barely alive and still had a long 
way to go. Many were severely ill, so together with local and 
foreign volunteers I traveled across Vojvodina and close to 
Hungarian border to help out. This is how I learned about 
Serbia, about the life and opportunities in villages and small 
towns, and realized I wanted to remain here. However, if I 
hadn’t managed to stay in Belgrade I would have probably 
tried to cross the border to the EU. 
 
Similar to Basri is Fahmi (a pseudonym), a thirty year old Afghani 
who settled in Sarajevo after he was turned away from the EU border 
over twenty times.  
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For Sumaya, the presence of other foreign-born individuals is 
equally important as the presence of her own nationals: “I am an 
orphan, I adjust easily and I prefer people with similar experiences 
no matter where they are from. It is easier to relate to them because 
of shared stories. What can I talk about with my co-national if we do 
not have anything in common apart from our homeland?” Saadia’s 
and Sumaya’s stories portray the label of “neighbors solidarity” that 
Damm (2007) attaches to immigrants in the host country that choose 
to settle close to other migrants regardless of the country of origin. 
What attaches these individuals to places with large concentration of 
other migrants is not merely a relationship with their country, but the 
remembered stories and life practices that they have in common with 
other individuals like them. These feelings translate into temporary 
nostalgia whereby sharing of one’s own rituals, tastes and habits 
become important in the process of settling and transitioning within 
a new outside society. Consequently, a large number of young 
migrants begin to view their temporary place of residence as a 
permanent home.  
Evidently, network externalities do not represent the sole factor 
that determines location choices of recent migrant settlers along the 
Balkan Route. Contrary to young migrants who settle in places with 
significant portions of different immigrant communities regardless of 
the size of the location, I have also met young individuals, all of them 
in their late twenties, who prefer to settle in large cities.  
 
I have a degree in dental medicine from Iraq and I wish to 
continue working here. I like this city, but more than anything, 
I like being in a large city. Living here makes it easier for me 
to learn the language, compete in the job market and take care 
of immigration documentation more easily. This is why I would 
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they were to attach significant importance to network externalities. 
What is obvious is that the actual time and place of arrival, the period 
of the largest refugee wave in Europe and locations where they knew 
somebody, represent the push factors that determined their ultimate 
decision to settle in a given place. Conversely, those individuals with 
weak family ties in their homeland or with a desire to settle for a 
better life abroad tend to abandon the link with external networks and 
focus more on individual motivations – shared life histories and 
economic opportunities. Both motives indicate different desires and 
feelings about the life in their host states and denote newly emerging 
push factors that are easily observable among younger population of 
recent migrants who find their new home along the Balkan Route or 
elsewhere on the European continent.  
As previously shown, both the time and space variables create 
symbolic and interesting characteristics of young middle-Eastern 
migrants across the Balkans, notably when used in a discourse of 
determinants of migrants’ location choices, which are strongly 
intertwined with the discussion on network externalities. The 
“clinginess” to perceived ethnic identity and cultural habit that is a 
product of a shared recent past among the younger generations of 
migrants originating from the Middle East is easily observable 
among these individuals. Those who settled in the Balkans precisely 
because of strong positive externalities are linked to their new homes 
because of a solid community support that they enjoy. They have a 
clear picture of “belonging” to a larger community away from home, 
a feeling which eases the transition process. In that sense, the 
importance of “home” remains and seems to be a product of 
nostalgia, rather than a real desire to return. Contrary to this is the 
feeling of those young who do not have a strong sense of “homeland” 
embedded in the transition process within their host states. For them, 
 42 
I moved to Sarajevo last year. I could not get papers in 
Croatia. There they offered me a place in a refugee centre 
where I stayed until I decided to cross over to Bosnia. My 
arrival story to here is long, but Sarajevo is now, I hope, my 
new home. I work here, occasionally, but what is important to 
me is … maybe you will think this is funny … but is the fact that 
during summer I get to work for many Arabs who come to visit 
Sarajevo. I take them around, you know. Also, there are many 
low-cost airlines that fly out from here to the Middle East, so it 
is much easier for me to reach my family who is now in Egypt. 
These are the opportunities of a big urban city, so this is why I 
think most migrants who live in Bosnia live in Sarajevo.  
 
Damm (2007) claims that immigrants choose large cities for 
variety of reasons, most of which translate to “more job opportunities 
and general economic activity, easy access to airports that facilitate 
contact with old networks abroad, access to large variety of goods 
and services …” (p. 161). The factors outlined by Damm, namely 
neighbor solidarity and urbanity, do emerge as important for recent 
young migrants from the Middle East who settle in former Yugoslav 
countries. For them, “network externalities” are less important than 
for those who settled in the same countries and cities due to familiar 
ties. The time and space of arrival of young middle-Eastern migrants 
cut across these drastically diverse push factors that determine their 
location choices and impose the perceived differences between them. 
The obvious desire to join the company of established family and 
friends was the first most observable trait among young migrants. 
Their young age and the fact that they have left their parents behind 
emerge as clear grounds for wanting “to feel secure” and “settle in a 
safe-haven”. In fact, the younger the participants were the more likely 
43
 43 
they were to attach significant importance to network externalities. 
What is obvious is that the actual time and place of arrival, the period 
of the largest refugee wave in Europe and locations where they knew 
somebody, represent the push factors that determined their ultimate 
decision to settle in a given place. Conversely, those individuals with 
weak family ties in their homeland or with a desire to settle for a 
better life abroad tend to abandon the link with external networks and 
focus more on individual motivations – shared life histories and 
economic opportunities. Both motives indicate different desires and 
feelings about the life in their host states and denote newly emerging 
push factors that are easily observable among younger population of 
recent migrants who find their new home along the Balkan Route or 
elsewhere on the European continent.  
As previously shown, both the time and space variables create 
symbolic and interesting characteristics of young middle-Eastern 
migrants across the Balkans, notably when used in a discourse of 
determinants of migrants’ location choices, which are strongly 
intertwined with the discussion on network externalities. The 
“clinginess” to perceived ethnic identity and cultural habit that is a 
product of a shared recent past among the younger generations of 
migrants originating from the Middle East is easily observable 
among these individuals. Those who settled in the Balkans precisely 
because of strong positive externalities are linked to their new homes 
because of a solid community support that they enjoy. They have a 
clear picture of “belonging” to a larger community away from home, 
a feeling which eases the transition process. In that sense, the 
importance of “home” remains and seems to be a product of 
nostalgia, rather than a real desire to return. Contrary to this is the 
feeling of those young who do not have a strong sense of “homeland” 
embedded in the transition process within their host states. For them, 
44
 45 
out to ways in which migrants choose their new homes and what 
motivates them to remain. Previous research (Bartel, 1989; Dunlevy, 
1991; Buckley 1996) that the most important determinant of 
immigrants’ location choices is the presence of earlier immigrants, 
while other factors include the presence of other foreign-born 
persons, economic factors (Bartel, 1989) and welfare payments 
(Zimmerman & Fix, 1994). While there is very limited research on 
the impact of religious similarities of the host state on migrants’ 
location choices, Chiswick and Miller (2005) describe ethnic migrant 
networks which provide the newly arrived members with ethnic 
goods (food, clothing), but also facilitate social organization, 
particularly religious services. The provision of these services is 
expected, they conclude, to increase the stock of migrants with 
similar ethnic background. The empirical research carried for the 
purposes of this work has identified that an important premise on 
which young migrants from the Middle East choose to settle in Serbia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina6 is embedded in the cultural 
reproduction, or better preservance of traditional everyday routinized 
religious activities and practices, which depict the importance of 
religious habits and assert belonging to an ethnic and religious 
community.  
Fatima (a pseudonym) declares herself as a Syrian, accentuating 
also that she is a Muslim. She sees herself as a wartime migrant who 
decided to settle in Sarajevo due to, as she puts it “many Muslim 
sisters and brothers” who have helped her get situated, organized for 
                                                
6 Although this study did take Croatia as a destination country of young 
migrants from the Middle East, religious similarity did not play a role of individuals 
who settled there. The reason for this is that the majority of interviewees who 
settled in Zagreb were more interested in education and/or employment 
opportunities.  
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solidarity and urbanity carry much weight in the integration process, 
despite the fact that they have arrived to the Balkans in the midst of 
their personal life tragedies. These push factors, although not as 
strong as network externalities, are translated into individual and not 
group-oriented interests. Thus, despite the fact that both categories of 
young migrants currently living in the Balkans do not share typical 
migrant characteristics induced by shared lived stories5, they both 
value the existence of other immigrant communities at the place of 
arrival. The rate at which this occurs, however, is different for these 
two groups, since it is highly contingent upon other push factors, such 
as religious similarities with their hosts.   
 
4. Religious Similaritiy as a Determinant of Location Choices: 
New Push Factors for Young Migrants?  
 
In the previous section I introduced network externalities, 
neighbor solidarity and urbanity which, as I have demonstrated, 
largely discriminate among young migrants from the Middle East 
settling along the Balkan Route. Now I ask how these factors extend 
to encompass the importance of religious similarity and availability 
or better whether this motive, in its present form and practiced 
activities, contributes to the emergence of different types of migrants 
among the observed group. Further, I unravel whether this factor, no 
matter how strong or weak it is, contributes to the effort of studying 
specific identity-related determinants of location choices among 
recent immigrants from the Middle East.  
In the literature on migrant location choices, various factors point 
                                                
5 Individual vs. group oriented interests (e.g. urbanity vs. presence of relatives 
in a given spatial context).  
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place of prayer and gather. We are all very young, mostly from 
Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. 
 
He goes on about declaring that he sees this “place of prayer and 
gather” as “a keeper of Islamic tradition in a foreign land that is 
welcoming of Arabs. We pray, fast, sit silently, drink tea and eat food 
from back home. We feel secure and we don’t bother anybody.” His 
friend, Abdul from Syria, who is twenty five and is a former security 
guard, continues:  
 
We have all chosen Belgrade based on connections, but ultimately 
what was important was that we, as Muslims, were accepted here, 
that we had a place of worship and that we were not disturbed in our 
practices. Historically, during Tito’s time, Serbia has had good 
relations with Syrian people. I did go to the mosque here in Belgrade 
and I was most welcomed. 
 
All of the twelve respondents, who arrived to Belgrade in the 
period from 2015 until 2017, speak about the importance of religious 
similarities as an important determinant of locational decisions. 
Freedom of religious practices and ability to, at least partially, 
identify with the locals, appear to significantly impact young 
migrants’ motivation to settle in a certain geographical area. In this 
constellation, we can observe that cultural reproduction forms the 
basis for existence of ethnic community groups in a given locality. 
These young migrants tend to posit their decisions to settle in a 
particular place against religious tradition of the host state. It turns 
ethnic community networks into makers and keepers of religious 
identity in a sense that it does not destroy what was “brought from 
home” and does not create new, more so “diasporic identities” among 
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immediate food and shelter and ease the transition process. She says:  
 
The only place where I truly enjoy myself is the mosque I 
attend. I go there to pray, to talk to other people who speak 
Arabic and pray for Allah’s mercy. I spend an entire day almost 
alone, so I feel at home there. I met other women, Bosnian, but 
also Arabic, two of them also from Syria. They are older and 
they came here not with the recent wave, but earlier with their 
Bosnian husbands. Although I do not have a family here, I feel 
at home. They have welcomed me here…- She readily continues 
to show that the mosque she attends is not only a place for 
worship - I learn Bosnian language here; I cook together with 
other women, so that poor can have food. I was shy in the 
beginning, but it is now getting better. This place is my safe 
haven. 
 
The Muslim community to which Fatima belongs is very much 
attached to the local religious community, of which many individuals 
from the Middle East are a part. Abid (a pseudonym), twenty-three 
year old student from Iraq also speaks of religious belonging.  
 
I am Irqi and I came to Serbia in 2015, when I managed to 
finally enter the country and get all the necessary 
documentation upon an invite from my friend. I choose Serbia 
because of friends, but in all honesty, because I found a large 
Muslim population here, although the majority of Serbs 
themselves are orthodox. There is a beautiful mosque here in 
Belgrade, a nice site for a Muslim from a foreign land. 
However, I go to a mosque we organized in a house of a friend. 
There are about 30 of us. We don’t do anything illegal, it is a 
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Despite a strong presence of network externalities, the internal 
divisions between recent young migrants who settle in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are more obvious than in Serbia and Croatia. In this 
context, we can than focus on the capabilities of migrant groups to 
participate in various “local” activities – religious, in this case. 
However, they also include, but are not limited to capabilities that 
“also centre upon the internal organization of migrant or exile 
communities, and the level of motivation to maintain group 
solidarity. A specific area of interest is the extent to which 
communities in different host countries collaborate and mobilize for 
a common purpose, or even identify with that purpose.” (Al-Ali et 
al., 2001, p. 581). Arguably, the decision to be viewed as “separate” 
among a large ethnic community (hereby I refer to all Arabs who 
settled along the Balkan Route) is making this religious community 
the one that can be viewed as a separate, yet positively linked 
determinant of migrants’ locational choices within a broader 
discourse on network externalities.  
In contrast to evidence which presents that young migrants who 
settle along the Balkan Route pursue typical migration patterns – that 
is they settle in areas where they have previous contacts following 
the principle of network externalities – highly religious young 
migrants do not list network externalities as the primary factor which 
determined their location choice. Although important, network 
externalities were seen as less determinant of locational decisions 
among migrants who listed religious similarities with the local 
population as their primary reason for choosing a certain settlement 
area. Adil (a pseudonym), an eighteen year old Syrian boy, arrived to 
Sarajevo in January 2017 after spending a few months in Serbia. 
Stating that he does not have good memories of his home after the 
onset of the conflict he states: “I do not want to return. I have a new 
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recent migrants. Clearly, if religious networks rely upon only one 
premise of network externalities, and a weak one such as religious 
similarity, than we cannot fully count for the observation that 
migrants settle where other migrants from the same country of origin 
concentrate. What is important in this regard, however, is the ability 
to fit in a religious sense, that is to say – religious individuals search 
other religious persons of preferably the same or similar ethnic 
background, rather than settle in places with co-nationals that are not 
religious. Hence, religion, as an unexplored determinant of migrants’ 
locational decisions, challenges the concept of network externalities 
in the case of young migrants from the Middle East.  
This severance between religious and irreligious groups was very 
obvious among young middle-Eastern migrants who now live in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is more, the overreliance on religious 
similarities is a distinct feature of all migrants whom I interviewed in 
this city; it is so much pronounced that six out of seven interviewees 
cited it as the primary determinant of the location choice. In fact, the 
separations that existed between religious and non-religious youth in 
their homeland are also clear in a foreign land:  
 
During our journey, religious practice was something that 
kept us strong and alive. Naturally, when you move in large 
groups across foreign lands you socialize with others that 
share the same beliefs, those that trust that Allah would save 
us. And he did. We are here, all together, and it is much easier 
since Sarajevo is a place which welcomes other Muslims, it is 
mostly a Muslim city. It is easy for us to talk to local imams and 
they help us a lot too, since they are also Muslim and they 
understand our troubles. 
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They have a good time in maktab; it is all interesting to 
them. Other children have heard about Syria, so they were well 
accepted from the very beginning. They have made a very good 
friend there, a little boy named Muhamed. Muhamed is 
Bosnian and he is helping them learn Bosnian language. My 
hope is that they will be able to start school next fall, even 
though they will probably go to 1st grade again because of their 
language skills.  
 
Zaim (a pseudonym) also agrees with the fact that religious 
networks are, especially for young Middle Eastern migrants who 
settle in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a beckon of religious identity 
inherited from home who allow the very young to use the 
opportunities of religious settings to which they are accustomed as 
places where they can experience gradual integration through 
something that is familiar to them. This feeling of being locally 
accepted is especially relevant for the young as the majority of them 
traveled alone and settled alone in these areas.  
 
Maktabs, mosques, local homes of good Muslims – for us, 
they are all places where we feel a little bit at home. We pray 
together, we speak the same language of prayer and hence 
integration and resocialization becomes much easier. Once 
you have this, once you have local friends, it is much easier to 
search for a job and become a part of a local society  
 
says Zaim, a twenty-seven-year-old English professor from Iraq. 
None of the respondents who view religious similarities with the 
local hosts seem to annunciate national differences when talking 
about migrants from the Middle East. In fact, although they do come 
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life here. I am learning Bosnian and want to integrate socially, into 
the school system and study to become an imam.” This young boy 
goes to mosque each Friday with his friend Tariq from Afghanistan. 
Tariq is only a year older, so they attend other activities together, but 
always stay close to the mosque. Tariq explains:  
 
I feel this local mosque as my home. I met a nice Bosnian 
guy who brought me here. I have been attending every Friday 
and I attend many other activities to which he invites me to. 
There are many different things here when it comes to the 
practice of Islam in Bosnia, but I do not mind. Muslims are 
Muslims everywhere. They are all good Muslims here - he adds 
as he points to the importance of feeling welcome first as a 
Muslim and then as a foreigner -This is not the experience I 
would have in Germany or Sweden or Canada. I would fit in 
my own ethnic community, but I don’t think I would ever be 
able to find my place among the locals… and I really want to 
integrate locally. My people matter to me, but I don’t mind if 
there is nobody here from Afghanistan. I have a few Arab 
friends, but most of my friends are Bosnian and my girlfriend 
is too.  
 
The same is true for Salim, a twenty-eight year old father of twin 
boys who are now six. He is young and, unlike all other interviewees, 
has arrived to Bosnia with a family. A few months ago his sons 
started attending a local mosque’s maktab7:  
 
                                                
7 School (in Arabic). In Bosnian language maktab or mekteb denotes a primary 
Islamic school.  
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They have a good time in maktab; it is all interesting to 
them. Other children have heard about Syria, so they were well 
accepted from the very beginning. They have made a very good 
friend there, a little boy named Muhamed. Muhamed is 
Bosnian and he is helping them learn Bosnian language. My 
hope is that they will be able to start school next fall, even 
though they will probably go to 1st grade again because of their 
language skills.  
 
Zaim (a pseudonym) also agrees with the fact that religious 
networks are, especially for young Middle Eastern migrants who 
settle in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a beckon of religious identity 
inherited from home who allow the very young to use the 
opportunities of religious settings to which they are accustomed as 
places where they can experience gradual integration through 
something that is familiar to them. This feeling of being locally 
accepted is especially relevant for the young as the majority of them 
traveled alone and settled alone in these areas.  
 
Maktabs, mosques, local homes of good Muslims – for us, 
they are all places where we feel a little bit at home. We pray 
together, we speak the same language of prayer and hence 
integration and resocialization becomes much easier. Once 
you have this, once you have local friends, it is much easier to 
search for a job and become a part of a local society  
 
says Zaim, a twenty-seven-year-old English professor from Iraq. 
None of the respondents who view religious similarities with the 
local hosts seem to annunciate national differences when talking 
about migrants from the Middle East. In fact, although they do come 
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present just a portion within a wide range of experiences, I have 
argued that contrary to immigrant population trend of geographically 
concentrating, recent middle-Eastern migrants in their late teens and 
up to their early thirties choose to divert from main transition route 
and settle along the Balkan Route due to the strong presence of ethnic 
and/or national networks and host-nation’s similarities with social 
identity traits that can also be observed among this cohort of migrants 
– namely religion.  Those I have interviewed, center instead on what 
they believe are the most valuable elements for migrants escaping 
political or social issues in their homelands – the presence of their 
own ethnic group which must be willing to help, but also the presence 
of religious associative networks. Although many of those 
interviewed also, somewhat, challenge the concept of network 
externalities by focusing more on neighbor solidarity, they do not 
abandon the concept in its entirety.  
In terms of strong religious associative networks, young cohorts 
of migrants from the Middle East exhibit rather strong connections 
and even reliance on religious institutions in their host state as long 
as they are hospitable and similar to their own religious practice. 
Alternatively, findings show that religious similarity, as a 
determinant of locational decision, is a strong binding factor to the 
host state as all respondents who are highly religious and who cite 
this reason as the primary one for choosing their location, also wish 
to remain here. Hence, what will be observable in the future is the 
creation of new diasporic networks in the Balkans and forms in which 
they will emerge. This group can be seen as the carrier of emerging, 
but still fairly weak diasporic activity persuaded by those who do not 
wish to return due to socio-political ills in their homeland and less 
religious support in other destination countries.  
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from more or less single-nationality families, they focus on religious 
uniformity and put aside national differences: “We are Muslim and 
that is what matters. It was God’s will for us to settle here, but at 
least we found a place where we can be Muslims again.” These 
young cohorts of middle-Eastern migrants who settled along the 
Balkan Route in the period from 2015-2017 maintain strong religious 
links with other religious individuals of same faith, but also links to 
different religious institutions. These patterns were especially 
obvious in Bosnia and Herzegovina and less so in Serbia, while in 
Croatia none of the interviewed individuals considered religion and 
religiosity a determinant of locational choice. Strong religious 
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their host states, weak or inexistent links to other foreign-born 
communities despite their strong presence in the three host states and 
no focus on national differences characterize the emerging new 
middle-Eastern diaspora in the Balkan states. Unlike migrants who 
rely on network externalities and who establish very weak cultural 
links with their host state, individuals who claim to be religious 
encourage strong links with locals in spite of their foreign origin. 
Thus, this group of migrants can be termed to be the bearer of an 
emerging, but still relatively weak diaspora, a pattern which is still 
difficult to observe and study in many European states. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
In this paper, I have explored the location choices and analyzed 
the factors that determine recent migrants’ motivations to remain in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia or Serbia within the framework of 
network externalities and existence of strong religious associative 
links with the host state. Aware that life histories outlined below 
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1. Introduction 
 
The title of this article “becoming diaspora” is evocative of a 
process that, in the view of the author, does not receive enough 
attention by policy makers. This process describes the trajectory 
of civic engagement of migrants in aid and development of their 
origin countries. The recent emphasis on supporting diaspora 
engagement in aid and development that arises from the efforts of 
some policy makers and UN organizations active in the migration 
field risks to homogenize the category of migrants and assimilate 
them to the notion of diaspora. By definition, the world diaspora 
refers to migrant communities that nurture a dual sense of 
belonging to both home and host country. Diasporas maintain 
strong ties with their origin countries that they aspire to through 
a commitment to contribute to their restoration, development and 
maintenance. Diasporas often nurture thoughts of an eventual 
return, in what can be conceived as a dual citizenship, the one of 
the heart and the one of the mind. Understandably, not all 
migrants feel the moral duty to engage in solidarity towards their 
																																								 																				
* University of Naples “L’Orientale”. 
	 59	
BECOMING DIASPORA. HOW THE HOST AND 
ORIGIN COUNTRIES INFLUENCE MIGRANTS’ 
ACTIVISM IN AID AND DEVELOPMENT: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Valeria Saggiomo* 
 
INDEX: 1. Introduction. – 2. The Political Opportunity, still a useful 
theoretical framework. – 3. Malian Diaspora in France. – 4. Lybian 
diaspora in the UK. – 5. Afghan Diaspora in Europe. – 6. Conclusions. – 
7. Bibliography. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The title of this article “becoming diaspora” is evocative of a 
process that, in the view of the author, does not receive enough 
attention by policy makers. This process describes the trajectory 
of civic engagement of migrants in aid and development of their 
origin countries. The recent emphasis on supporting diaspora 
engagement in aid and development that arises from the efforts of 
some policy makers and UN organizations active in the migration 
field risks to homogenize the category of migrants and assimilate 
them to the notion of diaspora. By definition, the world diaspora 
refers to migrant communities that nurture a dual sense of 
belonging to both home and host country. Diasporas maintain 
strong ties with their origin countries that they aspire to through 
a commitment to contribute to their restoration, development and 
maintenance. Diasporas often nurture thoughts of an eventual 
return, in what can be conceived as a dual citizenship, the one of 
the heart and the one of the mind. Understandably, not all 
migrants feel the moral duty to engage in solidarity towards their 
																																								 																				
* University of Naples “L’Orientale”. 
60
	 61	
diaspora engagement in Mali; the Lybian diaspora in the UK, 
where the support of institutional structures to Libyans exists, 
though at a slower pace, and the fall of the Geddafi’s regime in 
2011 prompted the reaction of Libyan diaspora, apparently 
limited to the initial phase of the humanitarian crises; the Afghan 
diaspora in Europe whose engagement in aid and development is 
hindered by the absence of a specific institutional support in the 
host countries and by the lack of a specific triggering situational 
factor in Afghanistan.1      
The three cases from Mali, Libya and Afghanistan present 
different characteristics for the historical roots of the diaspora, for 
the profile of people migrating to Europe, for the different hosting 
societies that are considered in this article. Despite differences, 
the three groups share a common feature that make them suitable 
for the proposed analysis, that is a good propensity to remit 
money back home, calculated comparing data on annual 
remittances flowing in the country, the total number of nationals 
living outside the country and the national GDP. The article 
assumes that this propensity is indicative of the willingness of 
migrants to maintain ties with the origin country, and of the 
sensitiveness towards engaging further in aid and development, if 
external conditions are conducive.  
 
																																								 																				
1 Initial research on these three diaspora groups was conducted with Giulia 
Spagna in the framework of a scoping study commissioned by the Danish 
Refugee Council to me as leading consultant. The scoping study was aimed at 
identifying potentials to promote diaspora related programming in DRC 
countries of operation, within the overall Diaspora Program promoted by its 
leader Mingo Heiduk in Copenhagen. The scoping study was conducted 
between December 2015 and January 2016 and explored potentials from a total 
of 22 origin countries, namely Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey in the 
Middle East and North Africa region (MENA); Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, 
Uganda, Yemen, Djibouti in the Horn of Africa and Yemen region (HoAY); 
Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Guinea in the West Africa 
region (WA), Afghanistan, and stand-alone countries in Africa such as Sudan, 
South Sudan, DR Congo and the Central Africa Republic.   
	 60	
fellow nationals, their origin country and their beloved land. Not 
all migrants have the capacity to do so, even if they are willing to. 
Not all migrants engage successfully in aid and development, 
even if their intention is positive and passionate. The one many 
migrants experience at a certain stage of their migration history is 
a process of ideal return to their homeland that may be exorcised 
through engaging in aid and development activities, in a 
collective form.   
The article aims to address the question of when migrants 
become diasporas? What trigger their activism towards social 
work of transnational solidarity?  
This article supports the idea that there are factors that 
stimulate the transition from the status of migrants to the one of 
diaspora. These factors are responsible for triggering a process 
that, time after time, leads migrants to become diasporas and 
engage in the origin countries to bring change through aid and 
development projects. What are these factors? This article 
suggests to consider the convergence of two distinct dimensions 
that positively affect the transition from migrants to diasporas. 
These are: the attitudes of host countries vis-à-vis the migration 
phenomenon, including the recognition of migrants as potential 
development actors, institutional structures and opportunities to 
support diaspora activism (contextual factors); secondly, the 
sudden eruption of a crises that, in the origin country, solicit 
diaspora engagement in helping fellow nationals (situational 
factors).  
Using a comparative analysis, this article argues that the 
convergence of contextual factors in the host societies and 
situational factors in the migrants’ origin countries at a certain 
time in history deeply influence the attitude to activism in aid and 
development by migrants as individuals and as groups. The article 
brings narratives from three cases: the Malian diaspora in France, 
where both factors occur, generating a high level of constant 
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complementing the political opportunity structure, affect diaspora 
engagement in the social sphere, such as national cleavage 
structures, institutional structures, prevailing strategies and 
alliance structures. All these aspects, according to the authors, 
frame what they call the “interaction context” that links 
macrostructural level of the political opportunity structures to the 
collective actions of movement actors. The major contribution of 
these authors has been to look for a connection between external 
opportunities and migrants’ agency that is exactly the perspective 
that this article works on.  
Scholars’ attention to migrants’ agency in the POS framework 
emerged towards the 2000, when the notion evidenced some 
shortfalls in supporting the analysis of ethnic and migration 
research (Bousetta 2000, 232) particularly concerning the lack of 
mechanisms of the POS approach to add insight to its general 
framework.  
In particular, the critique of Bousetta (Bousetta, 2000, 235) 
pointed towards an overemphasis of the POS approach to 
institutional factors that seemed to be the primary triggering 
factor in migrants’ activism. In other words, dedicated institutions 
such as Ministries of Diasporas in migrants’ origin countries, or 
offices in charge of diaspora involvement in home politics would 
act as catalyst of diaspora engagement in aid and development, as 
the case of some western African countries demonstrates. This 
focus on the institutional framework of the origin countries 
however, Bousetta noticed, seem to undermine the agency and 
strategies used by migrants in engaging with their origin 
countries. The POS framework, according to Bousetta, seems to 
forget immigrant organisations’ internal and identity construction 
processes, thus misinterpreting immigrants role and portraying 
them as passive agents whose actions are determined by 
institutional structures alone.  
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2. The Political Opportunity, still a useful theoretical 
framework 
 
Since the early 1990s, many comparative migration studies 
have adopted a political opportunity structure (POS) approach to 
explain variations in forms of migrants’ grassroots organising, 
mobilisation, participation and engagement.  
The approach of the political opportunity structure developed 
within the theoretical framework of social movement theory 
(Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994; Kriesi et al. 1995). Tarrow (1994, 85) 
defines the political opportunity structure notion as ‘consistent 
dimensions of the political environment -not necessarily formal 
or permanent- that provide incentives for people to undertake 
collective action by affecting their expectations for success or 
failure’. The political opportunity framework explains motives 
for people to act for reaching a certain objective and ascribe 
personal or collective motives to external contextual 
opportunities that favour processes and indirectly solicit people’s 
activism.  
Taking this perspective means recognizing that people, 
including migrants, tend to form organizations and act 
collectively to reach an objective when there are favourable 
external conditions that raise migrants’ positive expectations 
towards what they can achieve through collective actions. In other 
words, when a given political context is favourable in a given 
historical timeframe, for instance through a new legislation or 
through incentives to certain categories, people take the 
opportunity to organize themselves and achieve an objective.  
During the 1990s, the notion of political opportunity structure 
was further specified by authors like Kriesi, Koopmans, 
Duyvendak and Giugni (Kriesi et al 1995). In a famous book 
discussing the notion of POS in the context of the Social 
Movement Theory these authors added various components that, 
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for triggering migrants’ activism in line with the political 
opportunity approach.  
At the same time, the article embraces the perspective that 
Bousetta suggested in early 2000s that is to look at migrants’ 
agency in determining their future and their role in host societies. 
As such, migrants are conceived as potential agents of 
development in the host and origin societies, in line with the 
Migration and Development approach. In such a perspective, the 
article recognizes the importance of migrants’ relations in 
supporting their activism at both national and transnational level, 
to response to the critique that has been posed to the POS theory 
as being too rigid and static in offering explanations to 
mobilisation patterns, ignoring for example aspects related to 
networks and social capital. As argued by Koopmans et al. (2005, 
21) ‘collective actors never mobilise in a vacuum. They are 
always confronted with established actors who already occupy 
certain positions in the playing field with whom they enter into 
relations of competition, alliance or opposition’.  
In doing so, this work agrees with Marco Giugni (Giugni 2011) 
interpretation of the political opportunity approach in its post-
critique period, maintaining that the POS still represents a useful 
concept to understand current features of diaspora engagement. 
At the same time, the article builds a conceptual framework that 
draws from the most recent evolutions in the approach and applies 
them to the analysis of diaspora activism in aid and development 
to explain how situational factors in the origin countries, coupled 
with political opportunities in host countries influences migrants’ 
activism in aid and development.  
 
3. Malian Diaspora in France 
 
The case of Malian diaspora shows how institutional structures 
in the host societies are determinant to enhance diaspora 
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The critique of Koopmans (Koopmans et al. 2005, 19-20) 
suggests that in addition to the general institutional structures of 
the state, specific dimensions of the opportunity structures, such 
as integration policy, should be taken into account when 
analysing the factors that trigger migrants’ activism. This critique 
highlights the importance of hosting societies in shaping and 
modelling the role of migrants in the host country. Koopmans 
suggests that explicit integration measures promoted by host 
governments enhance the ability of migrants to engage in the 
socio-political sphere.  
Caponio and Garbaye (Garbaye 2005; Caponio 2005) seem to 
build on this critique when they point towards the importance to 
encompass the local besides the national level in the analysis of 
migrants’ activism in the host countries. In studying migrants’ 
organizations in three different local contexts in Italy, namely 
Milan, Naples and Bologna, Caponio evidenced how different 
local opportunities given by the different local/municipal 
governments influence levels of immigrant organization, 
suggesting the importance to look at the local context for 
understanding patterns of migrants’ activism.  
In the same vein, stressing the importance of local contexts to 
diaspora engagement in aid and development, this article looks at 
“opportunities” arising from migrants’ origin countries. The 
article conceives local contexts in terms of institutional structures, 
recognizing the importance of a political will in migrants’ origin 
countries to deal with the global diaspora and seek for its 
contribution to the country’s growth. More importantly however, 
local contexts are here framed as situational factors, meaning 
those calamities that occur in a given local political contexts and 
that spur diaspora activism and solidarity. Both institutional 
structure and situational factors fall under the category of external 
conditions (external to migrants’ agency) that are determinants 
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always confronted with established actors who already occupy 
certain positions in the playing field with whom they enter into 
relations of competition, alliance or opposition’.  
In doing so, this work agrees with Marco Giugni (Giugni 2011) 
interpretation of the political opportunity approach in its post-
critique period, maintaining that the POS still represents a useful 
concept to understand current features of diaspora engagement. 
At the same time, the article builds a conceptual framework that 
draws from the most recent evolutions in the approach and applies 
them to the analysis of diaspora activism in aid and development 
to explain how situational factors in the origin countries, coupled 
with political opportunities in host countries influences migrants’ 
activism in aid and development.  
 
3. Malian Diaspora in France 
 
The case of Malian diaspora shows how institutional structures 
in the host societies are determinant to enhance diaspora 
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During the 1990s, projects oriented towards education activities, 
professional training and teachers’ training (Galatowitsch 2009). 
Between 2000 and 2004, it is estimated that more than 5.5 million 
Euros have been channelled to Mali by Malian diaspora residing 
in France (FSP 2005). 
Nowadays, Malian Diaspora communities in France are still 
organised through Home Town Associations, which promote 
projects such as the building of schools, mosques, hospitals and 
act as mediators for exchange experiences between different 
towns in Mali and in France. Typically, Home Town Associations 
channel funds in the area of origin of the diaspora, through an 
established network of local counterparts. Among their recent 
activities, worth to mention are the provision of soft loan facilities 
to people in need of aid or support for business start-ups. This 
system, called tontine, is traditionally used in areas where the 
access to official credit is difficult.  
The relationships between Malian Diaspora and the population 
left home has always been very strong. Traditional leaders and 
griots in Mali ensured that a good reputation was maintained as 
the gifts of the migrants benefitted the entire community (Azam 
and Gubert 2004). Migrants maintain a high status in Mali, and 
Malian youth are encouraged to migrate in search of wealth, 
prestige and as an income diversification strategy for the family 
(Traoré 2009). 
At the same time, since the early 2000s France invested into 
diaspora strengthening as development actors. In 2002, France 
launched the Fond de Solidaritè Prioritaire - Codevelopment Mali 
with a budget of 2.6 Million Euros over three years (first phase). 
The FSP is a branch of the French Ministry of immigration aimed 
at boosting socio-economic development in Mali through 
dedicated diaspora projects. The FSP co-funded diaspora 
organisations’ and local counterparts’ projects aiming at 
promoting local development, provided technical assistance to 
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engagement in aid and development. Historical legacy and the 
level of bilateral cooperation between France and Mali on 
diaspora engagement in development, make the case of Malian 
diaspora in France extremely interesting for this study2.  
The relationship between France and Malian immigrants is old 
and solid. French colonisation prompted Malian belonging to the 
Soninke ethnic group to migrate into France already at the 
beginning of the 20th Century. During the 1960s and 1980s, 
droughts in Mali and labour needs in France attracted several 
Malians to migrate there. Most of them (an estimated 80%) 
originated from the Senegal River Valley that includes the region 
of Kayes where the majority of Malians in the diaspora belong to.  
Starting from the 1960s, Malians in France have been setting 
up associations to assist their fellow migrants in integration into 
the French society, and to pool funds to help their communities in 
Mali. In the 1970s, Malian diaspora’s Home Town Associations 
became a popular way to do so; The first development projects 
were supported by the Group de Recherche pour le Development 
Rurale (GRDR), which focussed on communal development 
projects entirely funded by the diaspora and implemented through 
a network of migrants in France and villages in Mali.  
During the 1980s, and after France officially recognised 
Diaspora associations in its territory, the number of diaspora 
associations in France started growing exponentially, totalling 
about 400. Their recognition boosted the activism of migrants far 
beyond remittances and rural development; Diaspora’s 
engagements encompassed infrastructural development projects, 
including the creation of wells, water tanks, schools, health 
centres and supporting the economic sector through the 
establishment of cooperatives, cereal stocks and enterprises. 
																																								 																				
2 Today, 125.300 Malian are part of the national diaspora, representing 
about 0,8% of the country’s total population (15,3 million). About half of 
global Malian diaspora reside in France. 
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HCME was re-structured as a non-political and non-profit 
organisation, with offices in 62 countries and the head quarter in 
Bamako. The aim of the HCME is to support Malians residing 
abroad, to channel migrants’ remittances towards investments in 
Mali, to promote cultural events and sport competitions, and to 
sustain decentralised cooperation. The HCME represents the an 
established Malian non-governmental institution, both for 
development purposes and during emergency situations, such as 
the case of the 2002 political crises in Ivory Coast, when in few 
days the HCME was able to mobilise diaspora to remit sufficient 
funds to repatriate Malians living in the Ivory Coast. (IOM 2009).  
 
4. Lybian diaspora in the UK 
 
The case of Libyan diaspora shows how situational factors in 
the origin country, such as the eruption of the civil was after the 
fall of Gaddafi’s regime in 2011, contribute to solicit diaspora 
engagement in aid and development. The case of Libyans in the 
United Kingdom also shows how institutional support from the 
host government, in the form of available funds to Libyan 
diaspora organizations, also triggers engagement of diaspora 
organizations. In line with the critique of Koopmans to the POS 
approach, this section on Libya looks at the hosting societies as a 
pivotal parameter to understanding Libyan migrants’ attitude to 
engage in humanitarian aid and development activities in Libya. 
Libyan diaspora originated between 1995 and 1998 when 
many young Libyans, mostly university graduates, students or 
working professionals, escaped Libya to avoid arrest, after 
clandestine Islamic organisations belonging to the Muslim 
Brotherhood and ‘Islamic Grouping’ were discovered by the 
Libyan authorities. A great part of them sought political asylum 
status in Italy, UK, Switzerland, Germany and other EU countries 
(Gamaty, 2012). Looking at the United Kingdom as one of the 
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diaspora organisations, and coached them through an office in 
France and an office in Mali (Gauvrit 2004). The second phase of 
the FSP (2006-2009) was implemented in collaboration with the 
Agence National de l’Accueil des Etrangers et des Migrations 
(ANAEM) and funded over 180 projects of diaspora 
organisations.3   
In 2013, France integrated diaspora support into its 
international cooperation policy. In fact, harnessing Mali’s 
diaspora for Development is one of the four pillars in France’s 
strategy for reconstruction and development of the country, 
alongside the external action of local governments (French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). In 2013, France and Mali 
launched the Mobility and Migration for Development 
Programme. The program aims at enhancing the economic impact 
of Malian diaspora by promoting job-creating entrepreneurship 
initiatives and supporting local governance. It addresses three 
areas: a) Building the capacities to effectively include migration 
in Malian public policies, for example by funding local capacity 
building operations through the qualified diaspora; b) Co-
financing and supporting local development projects; c) 
Supporting productive investments and migrant entrepreneurship. 
On the Malian side, Mali has established and pursued 
strategies to attract the involvement of their diaspora in the 
homeland’s development projects (ADPC, 2011 p. 5). To this 
end, in 2000 the Ministry for Malian Nationals Abroad and 
African Integration has been created and devoted to enhancing 
the role of Malian Diaspora for peace and development in Mali.  
In addition, the Haut Conseil des Maliens de l’exterieur 
(HCME) was created in 1991 to manage the relationship between 
Malian diaspora and the population in country. In 2003, the 
																																								 																				
3 http://www.panapress.com/Plus-de-180-projets-finances-par-le-FSP-et-l-
OMi-au-Mali--13-662274-18-lang1-index.html (accessed on 23 February 
2016).  
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education Challenge; Collaborative Challenge Fund; Global 
Innovation Fund; Common Ground initiative.4 
Who are Libyans in the UK? What is their potential in aid and 
development? The answer is anchored to the opportunity 
structure offered to refugees and migrants in the UK that seems 
to shape diaspora engagement in collective actions. Data from 
OECD show that 58% of Libyan nationals who reside in the UK 
are in possess of a University degree. This data is reinforced by 
qualitative studies on the profiles of Libyan Diaspora in the UK 
that report that students and business people represent the vast 
majority of Libyans in the UK (Blitz 2008, p 115). Higher 
education level and a relatively well-off status, probably 
constituted a fertile ground on which Libyan nationals in the UK 
were ready to build on, as soon as an external opportunity in their 
origin country arose. In fact, during the 2011 crises that 
determined the fall of long-term leader Muhammar Gaddafi, a 
vivid activism of Libyan organizations became visible in the UK 
and in the USA.  
Within this activism, the organization Volunteer Libya5 was 
set up by eight diaspora individuals in 2011 and started as 
fundraising association in the USA and increasingly focussed on 
youth empowerment and social cohesion programmes in Libya. 
Moved by the lack of opportunities in Libya that pushes more and 
more youngsters to join armed militia, the association organised 
trainings, volunteering and renovations projects, donations of 
school materials, scholarships for Libyan and Tunisian youth and 
distribution of non-food items in camps in Libya. The 
																																								 																				
4 For more information on the British Government support to Libyan 
organizations see https://www.gov.uk/world/organisations/dfid-middle-east-
and-north-africa (accessed 21/11/2017). 
5 Interview to Volunteer Libya by Giulia Spagna and Valeria Saggiomo, 
within the framework of a Scoping Study on Diaspora Engagement 
commissioned by the Danish Refugee Council from December 2015 to January 
2016. 
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preferred destinations of the Libyan diaspora, relations between 
the United Kingdom and Libya were tense from the mid-1980s, 
following the shooting of a British police officer in Central 
London apparently from a diplomatic office of the Libyan 
government. The subsequent Lockerbie case, when a bomb 
placed by two Libyan terrorists on a flight crossing Scotland 
caused the death of more than two hundred fifty persons, 
disrupted diplomatic contacts completely and led the UN Security 
Council to impose sanctions on Gaddafi’s government who 
refused to collaborate and hand over the suspects. Sanctions lay 
heavily on Libya for almost a decade and were suspended in 1998 
after Gaddafi recognized his responsibilities and promised to pay 
compensation to British families. That admission of fault 
reopened diplomatic relations between Libya and the United 
Kingdom from 2001. UN sanctions were lifted soon after and 
Libya started close cooperation with the UK in the war against 
terrorism and in the oil business. According to Blitz, Libya geo-
strategic importance to the UK has become evident in 2004, when 
Libya accepted to dismantle its nuclear weapon programme, 
opening commercial opportunities and collaboration in the war on 
terror (Blitz, 2008). Accordingly, since 2004, the UK government 
has enhanced cooperation on asylum and migration management 
with Libya, and the number of Libyan asylum seekers in the UK 
has increased. The number of Libyan charities registered in the 
UK expanded rapidly, taking advantage of the British Department 
for International Development (DfID) dedicated funding 
initiatives for development and humanitarian aid programmes led 
by diaspora organizations, particularly those open to Libyan 
diaspora organisations such as the Disability Rights Fund; Girls’ 
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According to a UK Governmental source,8 in 2015 six active 
Libyan Diaspora organizations were officially registered in the 
country. These are: Lawyers for Justice in Libya that operates in 
Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, promoting human rights, justice and 
the rule of law, with an annual budget of about 230.000 pounds; 
Libya Aid Relief Efforts that operates in Libya and Tunisia, 
targeting civilians and conflict-affected population with health 
projects, with an annual budget below 10.000 pounds; Libya 
Human Aid that operates in Libya and Syria, delivering 
humanitarian aid, with an annual budget of 424.000 pounds in 
2012, and 52.000 in 2013; Libyan Medical Relief LTD that 
operates in Libya only, providing medical and humanitarian 
relief, with an annual budget of 80.000 pounds in 2013, and below 
10.000 pounds in 2014; The Society for Libyan Studies,  an 
established cultural association active in England and Wales to 
promote the study of Libyan history, culture, languages, 
literature, art and customs. It organises cultural missions to Libya, 
exhibitions, meetings and lectures pertaining to the Libyan 
cultural sphere. It has a constant annual budget of about 90.000 
pounds; World for Libya that operates in Libya and Tunisia, 
providing medical support, training to Libyan doctors, education 
projects and financial assistance to refugees and displaced 
Libyans. The charity managed a budget of 765.000 pounds in 
2012, 53.000 in 2013, less than 2.000 in 2014.  
Data presented above demonstrates a vivid activism of 
charities immediately after the fall of the Gaddafi’s regime in 
2011, with a massive amount of money spent on humanitarian 
interventions that sharply declined in the subsequent years, until 
closure or minimal operations in 2014 and 2015. This indicates 
that Libyan diaspora activism in aid was clearly triggered by the 
2011 historical event and faded away soon after in the following 
																																								 																				
8 www.charitycommission.gov.uk (accessed on 23 February 2016). 
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humanitarian crisis that followed the fall of Gaddafi’s regime 
pushed around 2.4 million Libyan nationals in need of urgent 
assistance and prompted the activism of Libyan diaspora in the 
UK. Interviews with Libyan diaspora reported by media6 
described the way Libyans mobilised their resources and 
activated networks of Libyans in Europe and in the United Stated 
to collect funds and address humanitarian needs in their home 
country. Libyan diaspora’s activism involved the creation of 
charities and organisations to gather resources and organise a 
response in a structured way. For example, the “World Medical 
Camp for Libya” (WMCL), was set up in London in a few days 
immediately after the fall of Gaddafi’s regime in 2011. Through 
appeals aired by Facebook, the organisation quickly activated a 
network of supporters able to raise 100.000 euros in two weeks to 
arrange a convoy with medical supplies by road, via Egypt. The 
convoy successfully reached the hospitals in Benghazi, as well as 
to other Eastern towns including Derna, Bayda and Tobruk.7 
Despite the successes achieved, the organisation permanently 
closed in May 2013.  
The narrative on the World Medical Camp for Libya is 
evocative of the ways many Libyan Diaspora organisations in the 
UK seem to work. An overview of the annual budget of Libyan 
Diaspora organisations in the UK suggests that their activism is 
often strictly linked to a quick-response to a particular aspect of 
the humanitarian crises in Libya. This is also probably due to the 
lack of sustained core funding, as their budgets - considerable at 
the onset of the 2011 crises - sharply diminished in the following 
two or three years.   
																																								 																				
6 New America Now “Libyan Diaspora Helps the Homeland” Interview to 
Sarah Ibrahim, press officer of the World Medical Camp for Libya. 
http://newamericamedia.org/2011/03/libyan-expats-pitch-in-to-help-give-aid.  
php accessed on January 2016.  
7 http://www.tnpp.org/2011/02/world-medical-camp-for-libya-charity-to. 
html (accessed on 23 February 2016). 
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the Netherlands, in Denmark and in Norway. Recent research 
(Danstroem, Kleist, Soeresen 2015) confirm that the narrative on 
Afghan diaspora’s involvement in development and humanitarian 
aid in their origin country is scarce. Available data account for 
high remittances levels, estimated at 30% of the GDP, totalling 
more than five hundred million USD in 2013. While Afghan 
diaspora involvement in numerous investments in the sectors like 
telecommunications, banking, civil aviation, real estate, is known 
and documented, little research on diaspora organisations 
commitment to humanitarian activities or development projects 
exists.  
In the UK, Afghan Diaspora organisations are formally 
registered at the Charity Commission website, managed by 
governmental offices. The website accounts for 62 registered 
Afghan diaspora organisations in the UK, working in various 
domains such as relief, development, cultural activities, religious 
activities and human rights. Worth to mention is the existence of 
an umbrella organization, the Federation of Afghan Refugee 
Organisations in Europe (FAROE), that at the European level 
brings together 53 organisations of Afghan Diaspora in different 
European countries. As stated in its website, FAROE is the 
biggest and the most important coordinating body Afghans have 
ever had in Europe.9 The organization was founded in 1999, when 
Afghanistan suffered the theocratic dictatorship of the Taliban. 
Among others, FAROE’s aim is to stimulate Afghan 
organisations’ involvement in the promotion of human rights, 
good governance, democratisation and peace-building in 
Afghanistan. In addition, FAROE acts as advocacy forum to 
solicit the attention of Europe and European countries in 
contributing to the political stabilization of the country.  
																																								 																				
9 http://www.afghandiaspora.org/index.php?option=com_content&view 
=article&id=197&Itemid=93 (accessed on 21/11/2017). 
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years. Worth to note that because of the severe political 
fragmentation prevailing in Libya, neither a government body nor 
a national engagement strategy or policy dedicated wholly or 
partly to diaspora engagement in Libya exists. Ministries such as 
those of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Justice, 
Defence and Interior may all have roles relevant for a diaspora’s 
engagement in the country, but none appears to have an active 
strategy relating to this at the present time, according to research 
(Taylor, 2014).  
 
5. Afghan Diaspora in Europe 
 
The case of the Afghan diaspora describes how the lack of an 
institutional structure that recognizes its role in the host society, 
and the lack of specific situational factors in Afghanistan are 
detrimental to the Afghan diaspora engagement in aid and 
development, despite the good propensity of Afghans to remit 
money back home.  
Looking at historical milestones that generated Afghan 
diaspora, three distinct waves of migrations fluxes from 
Afghanistan can be identified. The first followed the Coup d’Etat 
in 1978 that established a Marxist regime; political opponents, 
officials form the former government, university professors and 
members of the elites flew the country to escape persecution. In 
1992, a second wave saw the massive exodus of the Marxist 
regime authorities and their supporters, who left power to a 
radical Islamist group, the Mujaheddeen. The third wave began in 
1996, when the Talibans took over Kabul, defeating the NATO 
force and its allies (Danstrom, Kleist, Soresen 2015).  
 The preferred destinations were the United States and Europe 
(OECD 2015). Germany and the United Kingdom host the vast 
majority of the Afghan diaspora residing in Europe (respectively 
23,6% and 13,6%) but there are also considerable communities in 
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and development is low and tend to focus on advocacy at the 
European level to intervene in the country and bring political 
change. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This article concludes that migrants who become diaspora 
undergo a long process of integration into the host societies and 
of re-working of their identities so to be able to contribute to the 
development of both the host and the origin country. In this long 
and sometimes painful process, hosting societies play a key role 
in either supporting of hindering migrants’ transition from 
passive beneficiaries of social welfare in the host counties to 
active actors of development in the origin countries. As the 
Malian diaspora case demonstrates, the presence in host societies 
of institutional structures that facilitate diaspora engagement in 
aid and development, a positive attitude of institutions towards 
the recognition of migrants as development actors, and a 
constructive relationship between migrants’ host and origin 
countries act as catalysts of diaspora activism. In such a context, 
his activism is strengthened, empowered and channelled into 
strategic development paths that potentially generate positive 
change in both the origin and the host countries.  
Conversely, as the case of the UK with Libyan migrants during 
the Lockerbie case seems to suggest, where a conducive 
framework is feeble, where host governments are less prone to 
enact social policies explicitly targeting migrants as potential aid 
and development actors, the engagement of migrants in the home 
affairs of the origin countries is much slower, less prominent and 
short-term. Equally, the lack of bilateral agreements and 
operational programs between the host and origin countries on 
how to maximise the contribution of diaspora groups or 
organizations in aid and development seems to affect diaspora 
	 76	
Looking at the local institutional setting, Diaspora’s 
engagement does not appear to be under the remit of a single 
institution, nor does it appear to be coordinated by a leading body 
in Afghanistan. According to research (Taylor et al. 2014, p.192) 
multiple agencies are involved in aspects of diaspora engagement, 
including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Borders 
and Tribal Affairs, and the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation. 
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(ANDS) includes the Afghan diaspora in its National 
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projects in Afghanistan, despite the estimated above 8 million 
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significant contribution of Afghan diaspora for aid and 
development, especially in the absence of a local dedicated 
institutional support system for channelling the Diaspora 
engagement in the country.  Afghan diaspora engagement in aid 
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and development is low and tend to focus on advocacy at the 
European level to intervene in the country and bring political 
change. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This article concludes that migrants who become diaspora 
undergo a long process of integration into the host societies and 
of re-working of their identities so to be able to contribute to the 
development of both the host and the origin country. In this long 
and sometimes painful process, hosting societies play a key role 
in either supporting of hindering migrants’ transition from 
passive beneficiaries of social welfare in the host counties to 
active actors of development in the origin countries. As the 
Malian diaspora case demonstrates, the presence in host societies 
of institutional structures that facilitate diaspora engagement in 
aid and development, a positive attitude of institutions towards 
the recognition of migrants as development actors, and a 
constructive relationship between migrants’ host and origin 
countries act as catalysts of diaspora activism. In such a context, 
his activism is strengthened, empowered and channelled into 
strategic development paths that potentially generate positive 
change in both the origin and the host countries.  
Conversely, as the case of the UK with Libyan migrants during 
the Lockerbie case seems to suggest, where a conducive 
framework is feeble, where host governments are less prone to 
enact social policies explicitly targeting migrants as potential aid 
and development actors, the engagement of migrants in the home 
affairs of the origin countries is much slower, less prominent and 
short-term. Equally, the lack of bilateral agreements and 
operational programs between the host and origin countries on 
how to maximise the contribution of diaspora groups or 
organizations in aid and development seems to affect diaspora 
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engagement negatively. Situational factors, instead, trigger 
diaspora activism in humanitarian aid, as the 2011 surge of 
Libyan diaspora organizations in the UK demonstrates. This trend 
however seems to follow emotional rather than intentional 
motives, as diaspora engagement gradually fades away after the 
onset of the crises. 
Finally, the case of Afghan diaspora organizations supports the 
argument that institutional structures conducive to diaspora 
engagement in hosting societies are pivotal in facilitating the 
transition from “migrants to diasporas”. In fact, the low number 
of Afghan diaspora organizations in Europe and the low profile 
they keep with regard to aid and development activities in 
Afghanistan sadly correspond to a vague cooperation framework 
between Afghan authorities and host governments on diaspora 
matters, despite the high level of remittances that flow in 
Afghanistan annually.    
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the links between migration governance 
and migration and development discourse in the current global 
and European contexts. Firstly, it briefly discusses the 
construction of migration as a matter of international policy and 
how the ‘root cause’ approach has inspired most of migration 
and development discourse, policies and practices. Secondly, the 
paper explores in more detail the embeddedness of the root 
cause approach in European migration and development 
cooperation policy, and identifies some of the shortcomings of 
this approach. Thirdly, the paper reviews some of the 
opportunities and challenges that the ‘mainstreaming of 
migration’ approach presents to embrace more decidedly the 
																																								 																				
* Project Development Officer for the Mediterranean at the International 
Organization for Migration.  
The responsibility for the content, the views, interpretations and 
conditions expressed herein rests solely with the author, and can in no way be 
taken to reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration or 
its Member States and partners. The author is grateful to Valeria Saggiomo 
for her review of the draft version of this paper. 
	 82	
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migrant remittances.1 On the other hand, it is telling of growing 
concerns associated with the ‘crisis (or reduction) of the state’, 
the perception of migration as a destabilizing factor for states 
and societies, and the perceived need for enhanced governance 
of international migration ever since the end of the Cold war, in 
a context marked by the collapse of communism and the 
expansion of neoliberal capitalism. (Geiger and Pécoud, 2014 
and 2010). 
Different, even contradictory, understandings of migration 
coexist and shape interstate cooperation around migration. For 
example, the perception of migration as a threat has coexisted 
with perceptions of migration (and especially remittances) as an 
asset in international and regional policy discourses on 
migration and migration and development. Certain 
understandings may, nevertheless, prevail at specific points in 
time, and in different arenas in which migration governance 
actors operate and interact, owing to power imbalances between 
such actors.  
In this framework, policy coherence, greater capacity to 
enhance international migration governance, and enhanced 
multilateral cooperation (both to manage migration and to make 
migration work for development) have been high in the 
international agenda. In Europe, this trend has translated into the 
gradual elaboration of European migration and development 
cooperation regimes, and increased cooperation with 
neighboring countries (Geiger and Pécoud, 2014). Recently (in 
the past three years or so), predominant perceptions of migration 
as a ‘risk’ or a ‘threat’, in an increasingly fragmented migration 
																																								 																				
1 This especially since data on ‘migrant’ remittances have become more 
widely disseminated, mainly by financial institutions such as the World 
Bank, making remittances an object of interstate cooperation; from 
‘regulation’ at the national level (e.g. adoption of anti-money laundering 
regulations) to international declarations on ‘financing for development’ (e.g. 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda). 
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reciprocal relationship between migration and all sectors of 
governance. Finally, the paper suggests that the new chapter in 
migration governance and international cooperation on this 
matter that is opening up with the forthcoming adoption of a 
Global compact for safe orderly and regular migration (GCM) 
represents an opportunity to ‘internalize’ the ‘root causes’ of 
migration, and understand them as embedded in the choices that 
we make, translated into sectoral policies. In this new chapter of 
international cooperation, we have the opportunity to review 
these choices and ensure that social policies create an enabling 
environment for people to achieve their full potential. As such, it 
is argued that the challenge for future migration governance lies 
in fully embracing the reciprocal relationship between migration 
and all sectors of governance, thus shifting the focus from ‘crisis 
management’ to building more truly inclusive societies in the 
long run. 
 
2. The construction of migration as a matter of international 
and European policy: A brief overview 
  
Since the 1990s, there has been a growing 
internationalization and regionalization of migration policy 
issues. Migration has been increasingly, and more strongly since 
the turn of the millennium, constructed or problematized as a 
matter of international policy. This trend reflects, on the one 
hand, a renewed optimism among the international community 
on the potential of migration to contribute to ‘development’ 
(mostly of the ‘developing world’, without fully embracing 
migration’s contributions to the welfare of affluent societies). It 
also reflects the rising interest in the diversification of 
development financing, including through private funds, such as 
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treated as an inherent element of capacity building in relation to 
migration governance. There seems to be a strong consensus and 
conviction among institutional actors that migration ‘evidence’ 
is currently lacking, insufficient or inadequate, and that better 
data (e.g. in terms of availability, quality and comparability) will 
lead to better policy making. A myriad of initiatives and 
institutions aim at producing, harmonizing and disseminating 
better migration data4. However, the availability of more, and 
‘better’ data, per se, does not necessarily translate into ‘better’ 
or ‘more effective’ international or regional migration policies. 
The number of international migrants in 2015,5 was estimated 
at 244 million, which make up around three per cent of the 
world’s population; this share has been stable for decades (UN 
DESA, 2016).6 The total number of refugees worldwide, is 
currently estimated at 22.5million, which together with the 
number of internally displaced persons (estimated at 40.3 
million) and asylum seekers (2.8 million) make up 65.6 million 
forcibly displaced worldwide. Nine of the top ten refugee-
hosting countries are in developing regions, three of which are 
classified as least developed countries (the Democratic Republic 
																																								 																				
4 For example, the establishment of the International Organization for 
Migration’s Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) 
https://gmdac.iom.int/, and the expansion of its Displacement Tracking 
Matrix (DTM) http://www.globaldtm.info/; the launch of the European 
Commission Joint Research Center, which includes migration among its 
thematic priorities, with the aim of producing knowledge to implement the 
New EU Migration Partnership Framework (June 2016) 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/ joint-research-centre_en; the United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) Population 
Division estimates http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migr 
ation/index.shtml; among others. 
5 This refers to the migrant stock, or people living outside their country of 
birth. 
6 Most (67 per cent) international migrants are living in about twenty 
countries, mainly in the United States of America (47 million), Germany and 
the Russian Federation (12 million each), and Saudi Arabia (10 million) (UN 
DESA, 2016). 
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governance context, have led to new forms of interstate 
cooperation outside of conventional aid, bilateral or multilateral 
frameworks. Many of these instances conflate elements of 
development-related cooperation and migration management. 
These new forms of cooperation have indeed revealed the truly 
‘pluricentric’ nature of migration governance.2 And, however 
unconventional these forms of cooperation may be, they entail 
formal implications in terms of resource allocation (e.g. creation 
of specific funding mechanisms) and the associated expected 
operationalization of the commitments embraced.3  
Similarly, data on migration (international and internal 
migration and forced displacement) have been key in the process 
of internationalization of migration policy issues. Data are often 
																																								 																				
2 Conference on “The Dynamics of Regional Migration Governance” 
organized by the European University Institute (EUI) under the MIGPROSP 
Project – Prospects for International Migration Governance”, (25-26 May 
2017, EUI, Florence). Visit: www.migrationgovernance.org (accessed 
10.10.2017). 
3 Some examples include the ‘EU-Turkey Statement’ of 18 March 2016; 
the proliferation of migration ‘compacts’(e.g. EC COM(2016) 385 final); the 
Joint Communication on the Central Mediterranean route (EC JOIN(2017) 4 
final); the Malta Summit hosted by Maltese Prime Minister Muscat and 
chaired by European Council President Tusk ‘Taking action on the Central 
Mediterranean route Managing flows, saving lives’ held on 3 February 2017 
to address the external dimension of migration, focusing on the Central 
Mediterranean Route and on stabilization in Libya and its outcome, the 
‘Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external 
aspects of migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route’ (visit: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/malta-migration-su 
mmit_feb2017.pdf); the recent bilateral cooperation initiatives and dialogue 
with transit countries, such as Libya and Niger, promoted by some countries 
such as Italy (e.g. Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding; Italy-Niger 
cooperation  the fight against trafficking and smuggling of migrants; the 
Ministerial Meeting convened by Italian Minister of Interior, Marco Minniti, 
with Ministers of Niger, Chad and Libya, held on 20 21 May 2017); the code 
of conduct for NGOs engaged in search and rescue operations at sea also 
promoted by Italy; or the so-called Euro-African ‘mini summit’ of Heads of 
State and Government held in Paris on 28 September 2017 and the resulting 
‘Joint Declaration’ and call for ‘protection missions’. 
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residents that year (510,284,450 in the EU28; IOM; Eurostat).10 
Yet, data, combined with media and policy discourse of the 
‘European migration crisis’ and powerful images, have further 
enabled the construction of migration as a matter of international 
and regional policy.  
On 19 September 2016, for the first time, Heads of State and 
Government, and High Representatives gathered to discuss, at 
the global level, issues related to ‘large movements of refugees 
and migrants’ at a dedicated high-level summit during the 
United Nations General Assembly.11 The New York Declaration 
for Refugees and Migrants (hereafter ‘New York Declaration’), 
adopted on this occasion, launched a state-led process of 
intergovernmental consultation towards the adoption of a Global 
compact for safe, orderly and regular migration in 2018. The 
summit materialized political consensus among states about the 
importance of addressing international migration by further 
fostering multilateral cooperation, and committing to addressing 
the so-called ‘root causes’ of migration and forced displacement.  
The root cause approach is deeply engrained in migration 
management and ‘migration and development’ discourse, policy 
and practice, especially since the 1990s.12 This approach is 
																																								 																				
10 This does not mean that foreign residents are equally distributed across 
countries or cities. There are cities where foreign (both European and non-
European) residents may make up to 20%. 
11 Visit UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants 2016 
https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit.  
12 Migration management and migration governance are closely related 
and sometimes used interchangeably, perhaps wrongly. The definition of 
these terms is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, international 
migration management is here understood as “a wide range of initiatives that 
aim at renewing policies pertaining to the cross-border movements of 
people”. It comprises a set of actors who “conceptualize and justify their 
increasing interventions in the migration field” (e.g. intergovernmental 
organizations); practices “that are now part of migration policies, and that are 
often performed by the institutions that promote the notion”; and discourses 
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of the Congo, Ethiopia, and Uganda; UNHCR, 2017).7 Despite 
revealing a longstanding stability in the international migrant 
stock, the fact that most migration (especially to Europe) is 
regular (de Haas, 2017), and that the majority of those forcibly 
displaced are in the Global South, data have nurtured the 
dominant narrative of migration in the Global North, constructed 
in terms of ‘mass’ (im)migration, ‘large movements’ and 
‘migration crises’.  
In Europe, data have had a prominent role in the construction 
of migration as a regional (and interregional) policy matter too, 
especially in terms of a ‘migration crisis’. Data on arrivals to 
Europe by sea, and on dead and missing migrants along the 
Central Mediterranean migration route and elsewhere,8 have 
become both more available, widely disseminated and visible. 
Italy is the country where most arrivals to Europe by sea, 
through the Central Mediterranean route, have been recorded in 
the past few years. Arrivals in Italy by sea were estimated at 
170,100 in 2014, 153,842 in 2015, 181,436 in 2016, and 
108,402 so far in 2017 (IOM, Italian Ministry of Interior, 2017). 
This year there has been significant decline of inflows in the 
past months, compared to the same period in previous years.9 It 
is worth noting that the 387,739 arrivals to Europe in 2016 
represented 0.07 per cent of the total number of European 
																																								 																				
7 Visit: UNHCR Figures at a Glance http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-
glance.html (accessed 13.10.2017). 
8 See for example IOM GMDAC Missing Migrants Project. IOM’s 
Missing Migrants Project began following two shipwrecks off the coast of 
Lampedusa in October 2013, in which nearly 400 migrants lost their lives. 
The Missing Migrants Project hosts the only existing global database on 
migrant deaths. Today, the Central Mediterranean migration route is 
considered the deadliest route https://gmdac.iom.int/missing-migrants-
project.  
9 Most arrivals by sea to Italy depart from Libya. The main countries of 
origin include Nigeria, Guinea, Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Eritrea, 
Gambia, Senegal, Sudan, Morocco and Ghana (Italian Ministry of Interior, 
IOM, as of 11 October). 
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residents that year (510,284,450 in the EU28; IOM; Eurostat).10 
Yet, data, combined with media and policy discourse of the 
‘European migration crisis’ and powerful images, have further 
enabled the construction of migration as a matter of international 
and regional policy.  
On 19 September 2016, for the first time, Heads of State and 
Government, and High Representatives gathered to discuss, at 
the global level, issues related to ‘large movements of refugees 
and migrants’ at a dedicated high-level summit during the 
United Nations General Assembly.11 The New York Declaration 
for Refugees and Migrants (hereafter ‘New York Declaration’), 
adopted on this occasion, launched a state-led process of 
intergovernmental consultation towards the adoption of a Global 
compact for safe, orderly and regular migration in 2018. The 
summit materialized political consensus among states about the 
importance of addressing international migration by further 
fostering multilateral cooperation, and committing to addressing 
the so-called ‘root causes’ of migration and forced displacement.  
The root cause approach is deeply engrained in migration 
management and ‘migration and development’ discourse, policy 
and practice, especially since the 1990s.12 This approach is 
																																								 																				
10 This does not mean that foreign residents are equally distributed across 
countries or cities. There are cities where foreign (both European and non-
European) residents may make up to 20%. 
11 Visit UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants 2016 
https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit.  
12 Migration management and migration governance are closely related 
and sometimes used interchangeably, perhaps wrongly. The definition of 
these terms is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, international 
migration management is here understood as “a wide range of initiatives that 
aim at renewing policies pertaining to the cross-border movements of 
people”. It comprises a set of actors who “conceptualize and justify their 
increasing interventions in the migration field” (e.g. intergovernmental 
organizations); practices “that are now part of migration policies, and that are 
often performed by the institutions that promote the notion”; and discourses 
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the mobilization of migrants’ financial or human resources for 
the (economic) development of countries or communities of 
origin. The main lines of action have revolved around the 
productive use of (private) migrant remittances, diaspora 
investment and skills transfers from (qualified) migrants to 
countries of origin (see for example, EC COM(2005) 390; 
COM(2011) 637; COM(2011) 743; COM(2013) 292). A closer 
look at relevant EU Communications, reveals a progressive 
acknowledgement of the mutual effects of migration on 
development and vice versa. It also discloses a shift of focus 
from addressing migration to Europe, to addressing also South-
South migration, including its social costs.  
The EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
(GAMM), which is one of fundamental instruments for EU 
cooperation with third countries on migration; further recognizes 
the importance of the links between migration and sectoral 
policies (e.g. employment, trade, agriculture, education, health) 
for third countries and, to some extent, for the EU through 
attention to such issues as labour market planning, and the 
labour market integration of regular migrants. Furthermore, a 
rights-based approach was clearly permeating migration 
management policy, as revealed by the emphasis put on human 
rights in the GAMM.  
The EU Agenda for Change (COM(2011) 637), the EU’s 
development cooperation policy framework, espoused an even 
more far-reaching approach to development cooperation. It 
recognized not only the fact that EU sectoral policies (e.g. on 
security, trade, agriculture and fisheries, environment, climate, 
energy and migration) have strong impacts on developing 
countries; but also that sustainable economic growth is as much 
about growth rates, as it is about the way in which such growth 
is achieved.  
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based on the highly contested, and yet largely influential 
assumption, that more development leads to less (South-North) 
migration.13 The next section explores how the root cause 
underlies European both migration and development 
cooperation policy and practice. 
 
3. Migration and development in the EU perspective  
 
The root cause approach is firmly embedded in European 
policy and practice on migration and development. Root causes, 
generally depicted in economic (e.g. poverty), political (e.g. 
persecution), or environmental (e.g. climate change) terms, are 
often assumed to be geographically and politically situated 
outside of the European Union (hereafter EU). 
The EU migration management approaches have consistently 
integrated migration and development as a key pillar, focusing 
																																								 																																							 																																							 										
about “what migration is and how it should be addressed” (see Geiger and 
Pécoud, 2010: 1-2). 
13 For example, the Programme of Action of the 1994 International 
Conference on Population and Development cites explicitly, among its 
objectives “To address the root causes of migration, especially … poverty”, 
and “To encourage more cooperation and dialogue between countries of 
origin and countries of destination in order to maximize the benefits of 
migration…”. (UNFPA, 1995, Chapter X, Section A, paragraph 10.2, pp. 67–
68). The Berne Initiative (2004) also aimed at defining common 
understandings on migration and included migration and development as a 
key element. Likewise, the Global Commission on International Migration 
(GCIM), convened in 2003 by the United Nations (UN) Secretary General, 
recommended to strengthen the governance of international migration in its 
report released in 2005 (GCIM, 2005). The recommendations of the GCIM 
led to the first United Nations General Assembly’s High-level Dialogue 
(HLD) on International Migration and Development in 2006, which featured 
‘addressing the root causes of migration’ and ‘strengthening bilateral, 
regional and multilateral cooperation on international migration and 
development’ in the agenda. A second HLD was held in 2013. In 2015 
migration was explicitly included in the 2030 Agenda, in which the 
international community committed to achieving 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals by 2030. 
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(civil war, persecution, poverty, and climate change) and 
externalizes them as pertaining to third countries, suggesting 
thus to address these issues through the EU external policy. 
More specifically, the focus is placed on partnership with 
countries of origin and transit,16 mainly on the fight against 
irregular migration and border management; and to some extent 
on mainstreaming migration issues into development 
cooperation.17  
Placing the ‘root causes’ of migration in a different 
geographical, economic, historical, social and political sphere 
than that in which we live, hinders our understanding and 
capacity address more comprehensively the reciprocal 
relationship between migration and all sectors of governance. 
The next section discusses the challenges and opportunities that 
the ‘mainstreaming approach’ presents to redefine the ‘root 
causes’ and review sectoral policy to seize the opportunities for 
policy change to achieve policy coherence. 
 
4. Mainstreaming migration into policy planning: 
challenges and opportunities 
 
In 2005, the Global Commission on International Migration 
suggested that the ‘mainstreaming of migration into 
development planning’ was key to enhancing international 
migration governance. As such, the ‘mainstreaming migration’ 
approach initially targeted ‘developing countries’, often 
																																								 																				
16 Some of these key countries include Algeria, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia (see for example: EC 
COM(2016) 385 final). 
17 The mainstreaming of migration into development cooperation had 
since the end of 2014 gained track in the EU development cooperation, as 
suggested by the 2014 Council Conclusions on Migration in EU 
Development Cooperation. 
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The year 2015, however, marks a turning point in the EU’s 
migration and development policy and practice. Since the 
adoption of the European Agenda on Migration (EAM), a short-
term ‘emergency response’ standpoint14 that revolves mainly 
around four pillars,15 seems to have outshined the more 
comprehensive approaches to international cooperation at large, 
and development cooperation in particular outlined in the 
Agenda for Change.  
The EAM sets key priorities around saving lives through 
(laudable) search and rescue efforts, border management, 
dismantling ‘criminal’ smuggling networks, return, relocation 
and resettlement schemes, and partnerships with countries of 
origin and transit ‘to tackle migration upstream’. The EU 
migration and development policy and practice also appear to be 
even more firmly grounded in the root cause approach: “To try 
to halt the human misery created by those who exploit migrants, 
we need to use the EU’s global role and wide range of tools to 
address the root causes of migration. Some of these are deep-
seated but must be addressed.” (EC COM(2015) 240: 2).  
The EAM includes references to migration’s contributions to 
the development of countries of origin and the EU’s 
commitment to support the achievement of migration-related 
targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (e.g. through 
facilitated remittances). Nonetheless, it identifies the root causes 
																																								 																				
14 For example, the EC Communication on establishing a new 
Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on 
Migration is introduced as follows: “Despite increased efforts by the EU, 
deaths in the Mediterranean Sea occur on a daily basis. Europe is currently 
experiencing unprecedented migratory flows, driven by geopolitical and 
economic factors that will continue, and maybe intensify, over the coming 
years and indeed it is a global challenge with more than 60 million displaced 
persons worldwide” (EC COM(2016) 385 final). 
15 The fight against irregular migration, traffickers and smugglers; 
securing Europe’s external borders; a strong common asylum policy; and a 
new European policy on legal migration (EC COM(2015) 240). 
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tangible impact on human mobility. For example, migration has 
been integrated in labour migration policies, and human and 
labour rights frameworks. Regarding finance, the focus has been 
placed on facilitating remittances to developing countries, 
improving remittance data, increasing the volume of remittances 
transferred through formal channels; encouraging remittances’ 
productive use and lowering their transfer costs. With regards to 
education, policies have looked at promoting student 
international mobility, migrants’ access to vocational training 
and skills development opportunities, and the recognition of 
qualifications and validation of foreign diplomas, among others. 
In the field of health, the accent has traditionally been put on 
countering ‘brain drain’, through the ‘ethical’ recruitment of 
health professionals from developing countries, but also by 
capitalizing on diasporas’ skills transfers. As to urban 
development and environment, the focus has been on 
migration’s contributions to adaptation and climate change 
resilience, and disaster risk reduction and preparedness. 
Interpreted solely as an issue of domestic policy for 
‘countries of origin’, and of external policy for donor or 
developed receiving countries, the mainstreaming approach falls 
short of proving means to overcome deeply rooted dichotomies 
inherent to the migration and development debate, which divide 
‘rich and poor’, ‘developed and under developed’, ‘destination 
and origin countries’. It also risks hindering the achievement of 
policy coherence within countries and beyond (e.g. between 
domestic policies and development cooperation policy).  
 These shortcomings, are not unsurmountable. The 
mainstreaming approach has the potential to embrace the 
reciprocity between migration and sectoral policy planning, 
thereby contributing to fostering greater policy coherence. In 
particular, the sectoral approach to mainstreaming migration has 
the potential to internalize the ‘root causes’ of migration as 
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conceived of as countries of origin or transit in migration 
management discourse.  
The Global Migration Group (GMG), for example, defined 
‘mainstreaming’ as “... the process of assessing the implications 
of migration on any action (or goals) planned in a development 
and poverty reduction strategy” (GMG 2010: 16). This approach 
gained track since 2011. More precisely, following the Fifth 
Meeting of the Global Forum on Migration and Development 
(GFMD, 2011), its operationalization in some ‘pilot countries’ 
was strongly supported by a few key donors.18 Practice has 
generally focused on building evidence of the effects of 
migration on ‘development’ (rarely vice versa), on enhancing 
intra-governmental coordination and capacities at central and 
local levels of government to design, implement, monitor and 
evaluate migration and development policies and initiatives, and 
on seizing migration’s potential for development through the 
identification, prioritization and implementation of migration 
and development strategic objectives, mostly leveraging on 
migrant remittances, migrants’ or ‘diaspora’ investment and 
skills transfers to professed homelands (GFMD, 2015). The 
ultimate goal is to facilitate ‘whole-of-government’ and ‘whole-
of-society’ approaches to migration governance with a view to 
attaining greater policy coherence in the fields of migration and 
development. 
Migration has thus been conventionally ‘mainstreamed’ in a 
few sectoral policies perceived as having a direct, or more 
																																								 																				
18 For example, the IOM-UNDP joint Global Project on Mainstreaming 
migration into national development strategies supported the piloting of this 
approach starting since 2011, starting in four countries (Bangladesh, Jamaica, 
Republic of Moldova, and Tunisia), subsequently expanding its 
operationalization in four more countries in 2014 (Ecuador, Kirghizstan, 
Morocco, and Serbia). Visit: Mainstreaming Migration into National 
Development Strategies https://www.iom.int/mainstreaming-migration-
national-development-strategies (accessed 15.10.2017).  
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been widely discussed and promoted, the effects of sectoral 
policies on migration decisions, conditions and outcomes remain 
poorly understood and often overlooked in migration and 
development discourse, policy and practice. Embracing the 
reciprocal relationship between migration and all sectors of 
governance is fundamental, if states are to seriously commit to 
the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs) 
outlined in the 2030 Agenda.   
Migration is now largely acknowledged as a cross-cutting 
issue, affecting and being affected by a variety of sectoral 
policies. Yet, it continues to be rarely understood and addressed 
as an inherent element of larger processes of social 
transformation, such as ‘development’. This may be partially 
owing to a certain resistance to understanding the relationship 
between migration and development as complex and non-linear, 
especially in the pursuit of ‘quick’ migration management 
solutions. Perhaps two noticeable exceptions worth mentioning 
are the far-reaching understanding of the links between EU 
sectoral policies and their impacts on developing countries 
outlined in the EU Agenda for Change, and the recognition, by 
the Global Commission on International Migration, of the 
importance of the effects of sectoral policies on the lives of 
people and on migration decisions.19  
Migration, can be all at once the driver, result and 
consequence of ‘development’.20 For example, migration, or the 
																																								 																				
19 For example, in 2005 the GCIM report recognized that agricultural 
subsidies and depressing world prices of agricultural commodities have an 
impact on the livelihoods of small farmers from developing countries, 
resulting, among others, in internal and international (temporary and 
seasonal) migration (GCIM 2005: 21). 
20 There are recent and well-founded attempts at theorizing migration as 
an inherent element of development and social transformation processes. In a 
recent paper, scholar Hein de Haas, for example, conceptualizes migration 
“as a function of aspirations and capabilities to migrate within a given set of 
opportunity structures. Drawing on Sen’s capabilities approach, this paper 
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issues in which we all participate and have the capacity to 
change. Rather than externalizing the root causes of migration, it 
offers an opportunity to think of the latter as embedded in the 
policy choices we make, thus as elements intrinsic to sectoral 
policy, some of which hinder people’s full participation in the 
societies they belong to. As such, it encourages reflection about 
the reciprocal effects of sectoral policies on migration decisions, 
conditions and outcomes (i.e. the extent to which sectoral policy 
goals and means of implementation determine, facilitate, compel 
or constrain people’s mobility), and of the effects of migration 
in the achievement of sectoral policy goals. In short, it opens 
space for making migration policies more sensitive to sectoral 
policy goals. For example, it offers an opportunity to review 
how certain patterns of production, consumption and lifestyles 
enshrined in sectoral policy create the conditions that compel 
people to migrate in search of new opportunities to cope with 
exclusion, marginalization and lack of prospects. In sum, it 
carries the potential for reflecting on the interdependencies 
between societies, and for internalizing the so-called ‘root 
causes’ as embedded in sectoral policy objectives promoted at 
home and abroad, irrespective of the countries’ level of income 
or geopolitical classification. This is further explored in the 
following section.  
 
5. The real challenge: addressing reciprocity between 
migration and all sectors of governance 
 
The relationship between migration and sustainable 
development is now firmly embedded in the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, which evokes how migrants 
contribute to development, and how better governance of 
migration can reduce global inequalities. While the effects of 
migration on ‘development’ in so-called countries of origin have 
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damage to biodiversity and traditional livelihoods and 
knowledge; in health policies to ensure that every one has the 
right to and can access quality healthcare; in welfare policies to 
guarantee equal access to social benefits, etc. In sum, it is about 
guaranteeing the full participation of each and every one of us, 
including migrants, in the social, cultural, political, civic and 
economic life of the societies in which we live and that some are 
able to bridge. The GCM could therefore allow embedding the 
‘root causes of migration’ in a more general understanding of 
the choices we make, the lifestyles we embrace, the patterns of 
consumption, production and resource utilization we promote 
and, which ultimately translate into the objectives of sectoral 
policies and affect human mobility, irrespective of where we 
live. The GCM also represents an opportunity to redefine 
migrants’ contributions to societies beyond narrow economic 
factors (e.g. remittances and investment), and to recognize and 
address the difficulties they face (e.g. with regards to living 
conditions, racism, xenophobia, intolerance and stigmatization). 
The GCM represents an opportunity to tackle these obstacles in 
a more decisive way, not in a utilitarian perspective, but simply 
because it is right to do so.  
The real challenge for this new chapter of international 
migration governance and international cooperation on 
migration, is thus to fully embrace the reciprocal relationship 
between migration and all sectors of governance. Indeed, the 
most serious commitment that states can make is to review and 
reform sectoral policies to address the real ‘root factors’ that 
constrain the realization of people’s full potential; not for 
migrants, but to leave no one behind.  
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ability to move across borders and to choose one’s places of 
residence, could be conceived of as an integral aspect of 
development, if we admit that the latter entails the expansion of 
people’s freedoms and capabilities to lead the lives they have 
reason to value (see Flahaux and de Haas, 2014). Displacement 
can also be the result of development projects (e.g. infrastructure 
works) that compel people to move. Migration could be further 
be seen as a ‘driver’ of development when people are able to 
participate of the welfare and to actively contribute to the social, 
economic, civic and political life of the societies they belong to.  
The process towards the adoption of the Global compact for 
safe, orderly and regular migration (GCM) in 2018 is grounded, 
among others, in the ambition of the international community to 
achieve sustainable development, in line with the 2030 Agenda. 
The GCM is expected to set out a range of principles, 
commitments and understandings among Member States 
regarding international migration in all its dimensions; 
contribute to global governance and enhanced coordination on 
international migration; present a framework for comprehensive 
international cooperation on migration; and address all aspects 
of international migration (humanitarian, developmental, human 
rights-related, etc.).  
As such, the GCM brings an opportunity to truly address 
migration as an inherent aspect of development, making 
migration policies more sensitive to sectoral policy objectives, 
and the later more sensitive to their effects on migration 
decisions, conditions and outcomes. It opens up an opportunity 
to discuss and address the root causes of migration embedded in 
employment policies to guarantee decent work conditions for 
all; in trade policies to address unequal terms of exchange, in 
agricultural and rural development policies to reverse the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 										
defines human mobility as people’s capability (freedom) to choose where to 
live, including the option to stay” (de Haas, 2014).  
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6. Conclusion 
 
Migration has been constructed in the past decades as an 
issue of international policy. In this context, migration 
management and migration and development discourses, 
policies and practices have been closely associated with one 
another, and firmly grounded in the ‘root cause’ approach. This 
approach tends to disregard the interdependencies between 
countries, and the mutual effects that sectoral policies, pursued 
at home and abroad, have on international migration at the 
micro-, meso- and macro-level. As such, it falls short of means 
to address more comprehensively the reciprocal relationship 
between migration and all sectors of governance.  
The mainstreaming of migration into sectoral policy planning 
offers an alternative to embrace such reciprocity and to 
contribute to greater policy coherence, so long as it is grounded 
in a and broad understanding of “human mobility”, and in the 
acknowledgment that the links between migration and 
development are complex and nonlinear.  
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the GCM, represents an opportunity to overcome deeply rooted 
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and to stimulate a joint reflection on how best recognize and 
address ‘root causes’ of migration that are embedded in sectoral 
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manage migrations in the perspective of supporting the potential 
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Italy is no exception to this trend. Anti-European sentiments 
fuelled by anti-establishment forces (Five Star Movement), 
coupled with anti-immigrant parties (Northern League) and the 
risk of terrorist attacks resulted in ordinary citizens being 
increasingly scared of migrants and sceptic about a common EU 
migration policy that is able to accommodate refugees, give home 
to economic migrants and gain benefits form the migration 
phenomenon.  
The government’s action to manage migrations seems to 
reflect the ambivalence of the Italian public opinion, divided over 
national egoism and benevolent humanitarianism.      
For instance, the recently approved Zampa Law2 on protection 
measures for unaccompanied child migrants enhances the 
protection of migrant children, affirming the prohibition by 
authorities from turning migrant children away at the borders or 
returning them to countries if that could cause them harm. The 
law also sets minimum standards of care for migrant children in 
Italy, including the reduction of time they spend in reception 
centres, a 10-day deadline to confirm their identities, guaranteed 
access to healthcare and expansion of the use of guardians and 
cultural mediators to ensure their needs are met. 
This positive model to support protection of migrant children 
in Italy contrasts with the restrictions of rights contained in the 
so-called Minniti Law3 on immigration and asylum. According to 
the Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI),4 
with the new law, for instance, in the name of simplifying judicial 
procedures and lightening the burden of the reception system, 
those seeking international protection will no longer have the 
																																								 																				
2 Law n. 47 approved by the Italian Parliament on 7 April 2017.  
3 Law n. 46 approved by the Italian Parliament on 13 April 2017. 
4 Why the new Italian law on immigration and asylum is not good news at 
all. April 28, 2017 - OPEN MIGRATION, available at:  
https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/why-the-new-italian-law-on-immigrati 
on-and-asylum-is-not-good-news-at-all/ (09/2017 accessed). 
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their lives in the rough sea. These movements however were not 
in the spotlight as they are nowadays. Since 2015, in fact, 
migrations get attention and interest from the public and from 
institutions who are called to avoid another tragic shipwreck as 
the one occurred on 18 April 2015 off Libyan coasts when an 
estimates 900 migrants, including women and children, lost their 
lives in the sea for lack of appropriate rescue operations at sea.1  
On the wave of that tragic event, and at a moment of raising 
distress by the Italian public opinion for the risk of terrorist 
attacks in the EU, the emerging national discourse in Italy 
revolved around two main pillars: on the one hand, boundaries 
around States entail surveillance to protect European citizens 
form external threats. On the other hand, there is a moral 
obligation to provide humanitarian aid to people in need, 
obligation enshrined in many constitutions of the EU countries, 
including Italy, in international treaties as well as in the codes of 
conducts of personnel dedicated to rescue operations and 
humanitarian aid.  
Despite the fact that often the multitude of people 
“threatening” European boundaries are the result of forced 
migrations, despite that they are prevalently escaping violence 
and conflicts, poverty and deprivation, migrations are discussed 
in the framework of security policies, as if they were a physical 
aggression to the States that are supposed to provide assistance, 
protection and support. 
The more migrations towards the EU increase in numbers, the 
more supposedly “host” States react moving behind the lines of 
the security discourse.  
																																								 																				
1 Operation Mare Nostrum was a year-long naval and air operation 
commenced by the Italian government on October 18, 2013 to tackle the 
migratory ship wreckages off Lampedusa. The operation was funded by the 
European Commission and saved at least 150,000 migrants, mainly from 
Africa and the Middle East. Mare Nostrum ended on 31 October 2014 and was 
not re-funded on the plea of representing a migrant pull factor to Europe. 
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met to discuss migration policies in Tampere,5 and the beginning 
of the new millennium, when the World Bank reveals the huge 
amount of transnational flux of money generated by migrants 
around the world.6  
In the late 1990s, the migration phenomenon was framed as 
the consequence of conflicts, political persecutions, natural 
disasters (forced migration) or as the ambition of few to improve 
their economic situation and look for better opportunities in the 
wealthier world (economic migration). Given these root causes 
and given the necessity to contain and possibly restrain migration 
flux to European countries, development cooperation measures 
were seen as a way to counter excessive population fluxes 
towards northern countries.7  
What was called the “root causes approach”, or using the 
words of a pragmatic observer “more development for less 
migration” policy,8 later evolved towards a perspective that sees 
the positive impact of migrations on the economies of the host 
countries and the countries of origin. When in 2003, the World 
Bank pointed out that globally migrants’ remittances to 
developing countries surpassed the level of all official 
development assistance, a growing interest towards the financial 
capacity of migrants emerged and research dedicated to 
quantifying the extent of the remittances phenomenon and 
																																								 																				
5 Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999. Presidency 
Conclusions. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm (10/2017 
accessed). 
6 J. Page, S. Plaza, Migration Remittances and Development: a review of 
global evidence, The World Bank, 2005. Draft presented at the Plenary Session 
of the African Economic Research Consortium, May 29, 2005. 
7 F. Pastore, “‘More development for less migration’ or ‘better migration 
for more development’? Shifting priorities in the European debate, in 
MigraCtion – Periodical analysis bulletin on migration policies in Europe, 
Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2003, 
http://www.cespi.it/bollMigraction/MigSpecial3.PDF. 
8 F. Pastore, ‘More development for less migration’ or ‘better migration for 
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chance to appeal the rejection of their asylum claims. Also, the 
law focuses on repatriation of irregular migrants, significantly 
expanding the number of Centres for Identification and Expulsion 
(CIE); it envisages the deportation of irregular migrants to their 
countries of origin or transit, also through bilateral agreements 
signed with Libya and Soudan, countries that do not qualify as 
“safe third countries”, as international law requires.  
If humanity is fading away from European and Italian policies 
and norms to manage the migration phenomenon, part of the 
blame lays on the paucity of positive narratives of migrants and 
the positive contribution they give to the development and to the 
economic and social growth of both countries of origin and 
countries of destination.  
This article aims to contributing to filling this gap, describing 
the theory of the migration and development nexus and the ways 
diaspora engage in aid and development in their origin countries. 
The article then discusses the migration and development 
approach within the scenario of the Italian policy for international 
development and migration management.  
The article suggests policy makers to manage migrations in the 
perspective of supporting the potential enshrined in the migration 
fluxes to boost development processes, particularly in the origin 
countries. In doing this, policy makers from host countries would 
adopt hosting policies respectful of migrants’ rights and needs 
and at the same time promote a new participatory development 
paradigm with migrants as key development actors.   
 
3. What is the Migration – Development Nexus? 
 
The migration-development (M&D) nexus is a paradigm that 
takes into consideration the potential development outcomes of 
the migration phenomenon. This policy perspective emerges in 
Europe between the end of the 1990s, when heads of state firstly 
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met to discuss migration policies in Tampere,5 and the beginning 
of the new millennium, when the World Bank reveals the huge 
amount of transnational flux of money generated by migrants 
around the world.6  
In the late 1990s, the migration phenomenon was framed as 
the consequence of conflicts, political persecutions, natural 
disasters (forced migration) or as the ambition of few to improve 
their economic situation and look for better opportunities in the 
wealthier world (economic migration). Given these root causes 
and given the necessity to contain and possibly restrain migration 
flux to European countries, development cooperation measures 
were seen as a way to counter excessive population fluxes 
towards northern countries.7  
What was called the “root causes approach”, or using the 
words of a pragmatic observer “more development for less 
migration” policy,8 later evolved towards a perspective that sees 
the positive impact of migrations on the economies of the host 
countries and the countries of origin. When in 2003, the World 
Bank pointed out that globally migrants’ remittances to 
developing countries surpassed the level of all official 
development assistance, a growing interest towards the financial 
capacity of migrants emerged and research dedicated to 
quantifying the extent of the remittances phenomenon and 
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governmental organizations.11 In Norway, the white paper on 
foreign policy recognized the benefits deriving from a policy that 
utilizes the positive effects of migration on foreign policy and 
development cooperation.12 In 2006 the UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan, talking to the General Assembly highlighted how the 
migration is a triple-win phenomenon that benefits the migrant, 
the host country and the countries of origin.13 In the same year, 
the High Level Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development was the first event at global level dealing 
exclusively with this subject.  Since 2007, the Global Forum on 
Migrations and Development provides the platform to advance 
the theory linking Migrations and Development and supports 
practical action-oriented outcomes of theoretical discussions. 
Numerous studies and policy guidance books were issued since 
then to accompany governments and institutions willing to 
embrace a co-development approach in managing migrations in 
their countries.14 
This interest at international level produced a sort of shift in 
paradigm on the migration development nexus, at least at the level 
of rhetoric. The discourse changed from a view that looked at 
																																								 																				
11 Joint policy memorandum by the Minister for Development Cooperation 
and the State Secretary for Justice, Dutch Policy Memorandum on Migration 
and Development, 2008.  
12 G. Sinatti, C. Horst, “Migrants as Agents of Development: Diaspora 
engagement discourse and practice in Europe”, in Ethnicities, 2014. 
13 High-Level Dialogue of the General Assembly on International 
Migrations and Development, New York, 15-16 September 2006. 
14 Among the most important see C. Horst, et al., Participation of 
Diasporas in Peacebuilding and Development. A Handbook for Practitioners 
and Policymakers, PRIO Oslo, 2010.  G. Sinatti, S. P. Alvarez Tinajero, 
Migration and Development: a Bottom-Up Approach. A Handbook for 
Practitioners and Policymakers, EC-UN Joint Migration and Development 
Initiative (JMDI) 2011. MPI/IOM, Developing a road Map for Engaging 
Diasporas in Development. A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners 
in Home and Host Countries, IOM, 2012. International Organization for 
Migration, Migration and Development. Migrant Stories, IOM, 2010. 
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relating it to the national economies of the receiving countries. 
The increasingly accurate data on international remittances 
published by the World Bank unveiled a huge financial flux 
potentially directed to development purposes.9  
For the first time, ever the world acknowledges the economic 
power of migrants. A new perception of migrants as agents of 
development started winning the hearts and minds of many policy 
makers. In 2003, the UN set up the Global Commission on 
International Migration for promoting a comprehensive debate 
about international migrations and its management by 
governments. In 2005, the European Union issued a 
communication on the migration and development nexus10, 
formally recognizing the potential of diaspora organizations to 
become actors of development for their countries of origin. The 
communication had relevant policy implications: international 
cooperation was not intended to restraining migratory fluxes but 
to maximizing the positive impact of migration on host and origin 
countries.  
Since then, though not always explicitly, a number of other 
European Member States reviewed their policies on migration 
management and development promotion so to include the role of 
diasporas (the so-called co-development approach). After France 
and Spain, the Netherlands acknowledged the contribution of 
diasporas in development, in complementarity with other non-
																																								 																				
9 To give an idea of the size of this phenomenon, in 2013 the global volume 
of migrants’ remittances to developing countries reached $404 billion, almost 
four times in excess of the International Community Investment in Overseas 
Development Assistance (World Bank 2014). Worth to note, that these figures 
may be underestimates because migrants also use unofficial channels to send 
money home, and these sums are not necessarily recorded (Newland 2007). 
10 European Commission, Migrazione e sviluppo: orientamenti concreti, 
COM(2005) 390 def., 1 September 2005, http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/it/com/2005/com2005_0390it01.doc.   
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contacts. For instance, the use of modern technology in education, 
the use of virtual reality in social relationships, gender sensitive 
costumes are all examples of behaviours that migrants easily 
transfer in their origin communities when they go back home, 
temporarily, virtually or physically. Social remittances have 
demonstrated to contribute to development purposes as well as 
financial remittances, although in a longer-term perspective. At 
the same time, migrants earning their income in the host countries 
contribute, with taxes and new income generating activities, to its 
social and economic development.  
Starting from these bases, the notion of co-development 
theorizes the link between the migration phenomenon and a 
process of positive development of host and origin countries. The 
French scholar Sami Nair19 coined the term co-development in 
the late 1990s, with reference to a development policy that 
reversed the tendency to consider migration fluxes from the 
former French colonies as a loss for the origin countries. 
According to Nair, migrations could benefit both the country of 
departure and the country of arrival if supported by a mutual co-
operation strategy. Legal presence and integration in the host 
country, France in that case, was a pre-condition for fostering the 
mutual benefits of co-development. From 2001, Spain echoed 
Nair’s approach and successfully implemented numerous co-
development actions both at State level and at regional level for 
about a decade.20  
																																								 																				
19 S. Nair, Rapport de bilan et d’orientation sur la politiquede 
codeveloppement liee aux flux migratoires, 1997. 
20 The GRECO plan (Programa Global de Regulación y Coordinación de 
la Extranjería y la Inmigración 2000-2004) was launched by the Spanish 
Ministry of Interior in 2001 on the wave of the enthusiasm surrounding the 
1999 Tampere Forum and the policies launched by France on Migration. The 
Plan mentioned co-development as a strategy to manage the migrations, 
combined with measures to channel migrants’ remittances to development 
purposes and the cooperation with governments of the migrants’ origin 
countries. 
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ways to reduce pressures of migration on receiving countries to a 
view in which migrants can be a resource for poverty reduction 
and sustainable development in their home countries.15 Research 
increasingly focused on remittances as a major indicator to 
measure the capacity of migrants to produce funding potentially 
useful for local economic growth. Little by little, the idea that 
migrants are not necessarily only victims of conflicts or poverty 
but can turn into “agents of change” or agents of development 
crept into the mind of policy makers.16 
 
4. Co-Development: an inclusive development approach 
  
In development studies, co-development is an approach that 
strategically recognizes migrants as potential development actors. 
Co-development is grounded on the recognition that refugees as 
well as people migrating for economic reasons often help their 
communities in the origin countries by sending money (financial 
remittances) for family consumption or for the construction of 
community facilities like schools and hospitals. In the last ten 
years, research is exploring the impact of the so-called social 
remittances17 that are the ideas, behaviours, identities and social 
capital18 that migrants acquire during the migration experience 
and export to their home communities with whom they maintain 
																																								 																				
15 N. Piper, “The “Migration-Development Nexus” Revisited from a Rights 
Perspective”, in Journal of Human Rights, issue 7, n.3, pp. 282-298. 
16 Secretary-General of the United Nations, International Migration and 
Development—Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/871, 18 May 2006, New 
York, United Nations. 
17 The notion of “social remittances” has been described by P. Levitt, N. 
Nyberg-Sorensen, “The Transnational Turn in Migration Studies”, in Global 
Migration Perspectives, 2004, n. 6. 
18 Social capital is “the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to 
the individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or 
less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” 
Bourdieu (1992). 
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Transnationalism means the capacity of diaspora to act both 
within the boundaries of the host country and outside,22 reaching 
the country of origin along the “here” and “there” pattern 
discussed by Riccio.23 There is a large debate whether this 
capacity implies physical presence of diaspora people in multiple 
places, including the origin country, as Portes argued,24 or not 
considering how virtual communication channels and modern 
technology support social networking despite physical presence. 
In any case, transnational activities promoted by diasporas are 
designed in a way that links different territories, involves actors 
living in various countries and has the ability to produce effects 
in multiple places. To conceptualise diaspora activities under the 
lens of transnational theory leads to evidence the strict relation 
between transnationalism and the notion of social remittances. In 
fact, as noted by Al-Ali, Black and Koser25 in their work on 
refugees in Europe, it is “not only people who travel between 
																																								 																				
22 Transnational theory has been debated by N. Glick Schiller, L. Basch, C. 
Blanc-Szanton, “Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for 
Understanding Migration”, in S. Vertovec, R. Cohen (eds.), Migration, 
Diasporas and Transnationalism, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. 26-
50. A. Portes, L. E. Guarzino, P. Landolt, “The Study of Transnationalism: 
Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field”, in Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, Issue 22, n. 2, 1999, pp. 217-237. A. Portes, “Introduction: The 
Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism”, in Global 
Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs, Issue 1, n. 3, 2001, pp. 181-193. 
A. Portes, “Conclusion: Towards a New World - the Origins and Effects of 
Transnational Activities”, in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Issue 22, n. 2, 1999, 
pp. 463-477. B. Riccio, “From ‘ethnic group’ to ‘transnational community’? 
Senegalese Migrants’ Ambivalent Experiences and Multiple Trajectories”, in 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Issue 27, n. 4, 2001, pp. 583-599. 
23 B. Riccio, “From ‘ethnic group’ to ‘transnational community’?”, cit., p. 
597 ff. 
24 A. Portes, L. E. Guarzino, P. Landolt, “The Study of Transnationalism”, 
cit., p. 219 ff. 
25 N. Al-Ali, R. Black, K. Koser, “Refugees and Transnationalism: The 
Experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe”, in Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, Issue 27, n. 4, 2001, pp. 615-634. 
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Because of the co-development programs promoted in Spain,21 
research documented numerous evidences on the link between 
migration and development in relations to migrants coming from 
countries like Equator, Colombia and Morocco. This research 
constituted a solid body of literature on co-development that 
expanded also to other European countries with significant 
migrant population, marking the beginning of the Diaspora 
Studies.  
 
5. Diaspora Studies and Related Policies 
 
The term ‘diaspora’ often refers to migrant communities that 
nurture a dual sense of belonging to both home and host country. 
Diaspora communities mainly result from forced migrations from 
their countries of origin, to which they maintain strong ties. They 
share a commitment to contribute to the restoration, development 
and maintenance, of their country of origin, and often nurture 
thoughts of an eventual return, while at the same time seeking to 
establish and maintain a sustainable livelihood in their country of 
destination. This dual citizenship, with the diaspora constituting 
a link between home and host country, has been the subject of 
research in the last decade, with a focus on the professional, 
social, cultural and monetary contributions that diasporas are able 
to send back home, and on their potential to generate development 
processes.  
In the last decade, diaspora studies tend to focus on specific 
dimensions of diaspora engagement in their origin countries, 
notably transnationalism and social remittances.    
																																								 																				
21 For example the constitution, in 2010, of a strong network of migrant 
organizations in Valencia, the FEDACOD (Federation of Associations for 
Codevelopment), see: www.fedacod.com.  
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Apparently, however, this distinction is not common in 
diaspora organizations’ engagement in aid and development.29 
Diaspora in fact seem to envisage their transnational action more 
as a manifestation of their sensitiveness towards their origin 
country through social works and charity (no matter whether short 
or long termed), rather than a professional commitment to global 
development and peace. While more research is needed to provide 
evidence for that, this work suggests conceiving diaspora 
engagement in aid and development of the origin countries as a 
synonymous of “diaspora solidarity”. In other words, diaspora 
engagement describes that part of activism that is directed to aid 
and benevolent actions for the benefit of the communities in the 
host and origin country, regardless of whether solidarity projects 
consist of humanitarian or development oriented activities.  
Why diaspora activism is important? 
There is little systematic research on the results of diaspora aid 
programs in their origin countries. What has been documented so 
far refers to diaspora organisations’ capacity to enjoy easier 
access to conflict areas in their countries of origin, because of 
shared language, cultural proximity and personal links with the 
beneficiaries30. In countries like Somalia, for instance, despite 
diaspora is exposed to insecurity threats the same as all people, 
including locals, their capacity to activate local networks and find 
ways to operate is higher than the capacity of international NGOs. 
This is proved by the recent IOM diaspora project MIDA Youth 
that was successful to involve Somali diaspora organizations 
																																								 																				
29 This is an observational finding of the author drawn upon different works 
with diaspora organizations, from 2010 to 2017. The observation regards about 
80 diaspora organizations met by in Denmark, in Somalia and in Italy, within 
the framework of projects led by the Danish Refugee Council and by the 
International Organization for Migration, Rome office. 
30 E. Svoboda, S. Pantuliano, International and local/diaspora actors in the 
Syria response. A diverging set of systems?, Humanitarian Policy Group 
Working Paper, March 2015. 
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countries, but also ideas, values and cultural artefacts”.26 
Research demonstrates that often, diaspora activism privileges 
social, before financial, capital as the resources diaspora mobilise 
in promoting development or humanitarian activities in the 
countries of origin rely on the transfer of social capital acquired 
by migrants in the host country. For instance, skills and 
competences, habits, ideas and visions, relationships with other 
actors (networks), acquired by migrants in the host country are 
the kind of resources that are shared and built upon in diaspora 
transnational activism.   
 
6. Diaspora Activism in Aid and Development 
 
What kind of activism? 
Literature generally differentiate diaspora engagement in 
development from humanitarian activism.27 This is mainly 
because the international community28 for development, and the 
main aid agencies, including UN agencies and NGOs normally 
frame their intervention within either the long-term development 
domain or the short-term humanitarian field. The two 
interventions differ very much in terms of objectives, strategies 
and modalities to achieve results.  
																																								 																				
26 N. Al-Ali, R. Black, K. Koser, “Refugees and Transnationalism”, cit., p. 
624 ff. 
27 Z. Sezgin, D. Dijkzeul, “Migrant Organizations in Humanitarian 
Action”, in Journal of International Migration and Integration, Issue 15, n. 2, 
2013, pp. 159–177.  
28 By International Community we mean the group of DAC countries 
(Development Assistance Committee) of the OECD that is involved in 
development cooperation, with all its Non-Governmental Organizations for aid 
and development and those intergovernmental and international organizations 
aimed at promoting global and local development.  
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beneficiary communities fosters strong local ownership of 
projects and thus high probability of sustainability.36 
 
7. Factors triggering diaspora activism 
 
Notoriously, not all groups of migrants dedicate to 
development or humanitarian activities. As evidenced by various 
scholars,37 diaspora engagement is highly specific to individual 
diaspora communities and their interests, aspirations, institutions 
and sources of identities. Most importantly however, contextual 
aspects play a role in shaping forms of diaspora engagement.  
These contextual aspects may relate to both the host and the 
origin countries, as well as to a wider international consensus to 
engage migrant/diaspora organizations as non-traditional partners 
of the international community for aid and development. For 
instance, natural disasters or conflicts may stimulate diaspora 
solidarity and activism, as documented by the research on the role 
of diaspora communities during the Arab Spring revolts and 
during the war in Syria in support to national fellows in need of 
humanitarian assistance.38 Also, opportunities in the host 
countries that support diaspora activism, such as new legal 
frameworks that recognise migrant organizations as agents of 
development, national and international policies in support of 
migrant activism, funding opportunities specifically dedicated to 
trigger diaspora activism in their origin countries, all have the 
																																								 																				
36 V. Saggiomo, M. Heiduk, Diaspora as Development Actors. Lessons 
Learned on How to best design programmes in support of diaspora-led 
development initiatives, DRC Evaluation Learning/Brief n. 05, available at: 
http://drc.dk/fileadmin/uploads/pdf/IA_PDF/Diaspora/links_and_resources/E
_L_BRIEF_05.pdf (09/2017 accessed). 
37 See K. Marchand, S. Langley, M. Siegel, Diaspora Engagement in 
Development. An Analysis of the Engagement of the Nigerian Diaspora in 
Germany and the Potentials for Cooperation, UNU-Merit., 2015. 
38 E. Svoboda, S. Pantuliano, International and local/diaspora actors in the 
Syria response, cit. 
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based in Italy to conduct projects aimed at fighting youth 
unemployment in Kisimayo and Baidoa, two places hardly 
accessible to internationals.31 
Additionally, the diaspora’s commitment to their country of 
origin does not fade out at the end of the emergency response, 
possibly making the link between Relief, Recovery and 
Development a reality.32 Long-termed commitment of diaspora 
organizations to their communities of origin has been observed 
especially in the case of home-town associations where members 
share the same geographical origin and group together with the 
aim to support their (extended) family.33   
Literature generally agree that diaspora groups are able to 
mobilise own networks and resources to support development 
programs and humanitarian responses,34 thus complementing 
international aid resources. The case study of the Mandaye mental 
health hospital in Somalia is explicatory of diaspora ability to 
activate transnational networks. The hospital in fact was built 
after the initiative of a Somali doctor living in Germany who was 
able to connect Somali psychologists in Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark with patients in Burao for distance therapy.35   
Experience with Somali and Afghan diaspora organisations 
has shown that their deep and personal engagement with 
																																								 																				
31 V. Saggiomo, Engaging, Enabling and Empowering the Somali diaspora 
in Italy: The MIDA Youth Experience, IOM, 2017, forthcoming.  
32 C. Horst, et al., Participation of Diasporas in Peacebuilding and 
Development. A Handbook for Practitioners and Policymakers, PRIO Oslo, 
2010. 
33 V. Saggiomo, “Cooperazione in equilibrio tra due mondi. La diaspora 
somala e le sue controparti locali nei progetti di sviluppo”, in L. Ciabarri, E. 
Vitturini, Dopo la Guerra: Democrazia, Sviluppo e Migrazioni in Somalia, 
Edizioni Mimesis, 2016, pp. 137-162. 
34 S. Vertovec, Transnational Networks and Skilled Labour Migration, 
Paper given at the conference: Ladenburger Diskurs “Migration” Gottlieb 
Daimler- und Karl Benz-Stiftung, Ladenburg, 14-15 February 2002. 
35 V. Saggiomo, “Cooperazione in equilibrio tra due mondi”, cit.  
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beneficiary communities fosters strong local ownership of 
projects and thus high probability of sustainability.36 
 
7. Factors triggering diaspora activism 
 
Notoriously, not all groups of migrants dedicate to 
development or humanitarian activities. As evidenced by various 
scholars,37 diaspora engagement is highly specific to individual 
diaspora communities and their interests, aspirations, institutions 
and sources of identities. Most importantly however, contextual 
aspects play a role in shaping forms of diaspora engagement.  
These contextual aspects may relate to both the host and the 
origin countries, as well as to a wider international consensus to 
engage migrant/diaspora organizations as non-traditional partners 
of the international community for aid and development. For 
instance, natural disasters or conflicts may stimulate diaspora 
solidarity and activism, as documented by the research on the role 
of diaspora communities during the Arab Spring revolts and 
during the war in Syria in support to national fellows in need of 
humanitarian assistance.38 Also, opportunities in the host 
countries that support diaspora activism, such as new legal 
frameworks that recognise migrant organizations as agents of 
development, national and international policies in support of 
migrant activism, funding opportunities specifically dedicated to 
trigger diaspora activism in their origin countries, all have the 
																																								 																				
36 V. Saggiomo, M. Heiduk, Diaspora as Development Actors. Lessons 
Learned on How to best design programmes in support of diaspora-led 
development initiatives, DRC Evaluation Learning/Brief n. 05, available at: 
http://drc.dk/fileadmin/uploads/pdf/IA_PDF/Diaspora/links_and_resources/E
_L_BRIEF_05.pdf (09/2017 accessed). 
37 See K. Marchand, S. Langley, M. Siegel, Diaspora Engagement in 
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38 E. Svoboda, S. Pantuliano, International and local/diaspora actors in the 
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modalities between institutional actors and diaspora 
organizations.41 On the side of diaspora origin States, in a view to 
boost a co-development approach, some endowed their 
administrative structure with specific offices dedicated to 
migration issues such as Ministries of Diaspora, or institutions in 
charge of the relationship with the nationals living abroad.  
The concomitance of these two external opportunities, namely 
local humanitarian needs and external institutional support to 
diaspora engagement is gradually favouring the transnational 
activism of many diaspora groups, particularly from those 
Countries where humanitarian access is at stake for insecurity or 
for political reasons such as Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia. 
  
8. Factors limiting diaspora activism 
 
Despite the attempt by many institutional actors in the 
humanitarian and development fields to involve diaspora 
organizations as partners in operation, a number of reasons have 
halted engagement in genuine partnerships so far.  
Initial research42 aimed at exploring possible modalities of a 
collaboration between diaspora and conventional actors43 point 
towards two main concerns/challenges: the aid sector’s 
mechanisms and jargon, and discording agendas.  
																																								 																				
41 P. Mezzetti, V. Saggiomo, P. Pirkkalainen, “Interaction between the 
Somali organizations and Italian and Finnish development actors”, in L. 
Laakso, P. Hautaniemi, “Diasporas, Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa”, 
in Zed Africa New Series, 2014.   
42 The reasons limiting genuine partnerships between traditional aid 
agencies and diaspora organizations have been analysed within a scoping study 
on Diaspora Engagement commissioned to the author by the Danish Refugee 
Council in 2015-2016. The scoping study was conducted in collaboration with 
Giulia Spagna.  
43 Such as the Danish Refugee Council Diaspora Programme’s DEMAC 
project. 
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effect to   prompt the engagement of diaspora communities in 
their origin countries.39 Similarly, in the attempt to cover a wider 
scope of needs, in a greater number of crises, diaspora 
organizations have been involved as non-traditional partners by 
the international community for aid and development. During the 
2016 World Humanitarian Summit, donor countries and aid 
agencies manifested their willingness to engage with non-
traditional partners to complement efforts and widen the 
modalities to deliver aid in those places where access is limited 
to humanitarian actors.40  
Institutional support remains among those external 
opportunities triggering diaspora engagement. For this reason, for 
a host country, embracing a co-development perspective means 
not only considering migrants as a source of potential 
development initiatives both in the receiving and in the origin 
countries but also acquiring a political consciousness about the 
contribution that migrants can bring to the economic and social 
upgrade of the host society. In this sense, adopting a co-
development perspective is a political choice by both the host and 
origin country that facilitates and supports diaspora’s activism 
towards aid and development and seeks modalities to promote 
cooperation and partnership between the traditional development 
and humanitarian world and potential non-traditional partners, 
such as diaspora organizations and groups. For instance, some 
diaspora host countries enshrine diaspora contribution to 
development in the Development Master Plans, and in some cases 
in the institutional arena by providing official interaction 
																																								 																				
39 See for instance the effect of the “Diaspora programs” promoted in 
Denmark by the Danish Refugee Council with Somali and Afghan 
communities, or similar programs promoted by the International Organization 
for Migration in Italy, namely through the MIDA Youth, MIDA Women, 
MIDA Somalia.  
40 C. Lattimer, Think Piece: Humanitarian Financing, Paper drafted for the 
World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, Development Initiatives. 
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violence and political conflict, and may thus represent certain 
political factions and opinions. All these aspects, sometimes 
enshrined in the identity of diaspora networks, potentially 
contrast with the adherence to the core humanitarian principles, 
with special reference to neutrality, impartiality and operational 
independence.  
 
9. Practices of Co-development in Italy  
 
The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation (MAECI) supports co-development projects 
promoted by the International Organization for Migrations in 
Rome since 2002, within the general MIDA framework. MIDA is 
a capacity building approach adopted by the International 
Organization for Migrations in 2001, aimed at identifying 
diaspora professionals and favouring their temporary 
employment within public and private institutions in the origin 
countries so to promote forms of circular migration and engage 
migrants in their home countries’ development goals. Over time, 
the MIDA structure broadened to include actions targeting 
organizations of diaspora individuals, as an expression of a 
collective voice and desire by diaspora communities to engage in 
their origin countries’ development. The capacity building 
approach of MIDA re-oriented its focus on the empowerment of 
diaspora organizations, through training and financial support for 
specific diaspora-led activities. In this framework, the Italian 
section of MIDA program supported migrant communities from 
Senegal, Ethiopia and Ghana to establish both collective and 
individual initiatives such as transnational businesses between 
Italy and the origin countries, social projects, as well as research 
activities to inform policy on how to channel migrants’ 
remittances for triggering development. From 2008, the 
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With reference to the first concern, aid workers complain that 
diaspora organizations are often not familiar with current 
humanitarian mechanisms, actors and their jargon, including the 
Humanitarian law, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the 
core Humanitarian Standards.  In addition to this, different 
interpretations of concepts like “protection”, and scarce 
knowledge by diaspora actors of the ways the humanitarian 
system is structured and organised represent an additional barrier 
to collaboration with the international community, according to 
practitioners.  
Experience in this field suggests that diaspora organisations 
can adapt and eventually adopt principles and conduct of the 
prevailing humanitarian system.44 It is however important to be 
conscious that this kind of assimilation does not necessarily serve 
the purpose of improving the overall humanitarian response. In 
fact, diaspora organizations have their own operational modalities 
that the international community for aid and development should 
understand and recognize as complementary to mainstreaming 
humanitarian practices. Research has not yet discovered if one 
can truly speak of a “diaspora approach” in aid and development, 
but according to lessons learnt from practice45 it is collaboration 
rather than co-option that yield the best results for a fruitful 
engagement with diaspora actors.  
The second challenge, discording agendas, refers to the 
observation that contrarily to most traditional humanitarian 
actors, many diaspora organisations are indeed based on 
ethnicity, tribal connections, political affiliation or religion. 
Diasporas mainly originate from forced migration related to 
																																								 																				
44 E. Svoboda, S. Pantuliano, International and local/diaspora actors in the 
Syria response, cit. 
45 V. Saggiomo, A. Ferro, Mid-Term Evaluation DIASPORA PROGRAM: 
Diaspora driven relief, rehabilitation and development, Copenhagen: Danish 
Refugee Council, 2014. 
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strategic policy of international cooperation, in view of the 2015 
Expo. Between 2008 and 2009, the Municipality availed about 
two million euro to diaspora organizations for pursuing their 
development objectives in the origin countries. The municipality 
of Milan, through a competitive selection of proposals, intended 
to enhance the social and human capital of migrant communities 
in Milan, and build on the municipality past experiences on 
supporting migrants’ engagement in their origin countries’ 
development.    
It is important to note that the effort of the Municipalities in 
the co-development approach complement the one of the civil 
society that independently gathered in the last ten years to discuss 
theoretical implications of the co-development. This is the case 
of Fondazioni4Africa Senegal Project, born after the initiative of 
four Italian banking foundations, four Italian NGOs, a research 
centre, and three Senegalese Diaspora organizations based in Italy 
with the objective to improve the socio-economic conditions of 
people living in Senegal, activating the decentralized cooperation 
system in Italy, particularly from the Tuscan region.   
 
10. New trends: From unconnected practices to 
comprehensive policies  
 
While scholars underline that, until 2009, practices of co-
development in Italy existed at local level without a national 
broader strategy,49 today the inclusion of migrants’ organizations 
in the Law 125/201450 hopefully represents a first step towards 
the elaboration of a national policy dedicated to promote co-
development at the national level in Italy. In fact, for the first time 
ever, the Italian Law on International Cooperation for 
																																								 																				
49 A. Stocchiero, Sei Personaggi in cerca di autore. Il Co-Sviluppo in Italia: 
pratiche senza politica, CeSPI Working Papers, 60/2009. 
50 Law 125/2014, Article 26 paragraph 2.d.  
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geographical coverage of MIDA interventions in Italy included 
Somalia, Latin America and the Middle East.46   
Despite not being formally part of a general development 
strategy of the Italian Cooperation,47 the linkage between 
migration and development and the co-development approach did 
represent a continuum in the Italian cooperation practice since 
2002. In addition to supporting co-development projects 
promoted by the IOM, in 2008 the Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs funded the PLASEPRI program (Plateforme d’appui au 
secteur privé) to the Senegalese Government with the 
considerable amount of twenty-four million euro. The Program 
ended in 2015 and aimed at supporting the establishment of small 
and medium enterprises in the agricultural sector in the regions 
where the majority of Senegalese people in Italy come from. The 
program provided technical and financial support to the 
Senegalese community in Italy for promoting co-development 
projects in Senegal, also through decentralized cooperation.   
In the last decade, parallel to co-development projects funded 
by the Italian Cooperation, a considerable number of co-
development practices arise from local level initiatives at 
municipal and regional level, through the various decentralized 
cooperation channels. These practices involve civil society actors, 
banks, migrants, local authorities in what has been called by 
scholars a bottom-up approach to co-development,48 as opposed 
to a top down approach, guided by a national strategy eventually 
designed for enhancing the role of migration for development. 
The municipality of Milan is an example of an Italian 
Municipality that pointed to co-development as one of the main 
																																								 																				
46 International Organization for Migration, The MIDA experience and 
beyond, IOM Geneva, 2009. 
47 A. Stocchiero, Sei Personaggi in cerca di autore. Il Co-Sviluppo in Italia: 
pratiche senza politica, CeSPI Working Papers, 60/2009. 
48 S. Ceschi (ed), Movimenti migratori e percorsi di cooperazione. 
L’esperienza di co-sviluppo di Fondazioni4Africa – Senegal, Carocci, 2012. 
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Despite this remarkable progress, it must be noted that the 
focus on co-development adopted by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and international cooperation and its implicit reference to 
the positive contribution of migrants to development seem to 
clash with the securitarian approach that prevails in the measures 
adopted by the Ministry of Interior, when dealing with the 
migration phenomenon. The restriction of the rights of migrants 
enshrined in the 2017 Minniti law, the prolixity of bureaucratic 
procedures for admission, residence and working permits hamper 
integration opportunities for migrants upon arrival and in the first 
years of permanence in Italy. Because integration is key to sustain 
diaspora engagement, the approach to migration management of 
the Ministry of Interior contradicts the efforts of the Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation of promoting an active 
positive role of migrants at national and transnational level.  
Italy seems to be caught in a dual approach to the migration 
phenomenon that risks undermining the effectiveness of the 
Migration and Development approach and of the co-development 
practices described above. To promote the convergence of 
migration management policies by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation on the side of diaspora 
work and the Ministry of Interiors on the side of new arrivals, 
more work is needed on integration measures that, according to 
research, have the effect to speed and easy diaspora engagement 
in development. Institutions in Italy should adopt a rights-
oriented approach, with operative implications in facilitating the 
acquisition of rights by migrants, such as, for instance, the right 
of movement on the European territory, the right to access social 
services, starting from health, decent houses and education, the 
right to participate actively in the socio-political life of the host 
country.  
The entitlement to enjoy these rights fully on the Italian 
territory would facilitate the integration of migrants in our 
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Development 125/2014 explicitly conceives migrants as agents of 
local development,51 with the view to promote the positive impact 
of migrations for both the origin and destination countries.  
This reference in the Italian law is clearly rooted in the co-
development approach, in accordance with the recent EU 
recognition of migrants as agents of development.52  
In addition, by providing an institutional framework to 
decentralized cooperation promoted by local authorities in the 
pursuit of their international development cooperation relations, 
the law 125/2014 allows the Italian national level governance to 
capitalize on the work done by those Provinces and 
Municipalities in the co-development sector.53 
 
11. Conclusions 
 
The new Italian Law on Cooperation for Development marks 
a shift in the Italian scenario whereas various practices of co-
development existed in isolation, without a comprehensive policy 
framework and development objective. Differently, today, after 
the new Italian law on Cooperation and development that 
recognize migrants as agents of development, the Italian 
government started to frame co-development potentials within a 
broader development policy. 
																																								 																				
51 Law 125/2014, article 2, paragraph 6: “Italian cooperation policies, by 
promoting local development also through the role played by communities of 
immigrants and their relations with their Countries of origin, contributes to 
developing shared migration policies with Partner Countries, inspired by the 
safeguard of human rights and compliance with European and international 
legislation”. 
52 European Commission, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, 
Migration and Development Commission staff working paper accompanying 
the document Communication form the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions, COM 2011 743 final. 
53 See article 9 Territorial Partnerships of law 125/2014. 
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1. Global trends in international migrations flows 
 
When assessing the rights of refugees and migrants that are 
being systematically violated by States in recent years, it could be 
useful to start with an overview of global trends regarding 
migration flows.   
First, it is worth noting that there is no single factor or cause 
for the current crisis of mass displacement of refugees and 
migrants. On the contrary, while armed conflict and persecution 
are still one of the main causes of forced displacement in several 
regions of the world, they are no longer the only determinants of 
people’s movements. Other factors include general violence 
perpetrated by a range of non-State actors, such as armed gangs 
and organized crime, discrimination and violence against 
communities, forced recruitment, as well as sexual and gender 
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societies, the development of those skills and attitudes that 
constitute the so-called social remittances as soon as migrants 
transfer them back to their origin countries. Ultimately, 
promoting integration of migrants through a rights-based 
approach would favour temporarily or permanent return of 
migrants/diasporas to their origin countries as agents of 
development, social change and economic progress. 
Far from promoting random discontinuous actions, a rights-
based approach should be enshrined in a long-term migration 
management process that entailing coordination between the 
local, regional and national institutional level, systematic 
programming and funding, and flexibility in meeting counterpart 
migrants’ needs.  
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passing an improved version of the European Commission Dublin 
regulation reform proposal3 –, but the final outcome is still 
uncertain. 
Finally, in terms of global trends, I must draw attention to the 
rise of xenophobia in the form of racist attacks against refugees 
in many regions and to the existence of a political rhetoric that 
equates the movements of refugees to a terrorist threat in several 
European Countries, the United States and South Africa. This, 
together with the lack of recognition of rights and integration 
policies, results in denial of access to appropriate assistance and 
basic services. Finally, in some cases, States are using anti-
terrorist operations as a pretext to crack down on refugees, while 
instrumentalizing the general migration issue in order to generate 
fear and gather consensus – something that has become common 
practice among politicians. 
 
2. States’ shared responsibility on refugees  
 
If 2016 was the year in which the international community 
realized the magnitude of the refugee crisis, 2017 is the year of 
States burying their heads in the sand and leaving the search for a 
solution to others. Wealthy States and the international 
community as a whole failed to equitably share responsibility for 
managing the ongoing global refugee crisis. Such responsibility 
																																								 																				
3	During the meeting of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (LIBE) of 19 October 2017, a major reform of the Dublin regulation 
was passed (41 in favour, 14 against and 0 abstentions), which determines 
which member state is responsible for processing an asylum request. The aim 
is to tackle the weaknesses of the current asylum rules and to share 
responsibility more equally between member States. All asylum seekers should 
be registered upon arrival in the EU and people needing protection should also 
be able to get it much faster, while those who do not could be returned more 
swiftly. Cecilia Wikström (ALDE, SE) was the rapporteur. See: 
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586639/EPRS_BRI%2
82016%29586639_EN.pdf.	
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based violence. Additional factors that are normally debated 
when recognizing the right to international protection are poverty, 
inequality and climate change.  
Also, economic interests by criminal groups are fueled by a 
wide use of restrictive migration policies by States, resulting in a 
serious lack of safe and legal pathways for refugees and migrants, 
who put their lives at risk undertaking illegal and dangerous 
routes by land and sea, in an attempt to find refuge. Amnesty 
International (AI) asserts that, instead of managing these flows in 
a humane and efficient manner, States prefer to ignore the bigger 
picture and manage the flows on a security basis. With the result 
that many of the refugees and migrants who survive the trip must 
face numerous violations and abuses along the transit routes as 
some regional contexts are particularly well known for mass 
violations of human rights. This is the case, for example, in the 
Central Mediterranean Sea, with its enormous death toll, as well 
as in North Africa, Southeast Asia, and Mexico1.  
Amnesty International is also seriously concerned about a 
widespread practice of refoulement in all regions of the world, in 
spite of its prohibition by the Geneva Convention on the Refugee 
Status2. I will focus specifically on the appalling case of 
refoulement from Europe to Afghanistan, in the final paragraph 
of this essay. With regard to the above-mentioned convention, the 
reluctance of new States to ratify it weakens the effectiveness of 
the international protection of refugees in Europe, where we are 
witnessing an erosion of the relevant existing legal framework. It 
is true that an attempt to reform the Common European Asylum 
System is underway – with the European Parliament recently 
																																								 																				
1 See Amnesty International – International Secretariat’s website, on 
Refugees and Migrants: www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/refugees-asylum-
seekers-and-migrants/. 
2 Please find the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugee, here: 
www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html. 
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passing an improved version of the European Commission Dublin 
regulation reform proposal3 –, but the final outcome is still 
uncertain. 
Finally, in terms of global trends, I must draw attention to the 
rise of xenophobia in the form of racist attacks against refugees 
in many regions and to the existence of a political rhetoric that 
equates the movements of refugees to a terrorist threat in several 
European Countries, the United States and South Africa. This, 
together with the lack of recognition of rights and integration 
policies, results in denial of access to appropriate assistance and 
basic services. Finally, in some cases, States are using anti-
terrorist operations as a pretext to crack down on refugees, while 
instrumentalizing the general migration issue in order to generate 
fear and gather consensus – something that has become common 
practice among politicians. 
 
2. States’ shared responsibility on refugees  
 
If 2016 was the year in which the international community 
realized the magnitude of the refugee crisis, 2017 is the year of 
States burying their heads in the sand and leaving the search for a 
solution to others. Wealthy States and the international 
community as a whole failed to equitably share responsibility for 
managing the ongoing global refugee crisis. Such responsibility 
																																								 																				
3	During the meeting of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (LIBE) of 19 October 2017, a major reform of the Dublin regulation 
was passed (41 in favour, 14 against and 0 abstentions), which determines 
which member state is responsible for processing an asylum request. The aim 
is to tackle the weaknesses of the current asylum rules and to share 
responsibility more equally between member States. All asylum seekers should 
be registered upon arrival in the EU and people needing protection should also 
be able to get it much faster, while those who do not could be returned more 
swiftly. Cecilia Wikström (ALDE, SE) was the rapporteur. See: 
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586639/EPRS_BRI%2
82016%29586639_EN.pdf.	
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particular, AI believes that the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and the other international and regional 
instruments of refugee law remain the main framework for the 
protection of refugees worldwide.  While it is understandable that 
pre-established principles and mechanisms are needed (including 
a definition of fair and proportionate contribution by each State), 
an effective responsibility-sharing framework should also ensure 
a proactive response to displacement crises. It is worth clarifying 
that, although a flexible approach to responsibility-sharing may 
allow States to contribute in different ways to a common 
response, financial support to Countries hosting large numbers of 
refugees and asylum-seekers in times of crisis should not be 
considered as a substitute for contributions to resettlement and 
relocation, or to the admission of asylum-seekers at the border.   
In the Organisation’s opinion, the new Global Compact on 
refugee responsibility sharing should include: a permanent 
distribution system of resettlement places, based on objective 
criteria; in cases of large movements of refugees, an additional 
distribution system to admit refugees through expedited safe and 
legal routes, also based on objective criteria; guaranteed full, 
flexible and predictable funding for refugee protection and 
meaningful financial support to Countries hosting large numbers 
of refugees (as said, over and above existing development 
assistance programmes); strengthened refugee status 
determination systems and increased use of prima facie 
recognition of refugee status; and, last but not least, respect, 
protection and fulfilment of the rights of refugees in their Country 
of asylum, including the enjoyment of an adequate standard of 
living, access to education, healthcare and other services, as well 
as economic self-reliance7.  
																																								 																				
7 See Amnesty International, The Global Refugee Crisis: Genuine 
Responsibility Sharing - Amnesty International’s Five Proposals, available at: 
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior40/4380/2016/en/. 
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still lies disproportionately with poorer Countries: 86% of the 
world’s 20 million refugees are in developing States4.  
Unfortunately, in 2016, several international meetings failed 
to address the global refugee crisis and provide relief to refugees 
and to the main host Countries: the World Humanitarian Summit, 
the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, the UN 
General Assembly High-Level Plenary on addressing large 
movements of refugees and migrants, the US-led Summit on the 
global refugee crisis. All these meetings led only to a few 
declarations on resettlement quotas from Syria. 
Amnesty International’s main objective regarding all the 
international meetings was for States to use them as opportunities 
to move from stop gap measures to long-term, proactive and 
globally coordinated solutions for refugee protection and 
responsibility-sharing5. Although the international community 
postponed the solution of the problem to 2019, AI continues to 
ask for a new Global Compact that will: resettle all refugees who 
are identified by UNHCR to be in need of resettlement, establish 
or increase alternative pathways for the admission of refugees, 
and significantly increase their contribution to humanitarian 
financing (including UN humanitarian appeals). A new Global 
Compact on refugee responsibility-sharing should also be firmly 
based on international human rights and refugee law6. In 
																																								 																				
4 See UNHCR “Figures at a glance”: www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-
glance.html. 
5 See S. Shetty, Tackling the global refugee crisis: Sharing, not shirking 
responsibility, Amnesty International 04/10/2016, available at: 
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/10/tackling-the-global-refugee-
crisis-sharing-responsibility/. See also, Amnesty International, UN Refugee 
Summit talks end in abject failure, 03/08/2016, available at: 
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/un-refugee-summit-talks-end-in-
abject-failure/.   
6 See S. Shetty, Global refugee deal risks being sacrificed on altar of selfish 
national interests, available at: www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/glo 
bal-refugee-deal-risks-being-sacrificed-on-altar-of-selfish-national-interests/. 
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7 See Amnesty International, The Global Refugee Crisis: Genuine 
Responsibility Sharing - Amnesty International’s Five Proposals, available at: 
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior40/4380/2016/en/. 
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on mutual recognition and mobility. In particular, EU legislators 
must ensure that the following core principles guide the reform: 
swift access to international protection; respect for human rights, 
particularly the right to seek asylum and the principles of family 
unity and the prohibition of non-refoulement; strong procedural 
rights (in line with EU law and European Court of Human Rights 
case law), such as provision of information, access to a lawyer, 
personal interview, and effective remedies; as well as flexibility 
to accommodate personal and humanitarian circumstances9.  
As for the international resettlement scheme, even though we 
have seen greater attention and commitment by many States that 
have increased their quotas, this has not yet reached UNHCR 
targets. Also, as long as this scheme remains voluntary, it is of 
little help in making States accountable. The European Union, for 
example, is making its policy on resettlement conditional on 
migration management cooperation. This trend, that first emerged 
in the case of the political agreement with Turkey, in 2016, is 
extremely worrying. The notion of one place being made 
available in Turkey for every Syrian refugee returned from 
Greece makes every place contingent upon a person taking the 
life threatening sea route to Greece disregarding the basic 
principles of the international protection system. It is now clear – 
with the relentless effort of the Italian Government, which is 
already paying the Al-Serraji Government in order to stop 
departures of migrants and facilitate readmissions, and the fund 
																																								 																				
9 See: Amnesty International European Institutions Office, Amnesty 
International Recommendations to the Slovak EU Presidency, pp. 2-4, 
available at: www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Presidency/AI_SK_Presidency_ 
calls_FINAL_new.pdf; Amnesty International European Institutions Office, 
Amnesty International’s contribution to the European Commission’s public 
consultation on the Debate on the future agenda for Home Affairs policies: An 
open and safe Europe – what next?, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-consultation/2013/pdf/0027  
/organisations/ai-amnesty-international_en.pdf. 
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3. Safe and legal pathways for refugees and migrants 
 
When it comes to the issue of safe and legal routes, the case of 
the European Union is pivotal. Since there is no safe and regular 
pathway for migrants and refugees to reach Europe, in  past years 
a large number of individuals have been risking their lives on 
irregular journeys by land or sea, transiting from Africa and the 
Middle East through Turkey or through the Mediterranean. 
Regarding the latter in particular, notwithstanding the major 
efforts of the Italian Navy and the EU operation Sophia, as well 
as of many NGO vessels (for the short period they were allowed 
by the Italian Government to operate freely in the area, in 
cooperation with the Italian Coast Guard8), hundreds of men, 
women and children died before reaching Italian shores. The 
Italian Section of Amnesty International is clearly strongly 
involved and committed to resolving this problem and, at 
European level, AI has been relentlessly working on the 
negotiations on legal pathways for humanitarian admission, 
particularly on the mentioned Dublin Regulation (Dublin III) 
review process, the international resettlement scheme, and the 
creation of new legal migration pathways. 
With regard to the review of Dublin III, which is universally 
recognized as a weak system with regard to its design, as well as 
to its implementation, it is imperative that any reform proposal be 
based on fairer distribution, an integration perspective, as well as 
																																								 																				
8 See some NGOs reactions: Doctors Without Borders, MSF committed to 
saving lives on Mediterranean but will not sign the Italian “Code of Conduct, 
available at: www.msf.org/en/article/msf-committed-saving-lives-mediterrane 
an-will-not-sign-italian-code-conduct; ASGI (Associazione Studi Giuridici 
sull’Immigrazione), Position Paper on the Proposed Code of Conduct for Ngos 
Involved in Migrants’ Rescue at Sea, available at: www.asgi.it/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/Draft-ASGI-Position-Paper_Final_EN.pdf; Human 
Rights Watch, EU: Draft Code for Sea Rescues Threatens Live, available at: 
www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/12/eu-draft-code-sea-rescues-threatens-lives. 
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on mutual recognition and mobility. In particular, EU legislators 
must ensure that the following core principles guide the reform: 
swift access to international protection; respect for human rights, 
particularly the right to seek asylum and the principles of family 
unity and the prohibition of non-refoulement; strong procedural 
rights (in line with EU law and European Court of Human Rights 
case law), such as provision of information, access to a lawyer, 
personal interview, and effective remedies; as well as flexibility 
to accommodate personal and humanitarian circumstances9.  
As for the international resettlement scheme, even though we 
have seen greater attention and commitment by many States that 
have increased their quotas, this has not yet reached UNHCR 
targets. Also, as long as this scheme remains voluntary, it is of 
little help in making States accountable. The European Union, for 
example, is making its policy on resettlement conditional on 
migration management cooperation. This trend, that first emerged 
in the case of the political agreement with Turkey, in 2016, is 
extremely worrying. The notion of one place being made 
available in Turkey for every Syrian refugee returned from 
Greece makes every place contingent upon a person taking the 
life threatening sea route to Greece disregarding the basic 
principles of the international protection system. It is now clear – 
with the relentless effort of the Italian Government, which is 
already paying the Al-Serraji Government in order to stop 
departures of migrants and facilitate readmissions, and the fund 
																																								 																				
9 See: Amnesty International European Institutions Office, Amnesty 
International Recommendations to the Slovak EU Presidency, pp. 2-4, 
available at: www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Presidency/AI_SK_Presidency_ 
calls_FINAL_new.pdf; Amnesty International European Institutions Office, 
Amnesty International’s contribution to the European Commission’s public 
consultation on the Debate on the future agenda for Home Affairs policies: An 
open and safe Europe – what next?, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/public-consultation/2013/pdf/0027  
/organisations/ai-amnesty-international_en.pdf. 
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State that people are trying to enter, usually through enhanced 
cooperation with other Countries11.  
Generally, Amnesty International considers that external 
migration policies are not unlawful per se and can include many 
different measures and activities. First of all, the externalisation 
of border control, which is to say enlisting other Countries to 
engage in punitive or preventive policies to stop irregular border 
crossings by refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants. Secondly, 
the externalisation of the asylum process, which is to say shifting 
to other Countries the responsibility for providing protection to 
those seeking asylum, as well as readmission agreements that 
facilitate the forcible return (to their Countries of origin) of people 
with no right to remain, such as irregular migrants or people 
whose asylum claims were unsuccessful. International assistance 
can also be used for externalisation purposes. For instance, States 
use positive incentives that attempt to address the perceived 
causes of migration and displacement by improving living 
conditions and access to rights and protection in Countries of 
origin and transit (including development aid, trade measures and 
foreign direct investment), as well as negative incentives. 
Another example of positive external migration policies are safe 
and regular entry pathways, such as policies enabling regular 
access to destination Countries for people in need of protection 
(e.g. resettlement, family reunification, protected entry, 
community sponsorships, etc.), as well as for migrants (e.g. 
labour migration schemes, student visas, etc.).   
However Amnesty International believes that several types of 
external migration policies, and particularly the externalisation of 
border control and asylum-processing, are dangerous to human 
rights12. And such policies are found in many regions of the 
																																								 																				
11 Idem, p. 5.  
12 More specifically: Right to Seek and Enjoy Asylum  (Art. 14, Universal 
Declaration Of Human Rights), Principle of Non-Refoulement (Art. 3, 
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raising effort at international level – that the EU is going to apply 
the same externalisation scheme to Libya.  
Finally, AI is firmly convinced that a lasting solution to the 
current refugee crisis will not be possible unless States start 
considering ordinary ways to let migrant workers (the so-called 
“economic migrants”) into their borders, safely. In with this 
regard, it is particularly interesting – and troubling – to note that, 
in its cooperation with “key” Third States, the EU is developing 
tailor made packages of incentives, asking them to ensure 
effective returns and readmission of migrants, in exchange for 
legal migration opportunities for their own nationals. This is of 
course no solution to refugees’ displacements nor to economic 
migration. 
 
4. Externalisation of migration control: EU cooperation with 
Turkey and Libya  
 
One recent and serious concern of AI, observing advanced 
States increasingly attempting to escape their responsibility 
towards refugees, is a widespread externalisation of migration 
policies10. The right of States to control their territory is clearly 
not questionable, as it is in their legitimate interest to control 
migration into their territories, and cooperate with other States in 
this field. What is questionable though is the regrettable practice 
by some States of placing increasing emphasis on certain 
“external migration policies” to define and manage the migration 
issue in general. These policies can in fact be a multifaceted 
spectrum of actions implemented outside of the territory of the 
																																								 																				
10 See Amnesty International, The Human Rights risks of External 
Migration Policies, available at: www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol30/6200/ 
2017/en/. 
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visa-free travel for Turkish nationals by June 2016, as well as to 
revive the stalled negotiations for Turkey to accede to the EU. 
Though following the attempted coup against president Erdogan 
and his subsequent hideous repression of Turkish society it 
appears that only the first part of the agreement has been 
implemented. 
The agreement was based on the assumption that Turkey is a 
safe place to which asylum-seekers and refugees can be returned. 
But this is clearly not the case. First of all, Amnesty International 
research has shown that, in late 2015 and early 2016, asylum-
seekers and refugees in Turkey were sent back to Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Syria, in violation of the principle of non-refoulement. 
Second, since Turkey is hardly safe for its own citizens, 
nowadays; it cannot really ensure asylum-seekers and refugees 
the full enjoyment of their rights.  
In this regard, a 2016 AI briefing (“No Safe Refuge: Asylum-
Seekers and Refugees Denied Effective Protection in Turkey”15) 
focusing on the treatment received in Turkey, shows that – 
contrary to what is required under EU and international law – 
asylum-seekers do not have access to fair and efficient procedures 
for the determination of their status, since Turkey’s asylum 
system is still very young and under-developed. Also, asylum-
seekers and refugees do not have timely access to so-called 
“durable solutions” as identified by UNHCR, including 
repatriation to Countries of origin (when safe), integration in host 
Countries, and resettlement to Third Countries. Lastly, research 
shows that asylum-seekers and refugees in Turkey are denied 
access to means of subsistence sufficient to maintain an adequate 
																																								 																				
15 See Amnesty International, No Safe Refuge: Asylum-Seekers and 
Refugees Denied Effective Protection in Turkey, available at: 
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur44/3825/2016/en/.  
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world. Apart from those initiated by the European Union and its 
Member States – briefly mentioned above and to which I will 
return in a moment – we also find that, for instance, Australia has 
concluded formal externalisation agreements with Cambodia, 
Nauru and Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the United States has 
externalized border control mechanisms in place with Mexico, 
Honduras and Guatemala13.  
To return to the European continent, the mentioned “EU-
Turkey Deal” is a milestone in this field. Under the terms of the 
agreement, “All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into 
Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey”14. 
This means that three categories of people are being returned: 
people who do not apply for asylum in Greece; those whose 
asylum applications have been evaluated by the Greek authorities 
and judged unfounded; and those whose asylum applications 
were found by the Greek authorities to be inadmissible. In 
exchange, the EU promised to resettle one Syrian refugee from 
Turkey to the EU for each Syrian refugee returned from Greece 
to Turkey (up to a maximum of 72,000 people). It also committed 
to provide up to 6 billion euros for a “Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey” (but only the first half has been delivered so far), to grant 
																																								 																				
Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman Or Degrading 
Treatment Or Punishment), Right to Liberty (Art. 9, International Covenant 
On Civil And Political Rights), Right to a Remedy (Art. 2, International 
Covenant On Civil And Political Rights), Freedom from Torture and Other Ill-
Treatment (Art. 2, Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman Or 
Degrading Treatment Or Punishment). 
13 See B. Frelick, I. M. Kysel, J. Podkul, “The Impact of Externalisation of 
Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants”, 
in Journal on Migration and Human Security, Volume 4, Number 4 (2016), 
pp. 190-220. 
14 Please find the text of the EU-Turkey Deal on the European Council 
website: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-tur 
key-Statement/. See also, a Questions & Answers document, by the European 
Commission, here: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_it.ht 
m. 
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15 See Amnesty International, No Safe Refuge: Asylum-Seekers and 
Refugees Denied Effective Protection in Turkey, available at: 
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur44/3825/2016/en/.  
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in torture resulting from cooperation on migration with Libya, AI 
pointed out that, with the support of the EU and the 
encouragement of many of its member States, Italy has put in 
place measures to support Libyan authorities – as well as informal 
leaders and groups – in their border control activities that are 
trapping hundreds of thousands of people in a Country where they 
are constantly exposed to the risk of serious human rights 
violations, and where they have no access to any form of 
protection. As a matter of fact, UNHCR operations in Libya are 
extremely limited due to security concerns and Libya, whose 
internal political conflict is far from settled, does not have an 
asylum system. Various NGOs and UN bodies confirm that 
thousands of refugees and migrants are arbitrarily detained in 
centers formally managed by the Libyan Ministry of Interior, as 
well as in informal detention centers run by militias and criminal 
gangs. In both types of centers, they are systematically exposed 
to torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
including sexual violence, usually to extort a ransom. Many are 
killed or left to die after being tortured, or are sometimes sold for 
forced labour. Moreover, these already vulnerable people are 
exposed to the generalized lawlessness and violence ruling the 
Country, where racism against sub-Saharan nationals is ordinary 
and widespread.  
Amnesty International documented this situation by 
interviewing hundreds of people19 and monitoring several 
incidents at sea, demonstrating, the reckless conduct of the 
Libyan Coast Guard that, when it does not resort to firearms and 
violence, it operates in disregard of basic security protocols and 
international standards20, as also reported in recent UN 
																																								 																				
19 See Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm: The Failure of European 
Policies in the central Mediterranean, available at: www.amnesty.org/en/doc 
uments/eur03/6655/2017/en/. 
20 Idem, pp. 21-26. 
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standard of living, due to the overall difficult situation of the 
Country and to additional barriers.  
As mentioned above, AI is also deeply concerned about EU’s 
plans to cooperate more closely with Libya on migration control, 
since this risks fueling the ill-treatment and indefinite detention 
of thousands of refugees and migrants in that Country. 
Testimonies gathered during AI visits to Sicily and Puglia in 2016 
and 2017 reveal shocking abuses by the Libyan coastguard and at 
immigration detention centers in Libya. Specifically, in a 2016 
report, the Organisation collected 90 testimonies regarding 
shootings and beatings by the Coast Guard, torture and other ill-
treatment at detention centers, and a case of a migrants’ boat left 
to sink with some 120 people on board16. Amnesty International 
is appalled by the Libyan Coast Guard’s practice of intercepting 
thousands of people at sea and returning them to detention centers 
where they suffer torture and other horrific abuses. It is therefore 
critical that any support from the EU and the Italian Government 
does not fuel the human rights violations to which foreign 
nationals in Libya are being subjected, such as torture, sexual 
violence, religious discrimination, exploitation, extortion or being 
sold to smugglers17. 
In preparation for Italy’s periodic review of before the UN 
Committee Against Torture, in November 2017, Amnesty 
International submitted its concerns and recommendations on the 
specific matter of torture and other human rights violations of 
refugees and migrants pushed-back or blocked in Libya favored 
by Italian and EU policies18.  With particular regard to complicity 
																																								 																				
16 See, Amnesty International, Lives Adrift: Refugees and Migrants in Peril 
in the Central Mediterranean, available at: www.amnesty.org/en/documents/E 
UR05/006/2014/en/. 
17 See Amnesty International, Italy: Submission to the United Nations 
Committee against Torture, 62nd Session, 6 November - 6 December 2017, 
available at: www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur30/7241/2017/en/. 
18 Idem, pp. 12-19. 
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in torture resulting from cooperation on migration with Libya, AI 
pointed out that, with the support of the EU and the 
encouragement of many of its member States, Italy has put in 
place measures to support Libyan authorities – as well as informal 
leaders and groups – in their border control activities that are 
trapping hundreds of thousands of people in a Country where they 
are constantly exposed to the risk of serious human rights 
violations, and where they have no access to any form of 
protection. As a matter of fact, UNHCR operations in Libya are 
extremely limited due to security concerns and Libya, whose 
internal political conflict is far from settled, does not have an 
asylum system. Various NGOs and UN bodies confirm that 
thousands of refugees and migrants are arbitrarily detained in 
centers formally managed by the Libyan Ministry of Interior, as 
well as in informal detention centers run by militias and criminal 
gangs. In both types of centers, they are systematically exposed 
to torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
including sexual violence, usually to extort a ransom. Many are 
killed or left to die after being tortured, or are sometimes sold for 
forced labour. Moreover, these already vulnerable people are 
exposed to the generalized lawlessness and violence ruling the 
Country, where racism against sub-Saharan nationals is ordinary 
and widespread.  
Amnesty International documented this situation by 
interviewing hundreds of people19 and monitoring several 
incidents at sea, demonstrating, the reckless conduct of the 
Libyan Coast Guard that, when it does not resort to firearms and 
violence, it operates in disregard of basic security protocols and 
international standards20, as also reported in recent UN 
																																								 																				
19 See Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm: The Failure of European 
Policies in the central Mediterranean, available at: www.amnesty.org/en/doc 
uments/eur03/6655/2017/en/. 
20 Idem, pp. 21-26. 
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region), as well as the southern borders, and to assist the Libyan 
authorities in establishing two operational coordination centers26. 
On 2 August 2017, in response to a formal request by Al-Serraji, 
Italy launched a naval operation in Libyan waters and deployed 
Navy officials on Libyan soil to support Libyan authorities in 
their activities against irregular migration and human 
smuggling27. As a result of these measures, the number of people 
intercepted at sea by the Libyan Coastguard and disembarked in 
Libya has increased. In 2017 about 16.500 people were routinely 
taken to official and informal detention centers and exposed to 
serious human rights violations and abuses28. 
To conclude, Governments often claim that their border 
control efforts are aimed at saving lives by reducing the incidence 
of irregular border crossings, or at combating criminal networks 
of smugglers and traffickers, but, as shown above, this is not 
always the case. On the contrary and in most cases, their primary 
goal is to reduce the number of people arriving, in the shortest 
possible time. Furthermore, while Amnesty International 
welcomes approaches that employ positive incentives (such as the 
creation of safe and legal routes to move across borders, as well 
as international cooperation intended to improve living conditions 
in refugee camps in developing Countries and establish viable 
asylum-systems), it recognizes that punitive or preventive 
measures are often synonymous with human rights abuse. The 
Organisation therefore notes that the current approach is bound to 
exacerbate the current unfair distribution of responsibility 
between developed and developing Countries, and will in fact 
																																								 																				
26 See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2187_en.htm.  
27 See: www.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/documentiparlamentari/IndiceE 
Testi/250/002/INTERO.pdf.  
28 The Libyan Coastguard reportedly intercepted and pulled back to Libya 
18,904 refugees and migrants in 2016. See: www.iom.int/news/iom-eu-train-
libyan-mediterraneanmigrant-rescuers; and www.iom.int/news/mediterranean 
-migrant-arrivals-reach-131772-2017-deaths-reach-2556.  
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documents21. In August 2017, the UN Special Rapporteurs on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution22, as well as the 
Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants and the 
Special Rapporteur on torture23, expressed their concern about 
interceptions resulting in disembarkation in Libya. Unfortunately, 
funding and expanding the programmes of international 
Agencies, which Italy and the EU are doing, is not sufficient to 
ensure that cooperation with Libya on migration issues does not 
violate human rights, including the prohibition of torture.  
In its submission to CAT, Amnesty International recalls the 
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a further six25. In July 2017, a 46.3 million euros project was 
approved under the EU Trust Fund for Africa, to strengthen 
Libyan capacity along the sea border (defining a Libyan SAR 
																																								 																				
21 See OHCHR, “Detained And Dehumanised” Report on Human Rights 
Abuses against Migrants in Libya, available at: www.ohchr.org/Documents/C 
ountries/LY/DetainedAndDehumanised_en.pdf. 
22 See OHCHR, Italy-EU search and rescue code could increase 
Mediterranean deaths, UN expert warns, 15 August 2017, available at: 
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21971&
LangID=E. 
23 See OHCHR, EU ‘trying to move border to Libya’ using policy that 
breaches rights – UN experts, 17 August 2017: www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEven 
ts/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21978&LangID=E. 
24 The training covers basic seamanship, more advanced specialist skills, as 
well as human rights and international law. Amnesty International reports that 
a new training, involving 87 Libyan personnel, began in Taranto, Italy, on 17 
September 2017, see: https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eunavf 
or-med/32315/operation-sophia-new-training-modules-libyan-coastguard-and 
-navy-arranged-italy_en; and www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releas 
es/2017/07/25-eunavformed-sophia-mandate-extended/. 
25 See: www.interno.gov.it/it/notizie/contro-traffico-dei-migranti-consegn 
ate-prime - motovedette-alla-marina-libica.  
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Operations (ECHO) Stated that the situation had “reverted to an 
increasingly acute humanitarian crisis”32. Beyond the general 
conflict-related risks, many people in the Country are also at 
particular risk of persecution. Amnesty International documented 
that human rights violations and persecution are widespread in 
areas under the control of the Government, as well as where Anti-
Government Elements are in control. These include extrajudicial 
executions, torture and ill-treatment, as well as denials of the 
rights to free movement, freedom of expression, political 
participation, access to education and the right to health care. 
Moreover, both sides of the conflict perpetrate human rights 
violations in areas outside their respective control, in a situation 
where accountability is almost impossible. 
It is clear that Afghans fleeing their Country who reach Europe 
have the right to lodge an asylum claim – and that they cannot be 
returned, based on the principle of non-refoulement. 
Unfortunately, though, AI noted a decrease in the recognition 
rates of Afghans’ applications for international protection in 
European Countries, in recent years, as well as a specular increase 
in forced returns or in the so-called “assisted voluntary returns” 
(which are nonetheless mandatory). The reason for this can only 
be linked to the refugee crisis in Europe and to the subsequent 
pressure by EU institutions and member States on Afghanistan to 
accept large numbers of returns, including through economic 
means (see development aid). Consequently, in order to be able 
to return people to that Country, many European States declared 
some areas of Afghanistan as “safe”, relying on the idea of an 
“Internal Flight Alternative” (IFA). In other words, the authorities 
recognise that the person’s province of origin is dangerous, but 
expect them to live elsewhere in the Country. To Amnesty 
																																								 																				
32 See European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 
Afghanistan Factsheet, May 2017, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/a 
id/Countries/factsheets/afghanistan_en.pdf.   
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force people fleeing conflict, persecution and poverty to put their 
lives into the hands of smugglers or traffickers. In particular, it 
considers that any policy seriously aiming to address the irregular 
arrivals of refugees and migrants should respond to the key 
problems at the roots of displacement. Those problems are: 
human rights violations and destitution in Countries of origin; 
lack of adequate protection and opportunities in Countries of 
transit or first refuge; near impossibility for refugees, asylum-
seekers and migrants to reach destination Countries in a safe and 
regular way29. 
 
5. An unthinkable bad practice: returns to Afghanistan 
 
Unbelievable as it is to human rights practitioners, thousands 
of Afghans have been returned from Europe to Afghanistan, in 
the last two years. These returns are taking place despite evidence 
that people returned face a real risk of serious human rights 
violations. Amnesty International recently published a report on 
this, following research trips to Afghanistan in May 201730.  
It is common knowledge that Afghanistan is currently being 
torn apart by an internal armed conflict between “Anti-
Government Elements” (including over 20 armed groups and the 
Taliban) and Pro-Government Forces. The United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that 2016 
was the deadliest year on record for civilians (11,418 people 
killed or injured)31, while in 2017 the Humanitarian Aid 
																																								 																				
29 See Amnesty International, The Human Rights risks of External 
Migration Policies, cit., p.12. 
30 See Amnesty International, Forced Back to Danger: Asylum-Seekers 
Returned from Europe to Afghanistan, available at: 
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa 11/6866/2017/en/. 
31 See United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2016 Annual 
Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Afghanistan, 
01/02/2017, available at: https://unama.unmissions.org/protection-of-
civilians-reports.   
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Government intervention, due diligence, monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms are crucial to the success of migration 
control policies, both internally and externally. Possible human 
rights impacts must be evaluated in advance and adequate funding 
must be allocated in order to provide effective protection of 
refugees and effective integration of migrants in hosting societies. 
Believing that outsourcing international protection and using 
leverage with poorer Countries will lead to a decrease in people 
wishing to enter richer and more peaceful States is, in my opinion, 
simply naïve. States should focus on positive aspects of 
migration, regulating it in a humane and efficient manner, and 
favoring positive incentives to other States, as this will foster their 
own development. These could include: a significant increase in 
funding for refugee protection and meaningful financial support 
to Countries hosting large numbers of refugees; a substantial 
increase in resettlement places for the world’s most vulnerable 
refugees, as identified by UNHCR; the significant expansion of 
other safe and legal routes for asylum-seekers to reach destination 
Countries (such as humanitarian visas, family reunification, 
student visas, and community sponsorship arrangements); and, 
finally, a review of the mechanisms through which migrants can 
apply for regular entry and the development of accessible and 
transparent systems,  which can open up real mobility 
opportunities, according to national labour markets.  
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International, the concept of IFA is «both legally questionable 
and factually unsound»33. In addition, this practice is particularly 
aimed at targeting children and young adults who originally 
reached Europe as unaccompanied children, and who face even 
greater risks because of the lack of national legislation, or of local 
or international NGOs that could provide them with support. 
Since it believes that, given the grave security and human rights 
situation across the Country, all returns to Afghanistan constitute 
refoulement, Amnesty International is calling on all European 
Countries to implement a moratorium on such returns until they 
can take place in safety and dignity.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The so-called “global refugee crisis” needs to be considered in 
the wider context of human migration. States, particularly those 
that share leadership of the international community and have the 
means to address the problem, need to see and understand the 
wider picture and start to genuinely cooperate in order to find 
more equitable, human and durable solutions to refugees and 
migrants flows. This does not mean “let everybody in”, but rather 
to make use of legitimate and existing tools to design a system 
that is respectful of human rights and humanitarian law. For 
example, States wishing to consider externalisation measures 
must at least make sure that the human rights of migrants, asylum-
seekers and refugees are central to the development and 
implementation of their external migration policies. This 
surprisingly would not result in non-cooperation on border 
control matters with Countries where there are systematic human 
rights violations, and in not preventing refugees and migrants 
from leaving such Countries. As in every other area of 
																																								 																				
33 See Amnesty International, Forced Back to Danger: Asylum-Seekers 
Returned from Europe to Afghanistan, cit., p. 33. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The arrival of about one million people, and the registration of 
over 1 million asylum applications each year in 2015 and 2016 has 
caused substantial upheaval regarding border controls in the EU. 
These arrivals were mainly by sea, through the southern 
Mediterranean primarily from north Africa to Italy and then from 
the summer onwards mainly from Turkey to the Greek islands, has 
galvanized public opinion and policy makers.1 The first part of 
what has been called a crisis but is increasingly being transformed 
into the new normal, has been the numbers.2 Mainly Syrian, Iraqi 
and Afghan asylum seekers have arrived over the year outstripping 
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their claims is supposed to fall on the first EU country through 
which they arrive.7 Obviously it is not realistic that all these 
refugees should be the responsibility of Greece as the EU policy 
and legislation requires. But no one seems to have a better plan for 
the moment. The European Commission and the Council are very 
keen on the idea of relocation where Member States offer places to 
refugees in Greece and Italy – in September 2015 it was agreed that 
160,000 places would be opened in this relocation scheme. But 
according to the Commission only 4,582 places have been offered 
by Member States and only 218 people moved as of 8 February 
2016.8 So in the meantime refugees continue to ‘self-relocate’ 
around the EU not always to the satisfaction of the authorities of 
the Member States.9  
Throughout the refugee crisis, the issue of security, terrorism 
and potential terrorism has been present. This concern has fuelled 
resistance to relocation, calls for more and better registration and 
investigation of refugees arriving in the EU. Further, the fear of 
refugees as possible sources of security risks and terrorism has 
been a concern expressed by a number of Schengen states which 
have used the exception in the EU border code to reintroduce intra-
Schengen border controls on persons when states are faced with a 
crisis. This contribution examines how the Schengen Member 
States have used the argument of the risk of terrorism/security 
																																								 																				
7 M. Fullerton, “Asylum Crisis Italian Style: The Dublin Regulation Collides 
with European Human Rights Law”, in Harvard Human Rights Journal, 2016, p. 
57. 
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Council on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the 
European Agenda on Migration, Annex 4, COM(2016)85final of 10.2.2016. 
9 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the 
European Agenda on Migration, COM(2016)85final of 10.2.2016. 
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other nationalities, in particular the Western Balkan nationals who 
had been a focus of concern.3 
The routes of arrival of refugees into the EU and their 
trajectories across Europe have fixated the EU external border 
agency, FRONTEX and many media outlets.4 The Schengen border 
control free area, a major success of the EU has been put under 
strain as refugees have travelled into the Schengen area from 
Turkey into Greece, out of the Schengen area into Macedonia and 
other non EU Member States and EU non-Schengen Member 
States (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania in the region) and 
then back into the Schengen area across the borders into Austria 
and Hungary.5 Many refugees make their way north to the more 
hospitable countries of northern Europe, Germany, Hungary and 
Sweden. According to the EU statistical agency EUROSTAT “Of 
the 138 000 Syrians who applied for the first time for asylum in the 
EU in the third quarter of 2015, more than three quarters were 
registered in three Member States: Germany (53 100), Hungary 
(35 800) and Sweden (18 100).”6  As refugees move, they run into 
border controls and various obstacles to the continuation of the 
journeys such as the cutting of train services. Yet, mainly they end 
up where they appear to want to be. The so-called Dublin system of 
allocating responsibility for caring for refugees and determining 
																																								 																				
3 J. Arsenijević, et al., “A crisis of protection and safe passage: violence 
experienced by migrants/refugees travelling along the Western Balkan corridor to 
Northern Europe”, in Conflict and health, 2017, p. 6. 
4 K. Santer, V. Wriedt, “(De-)Constructing Borders. Contestations in and 
around the Balkan Corridor in 2015/16”, in Movements. Journal für kritische 
Migrations-und Grenzregimeforschung, 2017. 
5 F. G. Sicurella, “The Language of Walls Along the Balkan Route”, in 
Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 2017, pp. 1-19. 
6 EUROSTAT, 9 December 2015 available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/sta 
tistics-explained/index.php/Asylumquarterlyreport. 
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o Norway (26 August 2017 – 25 September 2017) 
UCI Road World Championship in Bergen (Bergen 
airport) 
• Temporarily reintroduced border controls in the context 
of Recommendation of the Council of 11 May 2017: 
o Germany (11  May 2017 – 11 November 2017) 
land border with Austria 
o Austria (11  May 2017 – 11 November 2017) 
land border with Slovenia and with Hungary 
o Denmark (11  May 2017 – 11 November 2017) 
Danish ports with ferry connections to Germany and 
the Danish-German land border 
o Sweden (11  May 2017 – 11 November 2017)  
Swedish harbours in the Police Region South and 
West and the Öresund bridge 
o Norway (11  May 2017 – 11 November 2017)  
Norwegian ports with ferry connections to Denmark, 
Germany and Sweden.	
In practice, some border controls have been very substantially 
relaxed such as those on the trains between Denmark and Sweden. 
Yet the fact of continuing intra-Schengen border controls as a result 
of sea arrivals primarily in the Eastern Mediterranean as been a 
shock for the EU and its institutions. The convergence of terrorism 
and border crossing as the motivation for the re-introduction of 
these border controls is the issue examined here. 
 
2. Background  
 
The Schengen area is made up of the Schengen states, all EU 
Member States except Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania 
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threat in the context of the emergency temporary, reintroduction of 
intra-Schengen state border controls. The discovery of a Syrian 
passport near the venue of a terror attach in Paris on 13 November 
2015 has heighten these worries.10 
Since 13 September 2015 the following Member States have 
introduced intra-Schengen border controls under emergency 
measures (in order of appearance) on the basis of the arrival of 
refugees on their territory (see Annex I below for a short analysis 
of the 2015 EUROSTAT information of arrivals of refugees in the 
Member States): Germany, Austria, Slovenia,11 Sweden, Norway 
and Denmark. Malta and France had already notified the EU 
authorities that they would reintroduce border controls temporarily 
for the purposes of the Valletta migration conference and 
Commonwealth Heads of State meeting (Malta) and COP 21 
(France).12  
At the time of writing the Member States still carrying out intra-
Schengen border controls are the following: 
Current Temporarily Reintroduced Border Controls 
Temporarily reintroduced border controls in the context 
of foreseeable events: 
o France (16 July 2017 – 31 October 2017) 
Persistent terrorist threat 
																																								 																				
10 See for instance http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/15/why-syria 
n-refugee-passport-found-at-paris-attack-scene-must-be-treated-with-caution.  
11 Apparently, Hungary also temporarily introduce intra-Schengen border 
controls but the relevant notification is not available on the Council registry. 
12 E.R. Brouwer, et al., Internal border controls in the Schengen area: Is 
Schengen crisis-proof?, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, 2016. 
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o Norway (26 August 2017 – 25 September 2017) 
UCI Road World Championship in Bergen (Bergen 
airport) 
• Temporarily reintroduced border controls in the context 
of Recommendation of the Council of 11 May 2017: 
o Germany (11  May 2017 – 11 November 2017) 
land border with Austria 
o Austria (11  May 2017 – 11 November 2017) 
land border with Slovenia and with Hungary 
o Denmark (11  May 2017 – 11 November 2017) 
Danish ports with ferry connections to Germany and 
the Danish-German land border 
o Sweden (11  May 2017 – 11 November 2017)  
Swedish harbours in the Police Region South and 
West and the Öresund bridge 
o Norway (11  May 2017 – 11 November 2017)  
Norwegian ports with ferry connections to Denmark, 
Germany and Sweden.	
In practice, some border controls have been very substantially 
relaxed such as those on the trains between Denmark and Sweden. 
Yet the fact of continuing intra-Schengen border controls as a result 
of sea arrivals primarily in the Eastern Mediterranean as been a 
shock for the EU and its institutions. The convergence of terrorism 
and border crossing as the motivation for the re-introduction of 
these border controls is the issue examined here. 
 
2. Background  
 
The Schengen area is made up of the Schengen states, all EU 
Member States except Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania 
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bolts treaty – the Schengen Implementing Agreement (referred to 
by the CJEU as CISA) which included all the principles of the 
Dublin Agreement on the allocation of responsibility for asylum 
seekers. The Dublin Agreement was signed a few weeks after 
CISA. 
The Schengen states first abolished intra state border controls on 
persons on 25 March 1990. The whole system was incorporated 
into the EU in 1999 (by the Amsterdam Treaty) with opt outs only 
for Denmark, Ireland and the UK. All acceding states are required 
to join Schengen as soon as the Schengen states consider that they 
are ready. For the 2004 Member States (except Cyprus which 
remains outside because of its messy Green Border issue) entry 
took place on 21 December 2007 (in time for everyone to do their 
Christmas shopping in another Member State). Schengen now 
looks like this: 
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and the UK plus the ETFA states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway 
and Switzerland.13 Since 13 September 2015 when Germany 
notified the Council, Commission and Member States that it would 
be reintroducing selective border controls with Austria at specified 
places, there has been much media speculation that the Schengen 
area without border controls on the movement of persons moving 
among them is falling apart. The Anglo-American press has been 
particularly gleeful in its presentation of the ‘collapse’. Only the 
existence of the euro is more irritating than the Schengen area to 
the Anglo-American press thus in one year to have the possibility 
to herald the demise of both was a real bonanza. 
Before we participate in this Schengen bashing, it may be worth 
looking carefully at what has been happening to the Schengen area 
as regards the re-introduction of intra-Schengen states border 
controls and I particular the reasons for this reintroduction of 
border controls. But first a little history. The Schengen border 
control free area was first contained in the Schengen Agreement 
1985 between the three Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands – which already had their own free travel area 
dating from the 1950s) France and Germany. All other Member 
States and Schengen states joined after 1985 and by 1999 the frame 
was set. In 1987 the Single European Act contained for the first 
time he objective of abolition of border controls among the EU 
Member States but not much happened except a lot of infighting 
among the Member States about what the abolition of border 
controls meant, inspired and sustained by the UK (not least by 
inflaming Spanish authorities over the states of Gibraltar). The 
Schengen states moved forward and in 1990 adopted the nuts and 
																																								 																				
13 Switzerland has had a number of referenda where the people have voted to 
leave the free movement of workers area but stay in the Schengen area. 
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border controls on the basis of limited grounds (which specifically 
exclude a large number of third country nationals crossing the 
borders).14 The grounds for exceptional reintroduction of border 
controls are now contained in Article 25 SBC. Where there is a 
serious threat to public policy or internal security which requires 
immediate action a state may, exceptionally, reintroduce controls 
for a period of up to ten days. It must notify the other Member 
States and the Commission (and the Commission the Parliament) 
and supply the Article 24 justifications and justify the use of the 
Article 25 emergency procedure. The Commission may consult 
other states on receipt of the notification. Where the serious threat 
continues beyond the initial ten days, the state can prolong the 
border controls for a period of up to 20 days. Again, the state must 
take into account the Article 23 criteria in an assessment of 
necessity, proportionality and any new elements. Consultations and 
opinion are permitted here too. The Article 25 procedure can only 
be renewed for a total of two months. 
The Article 24 justifications set out the procedure for temporary 
introduction of border controls. The first step is that the state must 
inform the other Schengen states, the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council – for ‘normal’ foreseen threats the 
latest four weeks before the introduction of the border controls. A 
shorter period is permitted where the circumstances become known 
less than four weeks before the planned reintroduction of controls. 
The notification must include five elements: 
																																								 																				
14 Pursuant to Recital 5 of Regulation No 1051/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 
562/2006 Migration and the crossing of external borders by a large number of 
third - country nationals should not, per se, be considered to be a threat to public 
policy or internal security. 
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There was turbulence in the Schengen area at the 
commencement of the Arab Spring when a number of Tunisians 
arrived in Italy in 2011. The President of France accused the Italian 
authorities of issuing short residence permits to the Tunisians 
which permitted them to travel lawfully to France (when 
presumably the French President preferred for them to remain 
irregularly in Italy). Border controls were introduced briefly 
between two of the founding Member States of the EU. This was a 
sufficient shock to the system that the Commission proposed for 
reaching amendments to the Schengen Borders Code (the 
regulation covering the crossing of internal and external borders) 
which require the Member States to notify the Council, 
Commission and Member States if they seek to reintroduce border 
controls among themselves and to justify the reintroduction of such 
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14 Pursuant to Recital 5 of Regulation No 1051/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 
562/2006 Migration and the crossing of external borders by a large number of 
third - country nationals should not, per se, be considered to be a threat to public 
policy or internal security. 
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resort and in accordance with the procedure set out in Articles 24, 
25 and 26.  
If the serious threat to public policy or internal security persists 
beyond the period provided, it may be prolonged subject to further 
criteria (see below) but all new elements must be taken into 
account and the renewal must be for 20 and 30-day periods or the 
foreseeable duration of the serious threat. The total period of the 
reintroduction of border controls must not exceed 8 months (two 
months under Article 25 and six months under Article 23) unless 
there is a Commission recommendation and Council resolution to 
reintroduce border controls (Articles 19 and 26). The Article 23(a) 
criteria require that a Member State decide that the measure is a last 
resort and that the reintroduction of border controls is temporary. 
On prolonging the internal border controls, the state must assess 
whether the measure is likely to adequately remedy the threat and 
the proportionality of the measure in relation to the specific threat. 
In doing so the state must take into account the following: 
(a) The likely impact of any threats to its public policy or 
internal security including following terrorist incidents or threats 
including those posed by organised crime; 
(b) The likely impacts of the measure on free movement of 
persons within the Schengen area. 
Article 26 provides for exceptional circumstances where the 
overall functioning of the area without internal border control is put 
at risk as a result of persistent serious deficiencies relating to 
external border control. This is not the basis for any of the 
measures taken by Schengen states since the critical 13 September 
notification by Germany invoking an Article 25 border control with 
Austria, however, it is increasingly likely that it may be invoked as 
the Commission has reported that there are serious deficiencies in 
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(a) The reason for the proposed introduction including all 
relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat to 
public policy or internal security; 
(b) The scope of the proposed reintroduction specifying for 
which parts of the internal borders controls will be introduced; 
(c) The names of the affected crossing points; 
(d) The date and duration of the planned reintroduction. 
The Commission is entitled to request further information. The 
state can classify as confidential parts of the information but this 
cannot deprive the Commission and European Parliament of the 
totality of the information. When a state makes a notification, the 
Commission and the Member States are entitled to issue opinions. 
For the Commission, this means that if it has concerns regarding 
the necessity or proportionality of the measure or if it considers that 
consultation is appropriate, it should issue such an opinion. Article 
24 also provides for consultation including joint meetings among 
Member States on reintroduction of controls. These should take 
place at least 10 days before the reintroduction.  
The ‘normal’ procedure is contained in Article 23. It provides 
the general framework for the temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at internal borders (those between Schengen participating 
states). The first requirement is that there is a serious threat to 
public policy or internal security in a Member State. Where there is 
such an emergency, the state may exceptionally reintroduce border 
control at all or specific parts of its internal borders for a limited 
period of up to 30 days or for the foreseeable duration of the 
serious threat if its extension exceeds 30 days. But the scope and 
duration of the temporary reintroduction of border controls must 
not exceed what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious 
threat. Further, border controls can only be reintroduced as a last 
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overall functioning of the area without internal border control is put 
at risk as a result of persistent serious deficiencies relating to 
external border control. This is not the basis for any of the 
measures taken by Schengen states since the critical 13 September 
notification by Germany invoking an Article 25 border control with 
Austria, however, it is increasingly likely that it may be invoked as 
the Commission has reported that there are serious deficiencies in 
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October (the 22 September notification is not available): 
“temporary internal security checks will be limited to the level 
required by actual security needs”; 30 October “This influx 
seriously affects Germany’s public order and internal security in 
various ways [unspecified]”. 
Austria: notification 15 September 2015 “in view of the security 
situation caused by the huge migration flows to and via 
Austria…”18; 15 October [24 September document not available] 
“In view of the massive influx of third country nationals, such 
measure continues to be necessary for maintaining law and order, 
safeguarding internal security and avoiding continuous 
overstressing of police force..”. 18 November: “This is the only 
way to prevent security deficits.” “This further measure is 
inevitable to prevent a threat to public order and internal security.” 
Slovenia: notification 17 September 2015: “uncontrollable 
migration flows… coupled with the measures adopted by the 
neighbouring countries… presents a serious threat to Slovenia’s 
national security.”19 Extended once then lifted. 
Sweden: 12 November 2015 “due to the serious threat to public 
policy and internal security” posed by the arrival of refugees “now 
lead to extreme and increasing challenges regarding the 
functionality of the Swedish society which is one of the three goals 
of Swedish security.” “challenges for a range of important services 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																	
governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), No 
11986/15 of 14 September 2015. 
18 Council of the European Union, Summary conclusions of the 26th meeting 
of ERAC, held in Riga (LV) on 16-17 April 2015, No 1210/15 of 9 July 2015. 
19 Council of the European Union, Temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the Slovenian internal borders in accordance with Article 25 of 
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), No 
12111/15 of 17 September 2015. 
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Greek external border controls (contested by Greece).15 However, it 
is worth remembering that Schengen states have frequently 
reintroduced temporary border controls with one another, usually 
under the normal procedure for the purposes of safeguarding 
international events taking place in their countries, as a response to 
serious health scares and similar circumstances. Groenendijk 
undertook an excellent analysis of these activities in his 2003 
publication.16 
 
 
3. The ground of security threat in the Schengen States’ 
notifications on emergency reintroduction of border 
controls  
 
In this section I will examine the use of the ground of 
terrorism/security threat for the reintroduction of Schengen border 
controls among those Member States where the principal reason is 
the refugee crisis. 
Germany: notification 13 September 2015 – “Further arrivals [of 
refugees] would endanger public order and internal security.”17 12 
																																								 																				
15 Council of the European Union, Draft Council Implementing Decision 
setting out a Recommendation on addressing the serious deficiencies identified in 
the 2015 evaluation of the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of 
management of the external borders by Greece, No 5877/1/16 REV 1, of 11 
February 2016. 
16 K. Groenendijk, “New borders behind old ones: post-Schengen controls 
behind the internal borders and inside the Netherlands and Germany”, in Search 
of Europe’s Borders, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003, p. 113-146. 
17 Council of the European Union, Temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the German interal borders in accordance with Article 25 of 
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules 
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governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), No 
11986/15 of 14 September 2015. 
18 Council of the European Union, Summary conclusions of the 26th meeting 
of ERAC, held in Riga (LV) on 16-17 April 2015, No 1210/15 of 9 July 2015. 
19 Council of the European Union, Temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the Slovenian internal borders in accordance with Article 25 of 
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), No 
12111/15 of 17 September 2015. 
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public order and internal security because a very large number of 
illegal immigrants may be stranded in the Copenhagen area within 
a short period of time.” The reason for this seems to be the 
wholesale break down of the Nordic Union. The Danish authorities 
blame the Swedes and Norwegians (and Germans) for the border 
control introduction. They also complain that the Swedes, 
Norwegians and Finns (who are applying the rule apparently to 
Finnline) have all applied carrier sanctions requiring passengers 
entering to be checked by the transporters that they have passports 
or IDs and any other necessary documents.   
 
4. The ground of terrorism in the Schengen States’ 
notifications on emergency reintroduction of border 
controls  
 
Only two Member States specifically use the ground of a 
terrorism threat for their reintroduction of Schengen border controls 
on persons – France and Malta. 
Malta: The 25 November 2015 notification states “In view of 
the current situation with regard to the global terrorist threat…” the 
controls already in place for other purposes would be extended on 
the basis of Article 23 “in view of the serious threat to public 
policy and internal security that is currently considered to exist.”  
France: The 7 December 2015 notification states “The terrorist 
attacks that took place in Paris on 13 November 2015 led the 
government to declare a state of emergency throughout the 
country…owing to the imminent danger resulting from serious 
breaches of public order.” The controls are introduced with 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Spain. 
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in Swedish society…strictly necessary to respond to the threat to 
public policy and internal security..”20 Extended 18 December and 
moved to Article 23 controls.  
Norway: Notification 25 November 2015 “due to a serious 
threat to public policy and internal security posed by the 
consequences of the unpredictable migratory pressure and ensuing 
challenges to the functioning of the Norwegian society…”21 and on 
18 December “Although there has been a significant decrease in the 
number of migrants applying for asylum in Norway, we fear that 
the situation may change rapidly again if we abolish the introduced 
internal border controls.” The exceptional controls were moved to 
Article 24. 
Denmark: On 12 October Denmark notified the Council it would 
be exercising its right under the Danish Protocol TFEU and TEU to 
reintroduce temporary border controls. Then it opted into the 
amendments to the SBC.22 The on 4 January 2016 it introduced 
emergency border controls under Articles 23 and 25. The 
notification states “Denmark is of now faced with a serious risk to 
																																								 																				
20 Council of the European Union, Temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the Swedish internal borders in accordance with Article 23 and 25 of 
Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across border (Schengen Borders Code), No 
14047/15 of 12 November 2015. 
21 Council of the European Union, Temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in accordance with Articles 23 and 25 
of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), No 
14633/15 of 25 November 2015. 
22 Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 1051/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the 
temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional 
circumstances - Notification by Denmark, No 13214/15 of 19 October 2015. 
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quantifying the warnings on persons who may have had contacts to 
or fought with militant groups in crisis regions. This possibility 
does nevertheless underscore the need to register all the persons 
concerned, something which could not otherwise be achieved in the 
current, extraordinary situation.” 
However, the Commission accepts the necessity of the re-
introduction of controls. This seems quite exceptional considering 
the lack of detailed information regarding the nature of the threat 
which the Member States produced. 
 
6. A Legal Assessment of the Justifications 
 
At this point it is worth repeating the criteria against which any 
justification by a Schengen state to reintroduce border controls 
must be assessed. In Article 25 these are: 
(a) The reason for the proposed introduction including all 
relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat to 
public policy or internal security; 
(b) The scope of the proposed reintroduction specifying for 
which parts of the internal borders controls will be introduced; 
(c) The names of the affected crossing points; 
(d) The date and duration of the planned reintroduction. 
To these must be added the Article 23(a) criteria: 
(a) The likely impact of any threats to its public policy or 
internal security including following terrorist incidents or threats 
including those posed by organised crime; 
(b) The likely impacts of the measure on free movement of 
persons within the Schengen area. 
On an examination of the notifications made by the Member 
States under Article 25 (and repeated in their move to Article 23-
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5. The Commission’s Assessment23 
 
As required under the new SBC provisions, the Commission is 
required to make assessments of the Member States’ use of Article 
25. The assessment for Germany, Austria and Slovenia was 
published on 23 October 2015. On 15 December, the Commission 
issued its 8th biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen 
area 1 May – 10 December 2015 which covers some of the same 
ground as set out above. The Commission has also issued an 
assessment of the Maltese reintroduction of border controls but this 
is not public. According to the Commission’s assessment of 
Germany and Austria’s use of Article 25, the Commission is very 
forgiving. On the question of terrorism, it states: 
“14…Many of these persons have not been registered and 
screened in any other European country. While there is no direct 
evidence so far that jihadist group have exploited the movement of 
refugees with the specific aim of infiltrating Germany, in view of 
the large number of people entering the country, it is possible that 
among these persons there could also be people with links to crime, 
members of militant groups or lone extremists.” 
“30. As to the possibility advanced by the German authorities 
that also radicalised persons might be hiding among the bona fide 
asylum seekers entailing risks related to organised crime and 
terrorist threats, the Commission considers that this would need to 
be further substantiated to be considered in itself as constituting a 
serious threat to public policy and internal security e.g. by 
																																								 																				
23 European Commission, Commission opinion on the necessity and 
proportionality of the controls at internal borders reintroduced by Germany and 
Austria pursuant to Article 24(4) of Regulation No 562/2006 (Schengen Borders 
Code), C(2015)7100 final, of 23.10.2015. 
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States under Article 25 (and repeated in their move to Article 23-
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border controls again as the global terrorist threat is something so 
nebulous that it is unquantifiable.  
France justifies its reintroduction of border controls on the basis 
of its national state of emergency. As the object of all three 
substantial terrorist attacks in the EU in 2015 (January, July and 
November) at least one can understand the perspective of the 
French authorities that they have a problem. Whether border 
controls are the solution is another question. However, for the 
moment the Commission does not appear likely to challenge the 
French choice of border controls as a counter-terrorism measure. 
Turning to the scope of the border controls, here the 
notifications are more precise. All the Member States (except 
Malta) provide details of where they plan to carry out the border 
controls, usually including details about the exact border crossing 
points at which these will be conducted. This includes for all except 
Malta the names of the affected crossing points. There is less 
specificity on the date and duration of the reintroduction of border 
controls. The need to re-notify the institutions every 20/30 days or 
for the foreseeable duration means that there are quite a lot of 
notifications on the Council registry though it would seem that 
some are missing.  
None of the notifications deal with the additional justifications 
required under Article 23(a). The impact of the reintroduced border 
controls on the public policy treat is missing. No State seems 
willing to indicate how border controls at a small number of border 
crossing points with a few neighbours is going to solve their 
security deficits. It is also worth remembering that these controls 
only apply to those border crossing points which the Member 
States themselves have notified to the Commission under the SBC 
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24), there seems to be a noticeable shortage of detail on the reasons 
for the reintroduction of border controls. The German notification 
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border controls again as the global terrorist threat is something so 
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8. Conclusions 
 
The Schengen area of no border controls on the movement of 
persons has been under substantial strain over 2015-16. A 
surprising number of Member States have re-introduced border 
controls on persons among themselves on the grounds of the threat 
to security and of terrorism. These countries can be classed in two 
groups – those which claim a general security threat on account of 
the arrival of refugees – Austria, Germany, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden and those which claim a specific threat on the basis of 
terrorism – France and Malta. One of the noticeable aspects of the 
use of emergency intra-Schengen border controls is that they are 
most popular in the Nordic states which have had a passport union 
dating from 1957 which allowed movement without identity 
documents across the region. This was subsumed into the Schengen 
are as all the relevant states joined. That this very long standing 
free travel area which is, geographically, as far as one can get from 
the south-eastern EU external borders through which refugees are 
arriving is astonishing. The two countries through which most 
refugees are arriving – Greece and Italy – appear to have no interest 
in the re-introduction of Schengen border controls.  
It is also worth noting, as the Commission does in its opinion on 
Austria and Germany that the recital to the Schengen Borders Code 
provisions which create the emergency procedures specifically 
state that “migration and the crossing of external borders by a large 
number of third-country nationals should not, per se, be considered 
to be a threat to public policy or internal security.” So, the reasons 
which all relevant Member States but France and Malta give for the 
reintroduction of intra-Schengen border controls are directly 
foreseen as inadmissible reasons by the legislator when they were 
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as places where the Code applies. So, they do not automatically 
apply to green field border crossings (a matter of national law).  
Further none of the notifications address the issue of the impacts 
on free movement of persons within the Schengen area though this 
is something which the Commission addresses in its assessment of 
the Austrian/German reintroduction of border controls (it notes that 
no EU citizens have complained to them so apparently the controls 
are not annoying EU citizens).  
 
7. The Visegrad States 
 
The only 2004 Member State to introduce border controls under 
Article 25 SBC was Slovenia24 and it dropped the controls quickly. 
On 17 December in the margins of the Council meeting the 
Visegrad states (Czech R, Hungary, Poland and Slovak R) issued a 
statement regarding emergency introduction of intra-Schengen 
border controls. It is something of a warning to those states which 
have reintroduced border controls: “A common resolute and united 
action is needed to improve, support and preserve Schengen as one 
of the cornerstones of the European integration project. We call on 
all true friends of Schengen to join this effort towards a conclusive 
debate on the key proposals tabled by the European Commission in 
this respect.”25 Clearly, among the strongest supporters of border 
control free Europe are those who arrived last at the table. 
																																								 																				
24 The situation of Hungary is not available in the Council registry through the 
Commission states that it reintroduced intra-Schengen controls for a short period 
but lifted them – Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority 
Actions under the European Agenda on Migration, cit. 
25 http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/joint-statement-of-the-151221-
1. 
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or a Migration Crisis or more recently a Schengen border crisis.26 
Now we have the official figures and they are surprising in many 
ways. On 20 September 2017 EUROSTAT issued its quarterly 
asylum report confirming that the number of first time asylum 
applicants in the EU-28 decreased by -54 % in the second quarter 
of 2017 compared with the same quarter of 2016 and by -11 % 
compared with the first quarter of 2017. Overall, the number of 
persons seeking asylum from non-EU countries in the EU-
28 during the second quarter of 2017 reached 149 000. This was 
175 000 less than in the same quarter of 2016.27 
First, the total number of first time asylum applications in Q3 
2015 was 413,815 compared to 62,780 in Q3 2014. Of the new 
asylum applications 137,935 were made by Syrian nationals, 
56,670 by Afghans and 44,425 by Iraqis. For the 12 month period 
ending in Q3 2015 the total number of new asylum applications 
was: 997,12528 for the whole of the EU (population: 508 million).  
Most asylum applicants applied for asylum in one of five 
Member States which account for over 75% of the total number of 
asylum applications in the preceding 12 months. These are: 
 
																																								 																				
26 For an analysis of the Schengen border ‘crisis’ is ILPA European Update, 
December 2015.  
27 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_quarterl 
y_report accessed 25 September 2017. 
28 The figure for all applicants – both first claims and subsequent claims was 
1,066,210. This leaves a difference of 69,085 who are second or subsequent 
applicants – presumably people who applied for asylum in one Member State (eg 
Hungary) but travelled on to a second Member State (eg Germany) where they 
wanted their claim determined.  
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adopted in 2013. Only two years later it was exactly these reasons 
which supposedly had been excluded which were claimed by the 
Member States.  
Security and terrorism have once again become tangled up with 
refugees and movement of persons. The justification for this on the 
basis of security and terrorism seems rather slim and not defined. If 
there are good grounds these are not apparently being published 
either to the Council, Commission and Parliament or to the public. 
Instead there are general statements of threat which ring rather 
hollow. The Schengen area without border controls on persons was 
supposed to have put an end to this sort of reasoning within the 
area. It reappearance is somewhat disappointing for scholars and 
those who champion the Schengen area free of intra- state border 
controls. Yet, it is worth remembering that for the moment the 
damage to the area is fairly limited – involving a restricted number 
of Member States most of which are applying the controls only at 
some land and sea borders in practice. The situation may become 
more dramatic if the Commission and some Member States in the 
Council seek to use the powers contained in Article 19 and 26 of 
the Code to find that there are serious deficiencies in the 
management of Greece’s external border such as to justify more 
severe measures against that one Member State. 
 
Annex I: EUROSTAT 9 December 2015 on the Refugee crisis 
On 9 December 2015 Eurostat issued its Asylum quarterly 
report which covers the third quarter 2015 (July – end of 
September 2015). This period covers a very active period in the EU 
crisis of movement of persons – commonly called a Refugee Crisis 
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However, outcomes continue to vary greatly from Member State 
to Member State. The EU average of recognition (including refugee 
status and subsidiary protection) is 48%. But in the UK, the 
average is 37%. In France recognition is running at 26% but in the 
Netherlands, it is 71%. Of course, this also reflects the differences 
in top five nationalities of origin in the different Member States. 
However, that justification only goes so far.  
UNHCR has published its Statistical Yearbook 2014 which 
includes recognition rates by nationality and country.30 From this 
source we find that new asylum claims by Afghans made in the UK 
have a 44% success rate. But in Italy they have a 95% recognition 
rate. In Germany, the rate is 67% and in neighbouring Austria 98%. 
If one looks at Syrian asylum claims – a group which is generally 
accepted as being in need of international protection there are still 
variations across EU Member States. The recognition rate in the 
UK for new Syrian asylum applications is 93% but in Romania it is 
only 77%.  In Belgium, the rate is 98% but in Hungary it is 65%. 
What these figures tell us is that asylum seekers do not have 
equivalent out comes to their asylum claims irrespective of the 
Member State where they make their application.  
The whole argument of the justice of the Common European 
Asylum System is that there are common rules on the definition of 
a refugee and beneficiary of subsidiary protection, there are 
common procedural rules and the European Asylum Support Office 
produces common country of origin information. With so much 
convergence and harmonisation, the argument goes, it is justified to 
allow an asylum seeker only one chance to present his or her 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																	
http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21679843-thin-evidence-britain-declare 
s-its-biggest-source-refugees-safe-afte r-all-turned-away. 
30 http://www.unhcr.org/566584fc9.html. 
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There are still large differences in main countries of origin of 
asylum seekers in different EU Member States. In the UK, at the 
top of the list are Sudan, Eritrea, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
But for Germany the list is Syria, Albania, Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Serbia. For Italy, the list is even more different: Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Gambia and Senegal (clear the Syrians do not stop in 
Italy).  
 As regards outcomes, 75% of Syrians are granted refugee status 
and a further 23% subsidiary protection. For Iraqis, 80% are 
recognised as refugees and 7% are granted subsidiary protection. 
62% of Eritreans get refugee status and 24% subsidiary 
protection.29 
																																								 																				
29 As regards decision making in the UK on Eritreans see the extensive article 
in the Economist 12 December 2015 on the reversal of refusal decisions in 
respect of Eritrean asylum seekers before the Tribunal: 
Country	 Asylum		 %	of	total	 	 	 applicants	per	1	million	population	
Germany:		 317,670	 (26%	of	total)	 	 	 	 1,335	
Hungary:	 201,495	(26%	of	total	though	there	is		 	 	 10,975	
some	doubt	about	whether	these		
applicants	stay	in	Hungary	or	move	on)		
	
Sweden:	 87,595	 	 (10%	of	total)	 	 	 	 4,360	
Italy:	 79,820	 	 (7%	of	total)	 	 	 	 465	
Austria:	 65,260	 	 (7%	of	total)	 	 	 	 3,215	
UK:	 35,045	 	 (@4%	of	total)	 	 	 	 185	
At	the	other	end	of	the	spectre,	the	Member	States	with	the	lowest	number	of	first	time	asylum	applications	
were:	
Croatia		 175	 	 	 	 	 	 	 10	
Slovakia	 180	 	 	 	 	 	 	 5	
Estonia		 230	 	 	 	 	 	 	 55	
Slovenia	 250	 	 	 	 	 	 	 35	
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http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21679843-thin-evidence-britain-declare 
s-its-biggest-source-refugees-safe-afte r-all-turned-away. 
30 http://www.unhcr.org/566584fc9.html. 
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SOME LEGAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO 
IRREGULAR MIGRANTS AT SEA 
Tullio Scovazzi* 
 
INDEX: 1. The Asymmetrical Right to Emigrate. – 2. The Rights of 
Irregular Migrants: 2.A. The Right to Be Assisted if in Danger at Sea. 
2.B. The Right to Be Humanely Treated and not to Be Prosecuted. 2.C. 
The Right Not to Be Returned to a State Where There Is a Risk of Being 
Tortured. 2.D. The Rights of Refugees. – 3. The Past Italian “Pushing 
Back” Policy. – 4. Conclusive Remarks.   
 
 
1. The Asymmetrical Right to Emigrate 
 
In the past few years too many people have put their lives at 
risk in attempts to cross a border. They are driven by the desire 
to enter a country where they will be safe from persecution, 
poverty, conflicts, natural disasters or other calamities and 
where they have a chance for a decent life. They are ready to 
face social discrimination and vulnerability after arriving in the 
country of destination and living there irregularly. Migration is 
the reason why the waters of some seas, such as the 
Mediterranean, have become the graveyard of thousands of 
human beings, including children, leaving a number of African 
or Asian countries to reach Europe. 
This is a great human tragedy and it is not possible to put an 
end to human tragedies by resorting to walls or legal 
prohibitions. Unfortunately this is not wholly understood by the 
States of destination of irregular migrants, as proven by the 
																																								 																				
* University of Milan-Bicocca. 
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asylum application and if it is rejected, no other Member State is 
required to consider the evidence and claim again. But even with so 
much convergence and harmonisation, the outcomes are still far too 
different for asylum seekers from the same countries of origin in 
different EU Member States for this assumption to be valid.  
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establish a contiguous zone whose breadth cannot exceed 24 
n.m. from the baseline of the territorial sea, where they can 
exercise control over certain matters, including immigration.5   
It appears that, in the present situation of so-called 
globalization, goods and capitals can move freely or almost 
freely while human beings cannot. If they want to escape 
persecution, poverty or conflict, too many people are thus forced 
to cross borders clandestinely at the cost of great risk and 
suffering. If we consider this from the point of view of the 
migrant, one may very well ask what is the meaning of a right to 
emigrate without a corresponding right to immigrate. Where are 
migrants entitled to settle if they are rejected by the State of 
destination? On the high seas? In the unclaimed sector of 
Antarctica? On the Moon or in outer space? 
 
2. The Rights of Irregular Migrants: 2.A. The Right to Be 
Assisted if in Danger at Sea  
 
However, despite the state of uncertainty regarding their final 
destination, illegal migrants at sea do have some rights.6  
																																								 																																							 																																							 										
the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial 
sea”. 
5 When on the high seas, ships carrying migrants can only be boarded by 
the authorities of the flag State, except where acts of interference derive from 
powers conferred by such State (see Art. 110, para. 1, UNCLOS). This rule is 
basically confirmed by Art. 8 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Palermo, 2000). 
6 See, in general, N. Ronzitti, “Coastal State Jurisdiction over Refugees 
and Migrants at Sea”, in N. Ando, E. McWhinney, R. Wolfrum (eds.), Liber 
Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda, The Hague, 2002, II, p. 1271; B. Miltner, 
“Irregular Maritime Migration: Refugee Protection Issues in Rescue and 
Interception”, in Fordham International Law Journal, 2006, p. 75; S. 
Trevisanut, “Search and Rescue Operations in the Mediterranean: Factor of 
Cooperation or Conflict?”, in International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, 2010, p. 523; L. Salamone, La disciplina giuridica dell’immigrazione 
clandestina via mare, nel diritto italiano, europeo e internazionale, Torino, 
2011; S. Trevisanut, Immigrazione irregolare via mare – Diritto 
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persistent lack of an adequate European Union policy on 
immigration and asylum.1  
In fact, the human right to mobility is not fully protected by 
international law. Art. 13, para. 2, of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights states that every individual has the 
right to leave any country, including his own. The same right is 
protected by Art. 12, para. 2, of the 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.2 Nevertheless, this remains an 
asymmetrical right, one that is not complemented by a 
corresponding right to immigrate. Under customary international 
law and unless different provisions are applicable by virtue of 
specific treaties in force, any State has the sovereign right to 
allow or not to allow aliens to enter its territory and to adopt 
legislation limiting immigration flows. 
For instance, customary international law of the sea, as also 
reflected in Art. 19, para. 2 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 1982),3 affirms that passage 
by a ship flying a foreign flag through the territorial sea of a 
coastal State cannot be considered innocent if the ship engages 
in activities of immigration contrary to the legislation of such 
State. Under Art. 33 of the UNCLOS,4 coastal States can 
																																								 																				
1 Cfr. A. Pécoud, P. de Guchteneire (eds.), Migration without Borders, 
Oxford, 2007; L. Westra, S. Juss, T. Scovazzi (eds.), Towards a Refugee 
Oriented Right of Asylum, Farnham, 2015. 
2 “Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. (…)”. 
3 Hereinafter: UNCLOS. According to Art. 19, para. 2, “passage of a 
foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the 
following activities: (…) (g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, 
currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary 
laws and regulations of the coastal State; (…)”. 
4 “In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous 
zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent 
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and 
regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of 
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the framework of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) aim at ensuring safety of life at sea, in particular the 1979 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, which 
states that any person in distress at sea has the right to be 
rescued and brought to a place of safety.9 Unfortunately, the 
thorny question left open by the 1979 Convention is how to 
determine where the place of safety is located and consequently 
where the rescued persons are to be delivered. This does not 
help to ensure adequate assistance to rescued people, especially 
when dealing with large groups of migrants.  
 
2. The Rights of Irregular Migrants: 2.B. The Right to Be 
Treated Humanely and not to Be Prosecuted 
 
Migrants, in particular the most vulnerable among them, have 
the right to be treated humanely by immigration officials and to 
be protected from violence that may be inflicted upon them by 
others. As clearly stated in the Protocol against the Smuggling 
of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Palermo, 2000),  
“States Parties shall provide or strengthen specialized 
training for immigration and other relevant officials in 
preventing the conduct set forth in article 6 of this 
Protocol and in the humane treatment of migrants who 
have been the object of such conduct, while respecting 
their rights as set forth in this Protocol” (Art. 14, para. 1).  
“Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to 
afford migrants appropriate protection against violence 
that may be inflicted upon them, whether by individuals or 
																																								 																																							 																																							 										
mutual regional arrangements cooperate with neighbouring States for this 
purpose” (Art. 98, para. 2, of the UNCLOS). 
9 According to the Annex to the 1979 Convention, “Rescue” means “an 
operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical or other 
needs, and deliver them to a place of safety” (Chap. 1.3.2). 
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First, if illegal migrants are in distress at sea, they have the 
right to be assisted and rescued. The beneficiaries of the right to 
be assisted at sea are all persons who are in distress, irrespective 
of the nationality of the ship and of the legality of the activity in 
which they are engaged, be they stowaways, migrant smugglers, 
drug, weapons or slave traffickers, pirates or terrorists. In the 
case of migration by sea, the right to be assisted is of paramount 
importance, as migrants are often transported in inhuman 
conditions by unseaworthy and overcrowded craft and are 
exposed to the dangers caused by bad weather, starvation, 
dehydration and illness. In too many cases, the illegal migrant is 
also a person in distress at sea. 
The duty to render assistance to persons in danger has a 
longstanding tradition in maritime custom and is reflected today 
in Art. 98, para. 1, of the UNCLOS.7 Moreover, coastal States 
are bound to establish and operate an adequate and effective 
search and rescue at sea service.8 Several treaties adopted within 
																																								 																																							 																																							 										
internazionale e diritto dell’Unione Europea, Napoli, 2012; M. Di Filippo, 
“Irregular Migration and Safeguard of Life at Sea. International Rules and 
Recent Developments in the Mediterranean Sea”, in A. Del Vecchio (ed.), 
International Law of the Sea – Current Trends and Controversial Issues, The 
Hague, 2014, p. 1; U. Leanza, F. Graziani, “Poteri di enfoircement e di 
jurisdiction in materia di traffico di migranti via mare: aspetti operativi 
nell’attività di contrasto”, in La Comunità Internazionale, 2014, p. 163; T. 
Scovazzi, “Human Rights and Immigration at Sea”, in R. Rubio-Marín (ed.), 
Human Rights and Immigration, Oxford, 2014, p. 212. 
7 “Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as 
he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: 
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) 
to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if 
informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably 
be expected of him; (c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, 
its crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of 
the name of his own ship, its port of registry and the nearest port at which it 
will call”. 
8 “Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and 
maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding 
safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so require, by way of 
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derogation from this human right can be made.11 As stated in 
Article 2, para. 2, of the above mentioned 1984 Convention, 
“no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a 
state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability 
or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a 
justification of torture”.  
The individual is protected against torture also in an indirect 
way, in so far as international law prevents States from 
extraditing, expelling or returning a person to a State where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture. This is clearly stated in Art. 3 
of the 1984 Convention12 and is constantly repeated in several 
decisions of international human rights courts. 
Accordingly, also irregular migrants, like any other human 
beings, cannot be returned to a State where, given the specific 
circumstances, they run the risk of being tortured or subjected to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, even if the State in 
question is their own State or the State of their permanent 
residence. A similar prohibition applies to States parties to 
treaties that ban the death penalty as regards extradition, 
expulsion or return to States where the individuals concerned 
run the risk of being subjected to capital punishment. 
 
 
																																								 																				
11 According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Furundžija case, judgment of 10 December 1998, para. 144: “the 
prohibition of torture laid down in human rights treaties enshrines an absolute 
right, which can never be derogated from, not even in time of emergency (on 
this ground the prohibition applies to situations of armed conflicts). This is 
linked to the fact (...) that the prohibition of torture is a peremptory norm or 
jus cogens”. 
12 “No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds to believe that he would be 
in danger of being subjected to torture”. 
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groups, by reason of being the object of conduct set forth 
in article 6 of this Protocol” (Art. 16, para. 2). 
Migrants also have the right not to be criminalized for the 
attempt to migrate illegally. Irregular migrants who are victims 
of the crime of smuggling are very different from migrant 
smugglers who are responsible for this crime.10 As provided for 
in the above mentioned Palermo Protocol,  
“Migrants shall not be liable to criminal prosecution 
under this Protocol for the fact of having been the object 
of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol” (Art. 5). 
 
2. The Rights of Irregular Migrants: 2.C. The Right Not to Be 
Returned to a State Where There Is a Risk of Being Tortured 
 
Irregular migrants enjoy all the human rights granted to any 
individual and arising from customary international law and 
treaties in force. 
One of most fundamental human rights is the right not to be 
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, provided for, inter alia, in Art. 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Art. 7 of the 1969 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 5 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, Art. 5 of the 1981 African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and specifically regulated 
by the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. All the above-
mentioned treaties are consistent in setting forth that no 
																																								 																				
10 Art. 3, para. a, of the Palermo Protocol, defines “smuggling of 
migrants” as follows: “(…) the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person 
into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent 
resident”. 
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186
	 187	
with Article 14, para. 1, of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (“everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in 
other countries asylum from persecution”). Under the Refugee 
Convention, the refugee is granted only the right not to be 
returned to a State, including his or her own, where he or she 
would be threatened for a number of specific reasons (right of 
non-refoulement, according to the commonly used French 
expression): 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return 
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion” (Art. 33, para. 1).  
This is another example of asymmetrical rights. A refugee, 
who has a right not to be returned to a country where he is 
threatened, has no right of entry into a given State. He could be 
returned to a State where he is not threatened. But the latter in 
turn has no obligation to allow the refugee to enter its territory. 
If States continue to reject the refugee, one after the other, where 
is he or she entitled to settle? On the high seas? In the unclaimed 
sector of the Antarctic continent? On the Moon or in outer 
space? 
Regrettably the Refugee Convention is not sufficiently clear 
regarding this crucial question. However, it seems to be implied 
in a treaty recognizing “the social and humanitarian nature of 
the problem of refugees” (preamble) that a refugee who is 
outside his country and presents himself to an official of a State 
party is entitled to submit an application for asylum and to have 
it processed and screened. States cannot play with 
“asymmetrical rights” beyond a certain extent, reaching the 
point of denying the true objective of a treaty of humanitarian 
nature. If the refugee cannot decide whether, where and when to 
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2. The Rights of Irregular Migrants: 2.D. The Rights of 
Refugees 
 
Other human rights applicable to migrants by sea are linked 
to the condition of the refugee, according to the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (amended by the 
1967 Protocol). 
Refugee status is a matter of fact and does not depend on an 
official recognition by any authority. A refugee is defined by the 
1951 Convention as a person who,  
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” 
(Art. 1, para. A.2). 
This definition covers people who are persecuted for a 
number of reasons that are mostly based on political grounds. It 
does not include people who are attempting to flee conflicts, 
either international or domestic, poverty or natural disasters 
(war, economic or environmental refugees). The majority of 
current illegal migrants belong to these categories.  
The Refugee Convention, however, does not provide the 
refugee with a right to receive asylum in any of its States 
parties.13 In this respect, the 1951 Convention does not comply 
																																								 																				
13 Such a right might be granted by the domestic legislation of the States 
concerned. For example, under Article 10, para. 3, of the Constitution of 
Italy, enacted in 1947, “an alien who in his country is prevented from 
effectively exercising the democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Italian 
Constitution, has the right of asylum in the territory of the Republic 
according to the conditions established by the law” (unofficial translation).  
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have engaged in policies of “pushing-back” potential refugees at 
sea. In fact, the theory that human rights treaties apply only 
within the territory of States parties is not only wrong, it is a 
mockery of the rule of law. Respect for human rights is due to 
any individual who is under the power or effective control of 
any State agent, wherever the latter happens to be, including the 
high seas. 
 
3. The Past Italian “Pushing Back” Policy 
 
In the past Italy also implemented a policy of “pushing back” 
irregular migrants and was consequently judged to be in 
violation of the European Convention of Human Rights by the 
European Court of Human Rights, specifically in the case 
relating to the pushing-back to Libya of illegal migrants 
(Judgment of 23 February 2012 in the case Hirsi Jamaa and 
others v. Italy).  
This case confirmed that the Italian push-back policy did not 
comply with the obligations arising from the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The case was filed by eleven 
Somalis and thirteen Eritreans who were among a group of 
about 200 migrants intercepted at sea by Italian authorities and 
summarily returned to Libya. The applicants claimed violation 
of a number of provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, including Art. 3 (Torture) and Art. 4 of Protocol 
No. 4 (Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens).  
As regards the weight of bilateral agreements relating to the 
fight against illegal migration, the Court observed that  
“Italy cannot evade its own responsibility by relying 
on its obligations arising out of bilateral agreements 
with Libya. Even if it were to be assumed that those 
agreements made express provision for the return to 
Libya of migrants intercepted on the high seas, the 
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be admitted, he or she must at least be granted the right to 
directly submit an application to a State party to the 1951 
Convention. This can be considered a right to fair and efficient 
asylum procedures. The right of the refugee to have access to 
the territory of a State party to seek asylum is indirectly implied 
in Art. 31, para. 1, of the 1951 Convention: 
“The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, 
on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees 
who, coming directly from a territory where their life or 
freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or 
are present in their territory without authorization, 
provided they present themselves without delay to the 
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or 
presence”. 
As consistently pointed out by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, who is in charge of supervising the 
application of the Refugee Convention, 
“as a general rule, in order to give effect to their 
obligations under the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 
Protocol, States will be required to grant individuals 
seeking international protection access to the territory 
and to fair and efficient asylum procedures”.14 
At sea, the identification of asylum-seekers and the 
processing of their applications are activities that normally 
cannot be carried out on ships. Consequently, the rescuing or 
intercepting State is under an obligation to disembark the 
potential refugees in a place where they can exercise their right 
to fair and efficient asylum procedures. Regrettably, some States 
have taken the position that human rights treaties, including the 
1951 Convention, do not apply outside the national territory and 
																																								 																				
14 UNCHR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-
Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 26 January 2007, para. 8. 
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merely for having left the country irregularly. As regards 
Somalia, in the recent case of Sufi and Elmi (…) the 
Court noted the serious levels of violence in Mogadishu 
and the increased risk to persons returned to that 
country of being forced either to transit through areas 
affected by the armed conflict or to seek refuge in camps 
for displaced persons or refugees, where living 
conditions were appalling”.17  
The situation in Libya was well-known to the Italian 
authorities or could be easily verified by them through multiple 
sources.18  
According to the Court, irrespective of whether an intention 
to apply for asylum was manifested by the applicants – a 
circumstance that was disputed by the parties –, Italy was under 
the obligation of not pushing the migrants back to Libya: 
“In any event, the Court considers that it was for the 
national authorities, faced with a situation in which 
human rights were being systematically violated, as 
described above, to find out about the treatment to which 
the applicants would be exposed after their return (…) 
Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the fact 
that the parties concerned had failed to expressly request 
asylum did not exempt Italy from fulfilling its obligations 
under Article 3”.19 
The Court unanimously found that Italy was also responsible 
for violation of Art. 4 of Protocol No. 4, which prohibits the 
collective expulsion of aliens. In particular, the Court rejected 
the formalistic argument put forward by Italy that an expulsion 
can take place only if the aliens are inside the national territory. 
																																								 																				
17 Ibid., Para. 150. 
18 Ibid., Paras. 131 and 156. 
19 Ibid., Para. 133. 
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Contracting States’ responsibility continues even after 
their having entered into treaty commitments subsequent 
to the entry into force of the Convention or its Protocols 
in respect of these States”.15 
On the merits, the Court unanimously found that Italy was 
responsible for violation of Art. 3 of the Convention, since, by 
returning the applicants to Libya, it had exposed them to the risk 
of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
in Libya or in their countries of origin: 
“During the period in question no rule governing the 
protection of refugees was complied with by Libya. Any 
person entering the country by illegal means was deemed 
to be clandestine and no distinction was made between 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers. Consequently, 
those persons were systematically arrested and detained 
in conditions that outside visitors, such as delegations 
from the UNHCR, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International, could only describe as inhuman. Many 
cases of torture, poor hygiene conditions and lack of 
appropriate medical care were denounced by all the 
observers. Clandestine migrants were at risk of being 
returned to their countries of origin at any time and, if 
they managed to regain their freedom, were subjected to 
particularly precarious living conditions as a result of 
their irregular situation. Irregular immigrants, such as 
the applicants, were destined to occupy a marginal and 
isolated position in Libyan society, rendering them 
extremely vulnerable to xenophobic and racist acts”.16 
“(…) according to the UNHCR and Human Rights 
Watch, individuals forcibly repatriated to Eritrea face 
being tortured and detained in inhuman conditions 
																																								 																				
15 Ibid., Para. 129. 
16 Ibid., Para. 125. 
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17 Ibid., Para. 150. 
18 Ibid., Paras. 131 and 156. 
19 Ibid., Para. 133. 
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Finally, the Court unanimously found that there had been a 
violation of Art. 13 of the Convention (Right to an effective 
remedy), taken in conjunction with Arts. 3 of the Convention 
and 4 of Protocol No. 4, as the applicants were deprived of any 
remedy which would have enabled them to lodge their 
complaints with a competent authority and to obtain a thorough 
and rigorous assessment of their requests before the removal 
measure was enforced.24 
Today Italy has radically changed its previous attitude. In 
October 2013, after 366 migrants drowned in the vicinity of the 
island of Lampedusa, it initiated a policy of engaging units of 
the navy and police to deal with the humanitarian emergency 
occurring in the waters of the South-Central Mediterranean Sea. 
Illegal migrants and asylum seekers found in unseaworthy boats, 
where they are often abandoned by smugglers, are rescued and 
transported to the Italian territory where applications for asylum 
are processed.  
Subsequent migration policies have been established in the 
Central Mediterranean within the framework of relevant 
European Union legislation.25 However, a more balanced regime 
of asylum is still expected at the European Union level to better 
share among all member States the burdens met by some 
Mediterranean member States, in particular Greece and Italy.  
 
4. Conclusive Remarks 
 
In conclusion, many of the relevant facts demonstrate that 
illegal migrants are too often the victims not only of smugglers, 
																																								 																				
24 Ibid., Para. 205. 
25 See I. Tani, “Le forme di contrasto al fenomeno dell’immigrazione 
irregolare attraverso il Mediterraneo nell’ambito dell’Unione europea”, in A. 
Antonucci, I. Papanicolopulu, T. Scovazzi (eds.), L’immigrazione irregolare 
via mare nella giurisprudenza italiana e nell’esperienza europea, Torino, 
2016, p. 45. 
	 192	
After having remarked that Art. 420 does not use the word 
“territory”,21 the Court interpreted the Convention and its 
Protocols in a way “which renders the guarantees practical and 
effective and not theoretical and illusory”,22 showing a particular 
consideration for the fate of migrants who risk their lives at sea: 
“The Court has already found that, according to the 
established case-law of the Commission and of the 
Court, the purpose of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 is to 
prevent States being able to remove certain aliens 
without examining their personal circumstances and, 
consequently, without enabling them to put forward their 
arguments against the measure taken by the relevant 
authority. If, therefore, Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 were 
to apply only to collective expulsions from the national 
territory of the States Parties to the Convention, a 
significant component of contemporary migratory 
patterns would not fall within the ambit of that provision, 
notwithstanding the fact that the conduct it is intended to 
prohibit can occur outside national territory and in 
particular, as in the instant case, on the high seas. 
Article 4 would thus be ineffective in practice with 
regard to such situations, which, however, are on the 
increase. The consequence of that would be that 
migrants having taken to the sea, often risking their lives, 
and not having managed to reach the borders of a State, 
would not be entitled to an examination of their personal 
circumstances before being expelled, unlike those 
travelling by land”.23  
																																								 																				
20 “Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited”. 
21 Ibid., Para. 173. 
22 Ibid., Para. 175. 
23 Ibid., Para. 177. 
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are processed.  
Subsequent migration policies have been established in the 
Central Mediterranean within the framework of relevant 
European Union legislation.25 However, a more balanced regime 
of asylum is still expected at the European Union level to better 
share among all member States the burdens met by some 
Mediterranean member States, in particular Greece and Italy.  
 
4. Conclusive Remarks 
 
In conclusion, many of the relevant facts demonstrate that 
illegal migrants are too often the victims not only of smugglers, 
																																								 																				
24 Ibid., Para. 205. 
25 See I. Tani, “Le forme di contrasto al fenomeno dell’immigrazione 
irregolare attraverso il Mediterraneo nell’ambito dell’Unione europea”, in A. 
Antonucci, I. Papanicolopulu, T. Scovazzi (eds.), L’immigrazione irregolare 
via mare nella giurisprudenza italiana e nell’esperienza europea, Torino, 
2016, p. 45. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Mediterranean has never before been populated by so 
many ships, border police, military and NGOs, all scouting the 
horizon in search of vessels in distress, while their patrolling 
missions are constantly supported by an intense activity of 
aircraft and helicopters, satellite surveillance and drone 
operations. This militarization of the Mediterranean Sea is due 
in large part to the fact that Europe is facing its greatest 
maritime refugee crisis, one of the main challenges of this 
century that will eventually lead to long-lasting implications 
from a humanitarian, economic and geopolitical standpoint.  
However, in the battle against migrant smuggling, what 
powers can coastal States effectively enforce during operations 
at sea? In answering this question, this paper first focuses on 
enforcement powers at sea and then describes how the 
phenomenon of moving borders through military operations is 
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but also of a number of States that try to evade their legal and 
moral duties by resorting to shows of strength against the 
weakest of human beings or to barely credible legal 
technicalities. The treaties so far concluded are not sufficiently 
clear to deal with all the problems posed by this great human 
tragedy. The very invention of asymmetrical rights undermines 
the merits of international law in addressing the basic human 
needs of irregular migrants and asylum seekers. This is the 
reason why, where different views are admissible, a clear 
position should be taken in favour of the weaker subject, that is 
the illegal migrant, and against the stronger subject, that is the 
State. If it appears that the international rules in force do not 
offer sufficient protection for the weaker party, the only 
conclusion to be drawn is that the present regime should be 
changed and improved as soon as possible.  
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for both law enforcement and judicial authorities to take 
effective measures in order to secure the arrest of smugglers 
apprehended in international waters. In fact, these maritime 
spaces are normally subtracted from national jurisdiction and 
exceptions apply only to specific cases provided for by 
international conventions and bilateral treaties.  
 
3. Creeping Jurisdiction in Criminal Law   
 
Transnational criminal organizations pay close attention to 
operational activities performed at sea and adjust their tactics 
and modi operandi accordingly. These criminal networks have 
also been trying to adapt to law enforcement operations in 
territorial waters and contiguous zones and have changed their 
criminal behavior by perpetrating transnational crimes in what 
they believe to be areas of impunity, and thus not subject to 
national jurisdiction.  
However, under the aegis of Frontex Joint Operations, law 
enforcement authorities reacted to this peculiar phenomenon by 
extending the scope of their operations in international waters. 
As a result, in an effort to tackle this new approach taken by 
transnational criminal organizations, during the last few years, 
in Italy we have witnessed a trend to claim both enforcement 
and adjudicative jurisdiction on the high seas.2 
Given this operational scenario, since 2010 Italian law 
enforcement authorities like the Guardia di Finanza3 have 
																																								 																				
2 U. Leanza, F. Graziani, “Enforcement and Jurisdiction in Countering the 
Smuggling of Migrants: Operational Aspects”, in La Comunità 
Internazionale, 2/2014, 2014, pp. 163-209. 
3 Following the entry into force of the Legislative Decree 177/2016, from 
January 2017 the Guardia di Finanza is the only Italian authority responsible 
for maritime security while the Italian Coast Guard retains the coordination 
of all the activities related to the provision of Search and Rescue services at 
sea.  
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progressively leading to the externalization of border 
management.   
 
2. Jurisdiction Powers in Maritime Spaces 
 
As a general rule, State jurisdiction is based on the State’s 
territorial dimension. Therefore, when delimiting competences 
at sea through legislative powers (prescriptive jurisdiction), the 
measures implemented by border police (enforcement 
jurisdiction) within the territorial sea are in principle lawful, 
while actions performed outside territorial waters are regarded 
with suspicion, and sometimes even considered presumptively 
unlawful.1 As a result, when it comes to the prosecution of 
transnational crimes committed outside the scope of a coastal 
State’s sovereignty, judicial authorities are not usually 
competent to deal with such cases (adjudicative jurisdiction), 
save for a few exceptions provided for in international law. 
Nonetheless, in terms of the exercise of jurisdiction, the legal 
regime applicable at sea is unique. It is governed by the 
principle that the sovereignty of coastal States is inversely 
proportional to the distance from national coasts. Basically, the 
jurisdictional power of a coastal State decreases as the distance 
from the shore increases. Starting from territorial waters where 
States can exercise their full powers, passing through the 
contiguous zone where they can claim jurisdiction only in 
certain areas, and finally reaching international waters where 
every State enjoys freedom of navigation on the high seas.  
In this regard, over the years, disproportionate migratory 
pressures across the Mediterranean Sea have significantly 
increased the number of interdiction operations of migrants’ 
boats on the high seas. These events clearly highlighted the need 
																																								 																				
1 C. Ryngaert, “The Concept of Jurisdiction in International Law”, in 
University International Law Journal, Utrecht, 2015. 
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4. Case Study 1 – Operation “SHERI” 
 
On 24 August 2010, 51 migrants were rescued in the vicinity 
of Crotone, in Calabria. A few hours after the migrants were 
rescued, a Guardia di Finanza vessel intercepted a suspicious 
boat which was navigating at about 20 nautical miles from the 
Italian coastline. The sailboat, named SHERI, was flying a 
Turkish flag and it was allegedly linked to the migrant 
smuggling event that had just occurred. After receiving several 
signals to come to a halt, the sailboat was finally stopped at 
about 30 nautical miles and the two people on board were 
apprehended for further investigations. Once on shore, several 
migrants recognized the two individuals apprehended as being 
the smugglers who had previously transported them toward 
Italy. They were consequently arrested on charges of facilitating 
irregular immigration.  
After the arrest, the two smugglers appealed the judge’s 
decision before the Italian Court of Cassation on two grounds. In 
particular, they stated that their pursuit commenced outside 
territorial waters, and therefore their arrest was not legitimate 
because Italy had never formally declared the existence of a 
contiguous zone extending up to 24 nautical miles. In addition, 
they maintained that since they had not been caught in the act of 
disembarking migrants on Italian territory, they could not be 
arrested in international waters. However, during the 
proceedings, the Supreme Court rejected both complaints lodged 
by the smugglers and confirmed the approach taken by border 
police officers at sea. Specifically, the Court of Cassation 
pointed out that article 33 of the UNCLOS provides for the 
possibility of preventing infringement of immigration laws in 
the contiguous zone.7 Likewise, article 111 of the UNCLOS 
																																								 																				
7 UNCLOS, article 33 - Contiguous Zone: “1. In a zone contiguous to its 
territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal State may 
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exercised their powers to intercept migrants’ boats, arrest the 
smugglers and then seize the ship, regardless of the fact that 
these events took place outside Italian jurisdiction. Consequent 
to these early interception techniques on the high seas, judges 
and prosecutors began to acknowledge this methodology by 
extending the application of Italian criminal jurisdiction to 
international waters. This ad hoc approach adopted by the 
Italian magistrates finds its legal basis on the so-called principle 
of ‘creeping jurisdiction’ at sea, however, applied to the field of 
criminal law.  
In this domain, the operational scenarios faced by law 
enforcement and judicial authorities are mainly regulated by the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter 
UNCLOS),4 the United Nations Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(hereinafter SUA Convention)5 and the United Nations Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants (hereinafter UNTOC).6 
Below we submit four case studies in which the interpretation 
of international law has led to the slow but relentless process of 
‘moving borders’ further away from national coasts, a 
phenomenon that has recently contributed to the externalization 
of border management. These cases involve the use of national 
and international provisions that offer the legal instruments for 
both enforcement and judicial authorities to interfere with 
freedom of navigation on the high seas. 
 
																																								 																				
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Index and Final 
Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1983. 
Most Mediterranean States are party to the UNCLOS, except Israel, Libya, 
Syria and Turkey. Italy ratified it with Law no. 684 of 2 December 1994. 
5 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, Italy ratified it with Law 422 of 28 December 1989. 
6 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Palermo, 
2000. Italy ratified it with Law 146 of 16 March 2006. 
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7 UNCLOS, article 33 - Contiguous Zone: “1. In a zone contiguous to its 
territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal State may 
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(articles 33 and 111 UNCLOS), police and judicial authorities 
had the legal instruments to exercise enforcement and 
adjudicative powers beyond territorial sea. This ruling10 was 
quite remarkable as it clearly reversed a judgment issued by the 
same Court of Cassation only the previous year. In fact, in a 
similar case involving a Turkish vessel, the Court rejected the 
existence of a contiguous zone in Italy affirming that such a 
maritime space could not be invoked especially because Turkey 
had not ratified the UNCLOS.11 
 
5. Case Study 2 – Operation “TUSA” 
 
On 8 August 2012, under the aegis of Frontex Operation 
AENEAS 2012, an aircraft spotted a suspicious vessel allegedly 
involved in smuggling migrants, navigating at about 80 nautical 
miles from the Italian shores. On the following morning, the 
boat, named TUSA, abruptly halted its course in territorial 
waters. A SAR operation ensued and 158 migrants were rescued 
at about 11 nautical miles from the Italian coasts, while the 
smugglers who had just abandoned the ship were later 
intercepted by a Guardia di Finanza vessel. The smugglers were 
caught on board a rubber boat about 33 nautical miles from the 
Italian shores, attempting to flee from the sailboat they had 
previously left adrift. This time the right of hot pursuit could not 
be invoked because the interception of the smugglers took place 
outside the contiguous zone. As a result, both enforcement and 
judicial authorities required a different legal instrument to claim 
jurisdiction over the smugglers.   
																																								 																																							 																																							 										
confermino il coinvolgimento della nave in un traffico di migranti, 
sequestrarla conducendo la stessa in un porto dello Stato.” 
10 See Italian Court of Cassation, Sentence no. 29182/2011. 
11 See Italian Court of Cassation, Kircaoglu and Sanaga vs Italy, Sentence 
no. 32960/2010. 
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contemplates that the right of hot pursuit can be exercised if the 
chase has commenced in the contiguous zone and the ship has 
presumably violated the laws and regulations of the coastal 
State.  
Following this line of reasoning, the judge concluded that the 
pursuit and interception of the SHERI on the high seas, 
culminating in the arrest of the two smugglers, were indeed 
legitimate actions since the pursuit continued outside the 
territorial sea and was not interrupted until the smugglers were 
finally apprehended in international waters.8 In this case, the 
Court also noted that despite the fact that Italy had yet to declare 
the existence of a contiguous zone, both at national (article 12, 
paragraph 9 bis D.Lgs. 286/1998)9 and international level 
																																								 																																							 																																							 										
exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, 
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or 
territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations 
committed within its territory or territorial sea. 2. The contiguous zone may 
not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.” 
8 Ibid, article 111, paragraph 1 – Right of Hot Pursuit: “1. The hot pursuit 
of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the 
coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws 
and regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be commenced when the 
foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal waters, the archipelagic 
waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and 
may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the 
pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary that, at the time when the 
foreign ship within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone receives the 
order to stop, the ship giving the order should likewise be within the 
territorial sea or the contiguous zone. If the foreign ship is within a 
contiguous zone, as defined in article 33, the pursuit may only be undertaken 
if there has been a violation of the rights for the protection of which the zone 
was established.” 
9 Italian Immigration Law Consolidated Text, Legislative Decree 
286/1998. Article 12, paragraph 9 bis - Disposizioni contro le Immigrazioni 
Clandestine: “La nave italiana in servizio di polizia, che incontri nel mare 
territoriale o nella zona contigua, una nave, di cui si ha fondato motivo di 
ritenere che sia adibita o coinvolta nel trasporto illecito di migranti, può 
fermarla, sottoporla ad ispezione e, se vengono rinvenuti elementi che 
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perpetrators apprehended in international waters (article 4 of the 
Law no. 422/198915 and article 10 of the Italian Penal Code16). 
 
6. Case Study 3 – Operation “NEVERMORE” 
 
On October 12, 2013, under the aegis of Frontex Operation 
AENEAS 2013, an aircraft spotted a suspicious vessel allegedly 
involved in smuggling migrants, navigating at about 250 miles 
from the coasts of Calabria. In line with a modus operandi 
adopted by transnational criminal organization in those years, 
the fishing boat was flying no flag nor showed any distinctive 
mark indicating its nationality. However, the suspicious ship 
was towing a smaller and empty wooden boat attached with a 
rope. About 200 nautical miles from the coast of Calabria, the 
smugglers began to transfer migrants from the fishing vessel 
used as a mother boat to the smaller vessel. When these 
operations were terminated, the mother ship started heading 
																																								 																				
15 SUA Convention Italian ratification law, article 4 of the Law 422/1989 
- 1.: “Oltre che nei casi indicati negli articoli da 6 a 11 del codice penale, è 
punito secondo la legge italiana, a richiesta del Ministro di grazia e giustizia 
… d) lo straniero che commette all’estero uno dei reati previsti dall’articolo 3 
al fine di costringere un organo dello Stato a compiere qualsiasi atto o ad 
astenersene.” 
16 Italian Penal Code, article 10, “Delitto comune dello straniero 
all’estero”: “1. Lo straniero, che, fuori dei casi indicati negli articoli 7 e 8, 
commette in territorio estero, a danno dello Stato o di un cittadino, un delitto 
per il quale la legge italiana stabilisce la pena di morte o l’ergastolo, o la 
reclusione non inferiore nel minimo a un anno, è punito secondo la legge 
medesima, sempre che si trovi nel territorio dello Stato, e vi sia richiesta del 
ministro della giustizia, ovvero istanza o querela della persona offesa. 2. Se il 
delitto è commesso a danno delle Comunità europee, di uno Stato estero o di 
uno straniero, il colpevole è punito secondo la legge italiana, a richiesta del 
ministro della giustizia, sempre che: a) si trovi nel territorio dello Stato; b) si 
tratti di delitto per il quale è stabilita la pena di morte o dell’ergastolo, ovvero 
della reclusione non inferiore nel minimo a tre anni; c) l’estradizione di lui 
non sia stata conceduta, ovvero non sia stata accettata dal Governo dello 
Stato in cui egli ha commesso il delitto, o da quello dello Stato a cui egli 
appartiene.” 
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Since the smugglers had jeopardized the safety of the boat by 
damaging the engines, the GPS, life vests and the helm before 
abandoning the ship, in this specific case the norms of the 
United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation were applied. 
Hence, the judge confirmed the operational approach of border 
police authorities according to the SUA Convention provisions 
by observing that any damage caused to a ship to endanger its 
safe navigation can be punished by a State Party (article 3).12 In 
addition, he argued that the Convention also applies if the ship is 
navigating from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial 
sea (article 4)13 and that a State Party can establish its 
jurisdiction if the crime is committed in an attempt to compel 
that State to do or to abstain from doing any act (article 6).14  
As a result, at the end of the legal proceedings, the smugglers 
were prosecuted both for facilitating illegal immigration and for 
crimes committed against the safety of maritime navigation. 
However, pursuant to the provisions of the Italian law that 
ratified the SUA Convention, the smugglers could be prosecuted 
only after submitting a request to the Ministry of Justice which 
granted the possibility to proceed with respect to the foreign 
																																								 																				
12 SUA Convention, article 3 paragraph 1, letter c): “Any person commits 
an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally … c) destroys a ship or 
causes a damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of that ship.” 
13 Ibid, article 4 – “1. This Convention applies if the ship is navigating or 
is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond the outer limit 
of the territorial sea of a single State, or the later limits of its territorial sea 
with adjacent States. 2. In cases where the Convention does not apply 
pursuant to paragraph 1, it nevertheless applies when the offender or the 
alleged offender is found in the territory of a State Party other than the State 
referred to in paragraph 1.” 
14 Ibid, article 6, paragraph 2, letter c): “A State Party may also establish 
its jurisdiction any such offence when: … c) it is committed in an attempt to 
compel that State to do or to abstain from doing any act.” 
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pursuant to article 8 of Annex III of the UNTOC, with a 
particular reference to the legal provisions set forth in paragraph 
7.18  
This specific approach was further corroborated by the Italian 
Antimafia Directorate (hereinafter DNA) affirming that the 
UNTOC provisions effectively confer upon Italian authorities 
the enforcement and judicial powers needed to exercise their 
jurisdiction in respect of vessels without nationality. Likewise, 
the right of visit can be exercised on the high seas also in 
relation to a ship using a flag of convenience. Such a ship may 
not claim any nationality and therefore may be assimilated to a 
ship without nationality.19  
Whereas, if a ship navigating on the high seas is flying a flag 
of another State Party and this ship is suspected of migrant 
smuggling, before boarding and searching the vessel the coastal 
State must request prior authorization from the flag State.20  
																																								 																				
18 UNTOC, Annex III, Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, article 8, paragraph 7 Measures Against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Sea: “A State Party that has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea and is 
without nationality or may be assimilated to a vessel without nationality may 
board and search the vessel. If evidence confirming the suspicion is found, 
that State Party shall take appropriate measures in accordance with relevant 
domestic and international law.” 
19 UNCLOS, article 92, paragraph 2 - Status of Ships: “A ship which sails 
under the flags of two or more States, using them according to convenience, 
may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other 
State, and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality.” 
20 UNTOC, Annex III, Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, article 8, paragraph 2 - Measures Against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Sea: “A State Party that has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a vessel exercising freedom of navigation in accordance with 
international law and flying the flag or displaying the marks of registry of 
another State Party is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea may so 
notify the flag State, request confirmation of registry and, if confirmed, 
request authorization from the flag State to take appropriate measures with 
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toward North African coasts while the fishing vessel with the 
migrants on board proceeded toward Italian shores.  
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officers did not find any documentation proving the nationality, 
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visit on the high seas in cases of ships without nationality)17 and 
article 8 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air (measures against the smuggling of migrants 
by sea) contemplate the possibility of boarding and searching a 
stateless vessel in international waters. At the end of the legal 
proceedings, the judge confirmed the arrest of 17 smugglers 
																																								 																				
17 UNCLOS, article 110, paragraph 1 - Right of Visit: “Except where acts 
of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship which 
encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to 
complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not justified in 
boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: (a) the ship 
is engaged in piracy; (b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade; (c) the ship is 
engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has 
jurisdiction under article 109; (d) the ship is without nationality; or (e) though 
flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the 
same nationality as the warship.” 
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7. Case Study 4 – Operation “DEEP SEA” 
 
On April 22, 2015, the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
(hereinafter MRCC) of the Italian Coast Guard in Rome 
received two distress calls via satellite phone from two different 
rubber boats that had departed from Tripoli. These boats were 
allegedly carrying migrants on board and were heading toward 
Italian coasts. A SAR operation was then launched under the 
aegis of Frontex Operation TRITON 2015. Both rubber boats 
were intercepted by a Guardia di Finanza offshore patrol vessel 
in international waters and 220 migrants were rescued at a 
distance of about 20 nautical miles from Libyan shores. The 
migrants were then transferred on board the Italian vessel and 
escorted to the port of Catania while two smugglers were 
apprehended for further investigations. 
Although the event took place far away from national coasts, 
the judge acknowledged the operational approach adopted by 
border police authorities and confirmed the possibility of 
claiming jurisdiction over the smugglers arrested in international 
waters. In particular, the Court noted that smugglers 
systematically use unseaworthy boats on purpose in order to 
trigger SAR events. These well-known modi operandi compel 
the coastal State to act in accordance with the duty to render 
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In accordance with these arguments, the Court held that in the 
above-mentioned case the principle of territoriality was fully 
applicable pursuant to national norms, inter alia articles 621 and 
722 of the Italian Penal Code and article 12, paragraph 9 quater, 
D.Lgs. 286/1998.23 In addition, the judge noted that the exercise 
of enforcement powers on the high seas (e.g. boarding, 
searching and seizing the ship) are indeed legitimate when 
executed by those States Parties who have an interest in 
preventing the infringement of their domestic laws.24 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 										
regard to that vessel. The flag State may authorize the requesting State, inter 
alia: (a) To board the vessel; (b) To search the vessel; and (c) If evidence is 
found that the vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, to take 
appropriate measures with respect to the vessel and persons and cargo on 
board, as authorized by the flag State.” 
21 Italian Penal Code, article 6 - “Reati commessi nel territorio dello 
Stato”: “Chiunque commette un reato nel territorio dello Stato è punito 
secondo la legge italiana. Il reato si considera commesso nel territorio dello 
Stato, quando l’azione o l’omissione, che lo costituisce, è ivi avvenuta in 
tutto o in parte, ovvero si è ivi verificato l’evento che è la conseguenza 
dell’azione od omissione.” 
22 Ibid, article 7 – “Reati commessi all’estero”: “E’ punito secondo la 
legge italiana il cittadino o lo straniero che commette in territorio estero … 
ogni altro reato per il quale speciali disposizioni di legge o convenzioni 
internazionali stabiliscono l’applicabilità delle legge penale italiana.” 
23 Italian Immigration Law Consolidated Text, Legislative Decree 
286/1998. Article 12, paragraph 9 quater - Disposizioni contro le 
Immigrazioni Clandestine: “I poteri di cui al comma 9-bis possono essere 
esercitati al di fuori delle acque territoriali, oltre che da parte delle navi della 
Marina militare, anche da parte delle navi in servizio di polizia, nei limiti 
consentiti dalla legge, dal diritto internazionale o da accordi bilaterali o 
multilaterali, se la nave batte la bandiera nazionale o anche quella di altro 
Stato, ovvero si tratti di una nave senza bandiera o con bandiera di 
convenienza.” 
24 A. Antonucci, M. Fantinato, P. Caiazza, “The Evolution of 
Enforcement Powers on the High Seas through the Air-naval Operations of 
the Guardia di Finanza against the Smugglers of Migrants in the 
Mediterranean Sea”, in Cataldi G., et al. (eds.), A Mediterranean Perspective 
on Migrants’ Flows in the European Union: Protection of Rights, 
Intercultural Encounters and Integration Policies, Editoriale Scientifica 
Napoli, 2016, p. 295.  
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irregular immigration are also punishable under Italian criminal 
law. Specifically, this article refers to generic criminal conduct 
that contributes to irregular entry into Italian territory in any 
manner whatsoever.  
In this regard, the judge argued that despite the fact that 
preparatory acts to facilitate the illegal entry were committed 
abroad (both in Libya and in international waters), these 
preliminary actions were undoubtedly intended to compel the 
Italian State to intervene and therefore could also be prosecuted 
according to article 7 of the Italian Penal Code.28 This 
operational approach was further corroborated by the Court of 
Cassation and the DNA, both affirming that, along with 
international law provisions, domestic laws also effectively 
confer upon Italian authorities the enforcement and judicial 
powers to exercise their jurisdiction over unseaworthy vessels 
placing distress calls to the Italian authorities in order to be 
transported into Italian territory.   
 
8. Moving Borders and Border Externalization  
 
As we can infer from the case studies described in the 
previous paragraphs, from 2010 to 2015 there has been an 
increasing tendency to ‘move borders’ through law enforcement 
operations at sea. However, in 2010, SAR incidents usually took 
place about 20 nautical miles from the Italian coasts while 
migrants were transported on wooden boats that could often 
endure the long voyage across the Mediterranean Sea. After just 
five years, SAR events started occurring at approximately 20 
nautical miles from Libyan shores and migrants were smuggled 
																																								 																																							 																																							 										
o non ha titolo di residenza permanente, è punito con la reclusione da cinque 
a quindici anni e con la multa di 15.000 euro per ogni persona.” 
28 See supra note 20. 
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assistance at sea25 and to transport migrants into Italian territory 
pursuant to the existing provisions on the place of safety.26  
In addition, the judge argued that by endangering the lives of 
migrants, smugglers create a ‘state of necessity’ which is clearly 
premeditated and whose ultimate goal is to facilitate the entry of 
migrants into Italian territory under the aegis of a SAR 
operation. Under such circumstances, the distress call to the 
Italian authorities can be considered as an essential fragment of 
this premeditated criminal design, planned by the smugglers 
from the very beginning. Hence, the satellite phone call placed 
to the Italian MRCC constitutes a direct link to the State 
allowing for criminal jurisdiction over ships requesting 
assistance at sea and that are supposedly involved in migrant 
smuggling in international waters. Likewise, the Court 
highlighted that pursuant to provisions set forth in article 12 of 
D.Lgs. 286/1998,27 preparatory acts aimed at facilitating 
																																								 																				
25 UNCLOS, article 98, paragraph 1 – Duty to Render Assistance: “1. 
Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he 
can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) 
to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to 
proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if 
informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably 
be expected of him; (c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, 
its crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of 
the name of his own ship, its port of registry and the nearest port at which it 
will call.” 
26 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (chapter 
1.3.2) of 1979 and Resolution Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons 
Rescued at Sea, paragraph 2.5, MSC.167(78), adopted in May 2004 by the 
Maritime Safety Committee together with the SAR and SOLAS amendments. 
27 Italian Immigration Law Consolidated Text, Legislative Decree 
286/1998, article 12, paragraph 1 - Disposizioni contro le Immigrazioni 
Clandestine: “Salvo che il fatto costituisca più grave reato, chiunque, in 
violazione delle disposizioni del presente testo unico, promuove, dirige, 
organizza, finanzia o effettua il trasporto di stranieri nel territorio dello Stato 
ovvero compie altri atti diretti a procurarne illegalmente l’ingresso nel 
territorio dello Stato, ovvero di altro Stato del quale la persona non è cittadina 
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o non ha titolo di residenza permanente, è punito con la reclusione da cinque 
a quindici anni e con la multa di 15.000 euro per ogni persona.” 
28 See supra note 20. 
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border externalization strategies are a reoccurring process in the 
European debate, they still represent a much more 
comprehensive phenomenon that engulfs all the extraterritorial 
actions that a State can adopt. These measures may include 
creeping jurisdiction of coastal States, technical cooperation 
with third countries and extra-territorialization of asylum 
processing.  
Along the same line of reasoning, the above-mentioned case 
studies covered a five-year period and highlighted the 
innovative approach of Italian authorities in interpreting 
international conventions. However, following the 
implementation of this ‘creeping jurisdiction’ methodology 
during 2010-2015, it is noteworthy to remark that in 2016 the 
EU decided to sign two different technical cooperation 
agreements with third countries (Turkey and Libya). While the 
former agreement aimed at stemming the number of irregular 
border-crossings from Turkey,30 the latter provided for training 
the Libyan Coast Guard in order to reduce migratory pressures 
from Libya.31 Nevertheless, ongoing SAR and return operations 
to Libya continue to raise questions related to the unresolved 
issues of ‘safe third country’.32 In this regard, it is still unclear 
whether these concerns will soon be addressed in order to make 
																																								 																				
30 EU Turkey statement, signed on the 18th March 2016. 
31 In the framework of EUNAVFOR-Med Operation Sophia, on the 23 
August 2016, Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino and Commodore Abdalh 
Toumia signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the training of Libyan 
Coast Guard aimed at tackling migrant smugglers while contributing to 
prevent further loss of life at sea. 
32 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Position on 
Returns to Libya - Update I, October 2015, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/561cd8804.html (accessed on the 30 June 
2017). 
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on board unseaworthy rubber boats with a limited endurance 
that did not even allow them to reach Italian shores.  
This modus operandi was adopted by transnational criminal 
organizations to cope with the shortage of wooden boats in 
Libya and to trigger SAR events just a few miles outside the 
Libyan territorial sea, compelling the Italian State to intervene. 
Since this particular criminal behavior put the Italian SAR 
services under a considerable strain, several NGOs tried to fill 
the vacuum by patrolling the areas closer to Libyan waters along 
with Frontex and EUNAVFOR-Med military ships.  
Against this background, both Italian border police and 
judicial authorities have been trying to extend criminal 
jurisdiction through the interpretation of the existing national 
and international legal framework. The Italian magistrates tried 
to bridge the gap through creeping jurisdiction in order to 
apprehend smugglers in international waters and disrupt the 
migrant smuggling business model. This approach was 
unprecedented and contributed to securing the arrest of several 
smugglers intercepted on the high seas while acting as a 
deterrent to transnational criminal organizations.29 In this regard, 
it is worth mentioning that the phenomenon of creeping 
jurisdiction in SAR operations ensured both the safety of 
thousands of migrants rescued at sea, and a high level of sea 
border security in respect of the number of smugglers 
apprehended in international waters and then prosecuted in Italy.  
On the other hand, following the process of creeping 
jurisdiction, during the past couple of years, both Frontex and 
EU military activities in the Mediterranean have progressively 
fostered the externalization of border management. While 
																																								 																				
29 I. Papanicolopulu, “Immigrazione Irregolare via Mare ed Esercizio 
della Giurisdizione”, in T. Scovazzi, I. Papanicolopulu, A. Antonucci, et al. 
(eds.), L’Immigrazione Irregolare via Mare nella Giurisprudenza Italiana e 
nell’Esperienza Europea, Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 2016, p. 20-22. 
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replaced by technical cooperation agreements with third 
countries. While these agreements certainly will contribute to 
reducing migratory pressure on the Central and Eastern 
Mediterranean routes, it bears mentioning that these 
participating States are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union nor by the European Convention 
on Human Rights.  
So far, this latest development in border management 
externalization has not been matched by the introduction of a 
system to identify possible fundamental rights breaches during 
Joint Operations. In fact, despite the new Frontex Regulation 
that introduced a Fundamental Rights Officer35 and a 
Complaints Mechanism,36 these systems still need to be 
effectively tested in the operational field. For instance, where 
shared responsibility is not matched by a shared accountability 
of all the actors involved in border management, it is very 
difficult to imagine an incident reporting mechanism that would 
ultimately recognize a Member State as being responsible and 
held accountable for possible human rights violations.  
In addition, compared to the pioneering ‘creeping 
jurisdiction’ approach, externalizing border management to third 
countries comes at a price: both criminal prosecution of 
smugglers and asylum claims processing of refugees will be 
dealt with far from the European borders and far away from 
public scrutiny.37  
																																								 																				
35 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard, 
amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and 
Council Decision 2005/267/EC, article 71 - Fundamental Rights Officer  
36 Ibid, article 72 - Complaints Mechanism. 
37 J. Rijpma, M. Cremona, The Extra-territorialisation of EU Migration 
Policies and the Rule of Law, in EUI Working Papers, 2007, p. 20. 
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these operations compliant with human rights law, with 
particular reference to the principle of non-refoulement.33  
Likewise, in June 2017, as confirmation of this continuous 
tendency to externalize border management, the Italian Ministry 
of the Interiors signed a Joint Declaration with Chad, Niger and 
Libya to create extra-territorial centers for asylum claims 
processing in their territories.34 However, these programs cast 
doubts on how to ensure both the protection of human rights and 
access to legal remedies for refugees in those third countries. In 
addition, it has yet to be revealed whether these centers will be 
placed under the coordination of the European Union or under 
the supervision of any other international organization.  
Nonetheless, under the overarching framework of 
international relations with key third countries, these two 
measures adopted firstly by the EU through technical 
cooperation and then by the Italian government through bilateral 
agreements on extra-territorialization seem to endorse this 
refined process of border management externalization that has 
been in place over the past two years.  
 
9. Concluding Remarks 
 
Although this trend to ‘move borders’ through law 
enforcement and military operations at sea has stepped up the 
level of cooperation among different partners and stakeholders, 
this development in operational cooperation has been recently 
																																								 																				
33 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, article 19 - 
Protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition: “1. Collective 
expulsions are prohibited. 2. No one may be removed, expelled or extradited 
to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to 
the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” 
34 See: http://www.ansa.it/english/news/world/2017/05/22/migrant-centers 
-in-chad-niger_cf222ffa-972f-4b89-866f-d8112fb3259b.html (accessed on 
the 30 June 2017). 
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1. Introduction 
 
The present Paper intends to analyze the recent Memorandum 
of Understanding between Italy and Libya of 2 February 2017 
and explore to what extent Italy might be considered responsible 
for violating the fundamental rights of migrants rescued by the 
Libyan coast guard, if they are disembarked in Libya.  
As observed, and under the motto “Out of sight, out of mind, 
Europe’s policies of externalization aim at rendering invisible 
refugees and migrants, the violation of their rights and the actual 
causes of escape and displacement”.1 In fact, as we have learned 
from Australian2 and US border control practices,3 externalizing 
																																								 																				
* University of Naples “L’Orientale”. 
The present Paper was presented at the Final Conference of the OPEN 
DOORS Summer School on Migration, Sea Border Control and Human 
Rights and takes into account developments up to 21 June 2017.  
1 See Out of sight, out of mind: Externalization of migration and refugee 
policies, available at: www.proasyl.de/en/news/out-of-sight-out-of-mind-
externalisation-and-regionalisation-of-migration-and-refugee-policie/(10/17). 
2 Australia has experimented with extraterritorial processing twice, from 
2001 to 2008 and again from 2012 onward, outsourcing to Nauru and Papua 
New Guinea the examination of the asylum claims of individuals, 
intercepting them before they reach Australia or sending them to offshore 
centres after initial identity and health screening in Australia. See, ex multis, 
S. Keebone, “The Pacific Plan: The Provision of ‘Effective Protection’”, in 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2006, p. 696 ff.; the Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 28th sess., Agenda item 3, UN Doc. 
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In conclusion, while the significant increase in using creeping 
jurisdiction methodology through ‘moving borders’ and 
encouraging law enforcement cooperation with third countries 
can be hailed as positive developments, these border 
externalization strategies may also encompass some dangers. 
One of the greatest risks of moving the borders of external 
frontiers management so far away from Europe is that this entire 
process could eventually lead to an overall shift of 
responsibility. As a result, border management could be 
progressively externalized toward countries with a poor human 
rights framework and inadequate refugee protection, 
jeopardizing the rights and security of those genuine refugees 
seeking to reach Europe.  
In this regard, the European Union must accept that border 
security and international protection are indeed strictly 
connected.38 Therefore, border management externalization 
toward third countries should not be used by the EU as an 
elusive strategy to escape the principle of solidarity, the 
obligation to provide refugee protection and the safeguard of 
non-refoulement to unsafe countries.39 
 
																																								 																				
38 E. Guild, C. Costello, M. Garlick, V. Moreno-Lax, The 2015 Refugee 
Crisis in the European Union, CEPS Policy Brief no. 332, September 2015, 
p. 6. 
39 European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy 
[GC], judgment of 21 February 2012. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The present Paper intends to analyze the recent Memorandum 
of Understanding between Italy and Libya of 2 February 2017 
and explore to what extent Italy might be considered responsible 
for violating the fundamental rights of migrants rescued by the 
Libyan coast guard, if they are disembarked in Libya.  
As observed, and under the motto “Out of sight, out of mind, 
Europe’s policies of externalization aim at rendering invisible 
refugees and migrants, the violation of their rights and the actual 
causes of escape and displacement”.1 In fact, as we have learned 
from Australian2 and US border control practices,3 externalizing 
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policies, available at: www.proasyl.de/en/news/out-of-sight-out-of-mind-
externalisation-and-regionalisation-of-migration-and-refugee-policie/(10/17). 
2 Australia has experimented with extraterritorial processing twice, from 
2001 to 2008 and again from 2012 onward, outsourcing to Nauru and Papua 
New Guinea the examination of the asylum claims of individuals, 
intercepting them before they reach Australia or sending them to offshore 
centres after initial identity and health screening in Australia. See, ex multis, 
S. Keebone, “The Pacific Plan: The Provision of ‘Effective Protection’”, in 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2006, p. 696 ff.; the Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 28th sess., Agenda item 3, UN Doc. 
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noteworthy is the UNHCR-IOM joint statement5 on addressing 
migration and refugee movements along the Central 
Mediterranean route, delivered on 2 February 2017, the very 
same day of the signing of the Italy-Libya MoU, whereby both 
organizations stated in very clear terms that “We believe that, 
given the current context, it is not appropriate to consider Libya 
a safe third country nor to establish extraterritorial processing of 
asylum-seekers in North Africa”. In the same direction, the Final 
Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya,6 transmitted to the UN 
Security Council on 1 June 2017, which highlights, inter alia, 
serious human rights’ violations (including arbitrary detentions 
and summary executions) vis-à-vis migrants; links between 
armed groups, criminal groups, and different coast guard 
factions and in some cases even the coast guard’s involvement 
in smuggling, concluding that “[a]fter interception, migrants are 
often beaten, robbed and taken to detention centres or private 
houses and farms, where they are subjected to forced labour, 
rape and other sexual violence”.  
 
2. The Italy-Libya MoU as a small piece of a larger scenario 
 
Over the past decades the European Union and European 
Member States have been implementing different strategies of 
externalized border controls, such as visa requirements, carrier 
sanctions, extraterritorial patrolling of borders, “safe third 
																																								 																																							 																																							 										
(Associazione Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione): “The EU and Italy de 
facto violate the principle of non-refoulement”, 6 February 2017, at 
www.asgi.it/english/libya-eu-italy-asylum-migration (10/17); Amnesty 
Report “The human cost of European hypocrisy on Libya”, at 
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/the-human-cost-of-european-hypo 
crisy-on-libya/ (10/17). 
5 www.unhcr.org/news/press/2017/2/58931ffb4/joint-unhcr-iomstatement-
addressing-migration-refugee-movements-along.html (10/17). 
6  http://undocs.org/S/2017/466 (10/17). The Panel of Experts was 
established pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1973 (2011).  
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border controls can lead to infringement of migrants’ rights, in 
particular the prohibition of torture or inhuman treatment; the 
right to leave any country; the right to liberty (because of 
arbitrary and prolonged detention); the right to seek asylum; the 
rights of vulnerable people (children, victims of trafficking etc.); 
the right to effective remedies. What is usually a risk, becomes a 
certainty when we talk about Libya, because of the dire situation 
that migrants and asylum seekers face in this country, as well 
documented by several UN and NGO Reports, for example the 
Human Rights Watch World Report 2017, issued on 12 January 
2017 (a few weeks before the Italy-Libya MoU), which states 
that in Libya “Guards and militia members subjected migrants 
and refugees to beatings, forced labor, and sexual violence” and 
held them in detention camps in inhuman conditions. 4  Also 
																																								 																																							 																																							 										
A/HRC/28/68/Add.1, 6 March 2015, 7-9; Amnesty International, The State of 
the World’s Human Rights 2015, Report 2014/15, pp. 63-64; the 
Communiqué to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court of February 2017 for the Situation in Nauru and Manus Island, 
available at https://law.stanford.edu/publications/communique-to-the-office-
of-the-prosecutor-of-the-international-criminal-court-under-article-15-of-the-
rome-statute-the-situation-in-nauru-and-manus-island-liability-for-crimes-aga 
inst-humanity/(10/17). 
3  US management of migration flows has varied between refoulement 
(endorsed by the Supreme Court in the Sale judgment) and pre-screening in 
the Naval Base of Guantanamo, in Jamaica, and Turks and Caicos, violating 
human rights for conditions of detention, and giving rise to difficulties in 
accessing fair procedures and the risk of refoulement to unsafe countries. See 
M. Flynn, “There and Back Again: On the Diffusion of Immigration 
Detention”, in Journal on Migration and Human Security, 2014, p. 165 ff.; S. 
Legomsky, “The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Program”, in 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2006, p. 680 ff.; and H. Koh, “The 
‘Haiti Paradigm’ in United States Human Rights Policy”, in Yale Law 
Journal, 1994, p. 2391 ff. On the Sale judgment see in particular Goodwin-
Gill, “YLS Sale Symposium: The Globalization of High Seas Interdiction. 
Sale’s Legacy and Beyond”, 16 March 2014, available at: 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/16/yale-sale-symposium-globalization-high-se 
as-interdiction-sales-legacy-beyond (10/17). 
4  See also, ex multis, www.fidh.org/en/issues/migrants-rights/eu-libya-
cooperation-serious-risks-of-migrants-rights-violations (10/17); ASGI 
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Communication of 25 January 2011, 11  states that: “To 
effectively cope with this current situation, part of the answer 
must lie in the Libyan authorities preventing smugglers from 
operating, and for the Libyan Coast Guard to have the capacity 
to better manage maritime border and ensure safe 
disembarkation on the Libyan coast. Of course, the Libyan 
authorities’ effort must be supported by the EU and Member 
States notably through training, providing advice, capacity 
building and other means of support”. 12  To this end the 
Commission recommends to “Deploy the full range of EU 
missions and projects to support the Libyan authorities in border 
management and migrant protection in Southern Libya”.13  
At the informal Summit held at La Valletta on 3 February 
2017 (the day after the signing of the MoU), the European 
Council agreed to a Declaration (known as the Malta 
Declaration) concerning the Central-Mediterranean rout, 14 
which states inter alia that “Where possible the EU and Member 
States will also step up cooperation with and assistance to 
Libyan regional and local communities and with international 
organizations active in the country” and that “Priority will be 
given to … training, equipment and support to the Libyan 
national coast guard and other relevant agencies”.15  
																																								 																				
11 European Commission, Migration on the Central Mediterranean route 
Managing flows, saving lives, Joint Communication to the European 
Parliament, the European Council and the Council of 25 January 2017, 
JOIN(2017) 4 final. 
12 Ibid., p. 6 
13 Ibid., p. 13. 
14 European Council, Declaration concerning the Central-Mediterranean 
route (Malta Declaration), adopted on 3 February 2017, available at:  
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/03-malta-declarati 
on/ (10/17). 
15 In its recent report, European Partnership Framework on Migration: 
Commission reports on results and lessons learnt one year on, issued on 13 
June 2017, the European Commission affirms that: “To respond to the 
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country” procedures. The idea of externalizing border controls is 
not new in the European debate: what is new is the disturbing 
systematic recourse to this practice by multiple arrangements 
with third countries (i.e Turkey, but also several African 
countries), exposing migrants and asylum seekers to serious 
human rights violations. As noted, a new form of “‘contactless 
control of cross-border’ has been implemented, with the aim not 
only to deter, but also to pro-actively restrain the onwards 
movement of refugees and migrants to European territory”.7 The 
so called Eu-Turkey deal8 inaugurated this new approach while 
the MoU we are going to analyze is a disconcerting “from bad to 
worse”9 evolution, given the well-known situation of migrants 
and asylum seekers in Libya as documented in the reports 
mentioned above.  
Despite this, the signing of the agreement between Italy and 
Libya was envisaged and encouraged at the European level. 
Already in the European Council Conclusions of 28 June 2016 
there is a clear endorsement of “the expanded role for Operation 
Sophia in ... training the Libyan Coast Guard”.10 In even more 
unambiguous words the European Commission, in its Joint 
																																								 																				
7  V. Moreno-Lax, M. Giuffré, “The Rise of Consensual Containment: 
From ‘Contactless Control’ to ‘Contactless Responsibility’ for Forced 
Migration Flows”, in S. Juss (ed), Research Handbook on International 
Refugee Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (forthcoming). 
8 On the nature of this agreement see Order of the General Court of 28 
February 2017, case T-192/16, NF v. European Council and E. Cannizzaro, 
“Denialism as the Supreme Expression of Realism – A Quick Comment on 
NF v. European Council”, in European Papers, 2017, Vol. 2, No 1, 
www.europeanpapers.eu (10/17), p. 251 et seq. 
9 M. Giuffré, “From Turkey to Libya: The EU Migration Partnership from 
Bad to Worse”, in Eurojus, 20 March 2017, http://rivista.eurojus.it/from-
turkey-to-libya-the-eu-migration-partnership-fro m-badto-worse/ (10/17). 
10 European Council, Conclusions, European Council meeting (28 June 
2016), available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releasespdf/2016/6/4724 
4643506_en.pdf (10 /17), para. 19. 
219
	
	 219	
Communication of 25 January 2011, 11  states that: “To 
effectively cope with this current situation, part of the answer 
must lie in the Libyan authorities preventing smugglers from 
operating, and for the Libyan Coast Guard to have the capacity 
to better manage maritime border and ensure safe 
disembarkation on the Libyan coast. Of course, the Libyan 
authorities’ effort must be supported by the EU and Member 
States notably through training, providing advice, capacity 
building and other means of support”. 12  To this end the 
Commission recommends to “Deploy the full range of EU 
missions and projects to support the Libyan authorities in border 
management and migrant protection in Southern Libya”.13  
At the informal Summit held at La Valletta on 3 February 
2017 (the day after the signing of the MoU), the European 
Council agreed to a Declaration (known as the Malta 
Declaration) concerning the Central-Mediterranean rout, 14 
which states inter alia that “Where possible the EU and Member 
States will also step up cooperation with and assistance to 
Libyan regional and local communities and with international 
organizations active in the country” and that “Priority will be 
given to … training, equipment and support to the Libyan 
national coast guard and other relevant agencies”.15  
																																								 																				
11 European Commission, Migration on the Central Mediterranean route 
Managing flows, saving lives, Joint Communication to the European 
Parliament, the European Council and the Council of 25 January 2017, 
JOIN(2017) 4 final. 
12 Ibid., p. 6 
13 Ibid., p. 13. 
14 European Council, Declaration concerning the Central-Mediterranean 
route (Malta Declaration), adopted on 3 February 2017, available at:  
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/03-malta-declarati 
on/ (10/17). 
15 In its recent report, European Partnership Framework on Migration: 
Commission reports on results and lessons learnt one year on, issued on 13 
June 2017, the European Commission affirms that: “To respond to the 
220
	
	 221	
individuate urgent solutions to the irregular migrants matter 
which cross Libya to go to Europe by sea, through the provision 
of temporary hosting camps in Libya, under the exclusive 
control of the Libyan Interior Ministry, in anticipation of 
repatriation or voluntary return to the countries of origin”. What 
is really surprising is that the only two possibilities envisaged 
are expulsion or voluntary return, forgetting that neither of these 
alternatives is acceptable for people in need of protection. 
In the following articles the Memorandum states in very clear 
words that “The Parties commit to start cooperation initiatives 
… in order to stem the illegal migrants’ fluxes19 and face the 
consequences coming from them”20 ... and that “the Italian party 
commits to provide technical and technologic support to the 
Libyan institutions” 21  … and financing of “the … hosting 
centers already active”.22 
It is the purpose of this Paper to analyze the consequences of 
the Memorandum, focusing in particular on an incident 
occurring on 10 May 2017, when Libyan authorities, in 
coordination with the Italian Search and Rescue Authority, 
intercepted 500 migrants in international waters and returned 
																																								 																				
19 Italic added. Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, cit. 
20 Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, cit. Art. 1 lett. A). 
21 Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, cit. Art. 1 lett. C). 
22 Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, cit., art. 2.2. However, as 
observed, “local authorities in Libya’s capital city Tripoli and elsewhere are 
mounting resistance to EU plans to stem migration flows towards Italy” 
because Libya cannot manage all migrants who will remain in Libya (see 
https://euobserver.com/migration/136837 (10/17)). On 14 February 2017, a 
complaint was filed to Tripoli Appeal Court claiming the unconstitutionality 
of the Memorandum, which has been signed by President al-Sarraj in Rome 
without seeking the approval of the Parliament and the Government (see 
www.internazionale.it/notizie/annalisa-camilli/2017/02/20/italia-libiamigranti 
-accordo-illegale (10/17)). 
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3. The Italy-Libya MoU of 2 February 2017 
 
On 2 February 2017 Italy signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Libya “on cooperation in the development 
sector, to combat illegal immigration, human trafficking and 
contraband and on reinforcing the border security”.16  
The MoU resurrects the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership 
and Cooperation signed in 2008 between then Italian Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Libyan dictator Gaddafi 
(suspended in 2011 after the fall of Gaddafi and the subsequent 
civil war), which opened “the way to the highly criticized push-
backs of boat - refugees to North Africa” 17  resulting in the 
famous Hirsi judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
of 23 February 2012, where Italy was found responsible for 
violations of Articles 3, 13 and 4 of Protocol 4.18 
It is important to focus first of all on the Preamble, which 
states: “Reaffirming the resolute determination of cooperating to 
																																								 																																							 																																							 										
ongoing crisis along the Central Mediterranean Route, the EU has deepened 
its work with North African partners and with Libya in particular”. 
16  Unofficial translation of the Italy-Libya Memorandum of 
Understanding signed on 2 February 2017 is available at: 
www.statewatch.org/news/2017/fe b/it-libya-mem o-eng.htm (10/17). 
17 M. Giuffré, From Turkey to Libya, cit. 
18 On the Hirsi judgment see M. Den Heijer, “Reflections on Refoulement 
and Collective Expulsion in the Hirsi Case”, in International Journal of 
Refugee Law, 2013, p. 265 ff.; A. Liguori, “La Corte europea dei diritti 
dell’uomo condanna l’Italia per i respingimenti verso la Libia del 2009: il 
caso Hirsi”, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2012, p. 415 ff.; F. Messineo, 
“Yet Another Mala Figura: Italy Breached Non-Refoulement Obligations by 
Intercepting Migrants’ Boats at Sea, Says ECtHR”, in EJIL: Talk!, 24 
February 2012, www.ejiltalk.org/yet-another-mala-figura-italy-breached-
non-refoulement-obligations-by-intercepting-migrants-boats-at-sea-says-ecth 
r/ (10/17); V. Moreno-Lax, “Hirsi v. Italy or the Strasbourg Court v. 
Extraterritorial Migration Control?”, in Human Rights Law Review, 2012, p. 
574 ff.; N. Napoletano, “La condanna dei ‘respingimenti’ operati dall’Italia 
verso la Libia da parte della Corte europea dei diritti umani: molte luci e 
qualche ombra”, in Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 2012, p. 436 ff. 
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basis of the available video, the entire interception and rescue 
operation “was carried out by the Libyan coast guard in a 
manner which put the refugees and migrants at grave risk of 
falling into the water and drowning” and was in clear contempt 
of standard practices. In fact, the Libyan Coast Guard came so 
close to the overcrowded boat on one side that it risked causing 
it to sink (“a manoeuvre which has in the past caused boats to 
capsize as the people on board tend to move all on the side of 
the vessel approaching to rescue them”26); moreover, the Libyan 
Coast Guard did not provide the rescued migrants with life-
jackets nor did it cast a lifeboat into the water; in addition, they 
didn’t even try to identify vulnerable people in need of urgent 
medical care.  
Some of the rescued migrants were transferred onto the 
Libyan vessel, while the majority remained in the wooden one. 
Both boats were taken back to Tripoli.  
 
5. Italy’s responsibility 
 
Could Italy be held responsible for the fate of those migrants 
rescued and towed back to Libya? To this end we must verify 
that the conduct: 
a) is ‘attributable’ to the State 
b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the 
State.  
With respect to point b), in light of the revelations in the 
above mentioned international Reports, there is no doubt that the 
migrants’ return to Libya violates at the very least 27  the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 										
25 See Amnesty Public Statement, Italy: Refugees and migrants in the 
central Mediterranean, cutting the lifelines, cit. 
26 Ibidem. 
27 On the possible violation of “the right to leave” see N. Markard, “The 
Right to Leave by Sea: Legal Limits on EU Migration Control by Third 
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them to Libya. As noted, 23  “[t]he incident represented an 
extremely worrying departure from the procedures so far applied 
to search and rescue operations of refugees and migrants in the 
central Mediterranean”. Up to that time, in fact, SAR operations, 
coordinated by the Italian Coast Guard Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Centre in Rome (MRCC Rome) - with the 
cooperation of EU vessels, Frontex, the EU military operation 
EUNAVFORMED SOPHIA, as well as merchant vessels and, 
above all, ONG boats -, were directed to safe disembarkations in 
Italy. 
 
4. The maritime operation of 10 May 2017 
 
On 10 May 2017 the Italian Coast Guard Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Centre in Rome (MRCC Rome) was contacted by 
refugees and migrants in distress on an overcrowded wooden 
boat in Libyan territorial waters.  
MRCC Rome alerted both the Libyan authorities and a vessel 
of the German NGO Sea-Watch which was in the vicinity. 
When the Libyan coast guard agreed to coordinate the rescue 
operation, the Italians informed the German NGO that the 
Libyan coast guard had “on scene command”. By the time the 
Sea-Watch vessel detected the boat in distress, the latter was 
already in international waters.  
The Libyan coast guard, ignoring the radio calls sent by Sea-
Watch, made a very dangerous high-speed manoeuvre, putting 
at risk its own crew and that of the German vessel. The scene 
was filmed:24  as observed by Amnesty International 25  on the 
																																								 																				
23 See Amnesty Public Statement, Italy: Refugees and migrants in the 
central Mediterranean, cutting the lifelines, available at: www.amnesty.org/ 
en/documents/eur30/6319/2017/en/ (10/17). 
24 For a detailed report of the incident, including a video, see: https://sea-
watch.org/en/libyan-navy-is-putting-sea-watch-crew-and-refugees-into-dange 
r-during-an-illegal-return-operation (10/17). 
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According to the International Law Commission, which 
regulates “Aid and Assistance” at article 16 ASR, 30 three 
conditions must be satisfied: “first, the relevant State organ or 
agency providing aid or assistance must be aware of the 
circumstances making the conduct of the assisted State 
internationally wrongful; secondly, the aid or assistance must be 
given with a view to facilitating the commission of that act, and 
must actually do so; and thirdly, the completed act must be such 
that it would have been wrongful had it been committed by the 
assisting State itself”.31  
Indeed, all three of these requirements can be considered met 
if migrants are taken back to Libya in compliance with the Italy-
Libya MoU32: 
1. Returning migrants back to Libya puts them at risk of 
torture and ill-treatment in Libya (and chain refoulement): both 
the prohibition of torture and the principle of non-refoulement 
are recognized as customary international law. Italy is well 
aware of the circumstances making the conduct of Libya 
internationally wrongful as several reports have clearly 
demonstrated the existence of risks to migrants once they are 
returned to Libya and Italy had already been condemned once 
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prohibition of torture due to the risk of torture and ill-treatment 
while in Libya and of refoulement from Libya to countries of 
origin (such as Eritrea and Sudan). 
With respect to point a), according to general international 
law, a State is directly responsible for the conduct of its organs 
and agents (the organ or agent exercising elements of 
government authority acts for the State, even when it exceeds its 
authority or acts contrary to instructions): this might entail direct 
responsibility on the part of Italy both if it adopts a decision to 
transfer migrants who have already arrived on its territory 
(Soering  jurisprudence), or if it intercepts a vessel carrying 
asylum seekers and diverts it to Libya (Hirsi case). 
In this particular case (the incident of 10 May 2017), because 
a State organ (Italy’s Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, 
MRCC) instructed the Libyan authorities to take “on scene 
command” (even though it was aware that such instruction 
would lead to the return of intercepted people back to an unsafe 
place: i.e. Libya), the outsourcing State is responsible for its 
own conduct.28  
In general: if there are no specific instructions but, as might 
happen as a consequence of the Italy-Libya MoU of 2 February 
2017, the Libyan Coast Guard intervenes with assets provided 
by Italy (boats, equipment or financial aid), then Italy may incur 
indirect responsibility for complicity.29  
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According to the International Law Commission, which 
regulates “Aid and Assistance” at article 16 ASR, 30 three 
conditions must be satisfied: “first, the relevant State organ or 
agency providing aid or assistance must be aware of the 
circumstances making the conduct of the assisted State 
internationally wrongful; secondly, the aid or assistance must be 
given with a view to facilitating the commission of that act, and 
must actually do so; and thirdly, the completed act must be such 
that it would have been wrongful had it been committed by the 
assisting State itself”.31  
Indeed, all three of these requirements can be considered met 
if migrants are taken back to Libya in compliance with the Italy-
Libya MoU32: 
1. Returning migrants back to Libya puts them at risk of 
torture and ill-treatment in Libya (and chain refoulement): both 
the prohibition of torture and the principle of non-refoulement 
are recognized as customary international law. Italy is well 
aware of the circumstances making the conduct of Libya 
internationally wrongful as several reports have clearly 
demonstrated the existence of risks to migrants once they are 
returned to Libya and Italy had already been condemned once 
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before for the same violation by the ECtHR in the Hirsi case. 
Since then, the risk of abuse of migrants in Libya has become 
increasingly worse. 
2. The substantial financial resources for the ʻhosting campsʼ, 
in addition to the provision of boats and equipment to the 
Libyan Coast Guard in order to “stem the flow of migrants”, is 
clearly giving assistance to Libya “with a view to facilitating the 
commission of the wrongful act”, i.e. the returning of migrants 
to Libya. It would be another matter if aid and assistance were 
given in good faith - for example, as aid for development -, and 
was subsequently misused by the receiving country to enforce 
border controls resulting in refoulement. 
3. Finally, there is no doubt that such inhuman treatment of 
migrants would be considered an internationally wrongful act if 
committed by Italy.  
Italy can therefore be held responsible for complicity for the 
aid given to Libya with the explicit aim of stemming the flow of 
migrants, irrespective of their protection needs, in addition 
obviously to Libya’s own responsibilities.  
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